Grabowski v. Carelink Cmty. Support Servs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 2611 EDA 2018,2611 EDA 2018
• Parties: Michelle GRABOWSKI, Appellant v. CARELINK COMMUNITY SUPPORT SERVICES, INC.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

230 A.3d 465

Michelle GRABOWSKI, Appellant

v.CARELINK COMMUNITY SUPPORT SERVICES, INC.

No. 2611 EDA 2018

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued August 27, 2019

Filed March 9, 2020

Michael Wiseman, Swarthmore, for appellant.

Anthony V. Pomeranz, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STRASSBURGER, J.^* , and COLINS, J.*

OPINION BY COLINS, J.:

Appellant Michelle Grabowski (Plaintiff) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (trial court) granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant Carelink Community Support Services, Inc. (Employer) in this work-place personal injury action. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

The following facts were established as undisputed on Employer's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff was an employee of Employer, working as a residential counselor at Employer's inpatient psychiatric and mental health service facility. Complaint ¶¶4-5; Answer and New Matter, Answer ¶¶4-5. On December 20, 2014, Plaintiff was injured at Employer's facility while performing her job duties when she was attacked by a resident of Employer's facility whom she was assisting. Complaint ¶¶6-8; Answer and New Matter, Answer ¶¶6-7. Between December 20, 2014, and August 1, 2016, Plaintiff received workers' compensation payments totaling $75,365.88 for her injuries in this attack. Answer and New Matter, New Matter ¶¶4-5 & Ex. A; Reply to New Matter ¶¶4-5. On August 1, 2016, Plaintiff entered into a compromise and release agreement (C & R Agreement) with Employer under which she was paid an additional lump sum of $40,000 to settle all claims with respect to her rights to workers' compensation benefits for the December 20, 2014 attack. Answer and New Matter, New Matter ¶5 & Ex. A; Reply to New Matter ¶5; C & R Agreement ¶10. Following a hearing on August 2, 2016, a workers' compensation judge (WCJ) issued a decision and order approving the C & R Agreement. 8/4/16 WCJ Decision.

On December 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Employer alleging that Employer was liable for the attack because it did not have safety procedures, equipment and a building design sufficient to protect Plaintiff from "potentially violent patients." Complaint ¶¶10-11. Plaintiff averred in her complaint that she was attacked "while working in the course and scope of her employment" and that the attacker "[w]ithout leave or notice or provocation, ... did lay violent hands upon the Plaintiff; fondling and groping her before knocking her to the floor and assaulting her in a sexual nature." Id. ¶¶7-8. Employer filed preliminary objections to the complaint, asserting that the action was barred by the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) and the workers' compensation proceeding concerning Plaintiff's December 20, 2014 injuries. The trial court overruled the preliminary objections without prejudice to Employer raising the same issues on a motion for judgment on the pleadings or for summary judgment. Trial Court Order, 5/18/17.

On June 7, 2017, Employer filed an answer and new matter endorsed with a Notice to Plead directing Plaintiff to respond to its new matter within 20 days. Employer admitted that the incident on which Plaintiff based her claims occurred while she was working in the scope of her employment, Answer and New Matter, Answer ¶¶5-7, but denied Plaintiff's averments of negligence. In its new matter, Employer pled the facts concerning Plaintiff's receipt of workers' compensation benefits and the C & R Agreement and asserted that Plaintiff's action was barred by the workers' compensation proceeding and its immunity under the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA, 77 P.S. § 481. Answer and New Matter, New Matter ¶¶2-11 & Ex. A. Plaintiff did not respond to Employer's new matter within 20 days.

On July 7, 2017, Employer filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings seeking judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff's action was barred by its immunity under the WCA and the workers' compensation proceeding. On July 20, 2017, Plaintiff filed an untimely reply to new matter admitting the facts concerning her receipt of workers' compensation benefits and the C & R Agreement and that her injury occurred in the course and scope of her employment, but denying the other new matter averments concerning Employer's WCA immunity as legal conclusions. Reply to New Matter ¶¶2-11. On July 25, 2017, Plaintiff filed a timely response to Employer's motion for judgment on the pleadings. In this response, Plaintiff admitted and attached as exhibits the C & R Agreement and WCJ's decision approving the C & R Agreement, but argued that her claim against Employer was not barred because it fell within the WCA's "personal animus" or "third party attack" exception. On August 2, 2018, the trial court entered an order granting Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that the action was barred by the WCA. This timely appeal followed.

Plaintiff states the issues that she raises in this appeal as follows:

1) Whether the Trial Court improperly granted judgment on the pleadings even though there are disputed issues of fact regarding the incident in question, especially the motivation behind the assault on the Plaintiff/Appellant.

2) Whether the Trial Court erred in determining that Plaintiff/Appellant's Complaint was not factually and legally sufficient to set forth a claim for damages outside the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act pursuant to the "Personal Animus"/"Third Party Attack" exception of the Act. See, 77 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 411.

3) Whether the Court failed to properly recognize and apply the "Personal Animus" exception of the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act to the facts of this action. Specifically, that the very nature of a sexual assault cannot be considered a work-related experience.

Appellant's Brief at 4 (footnote omitted). Although Plaintiff states these as three issues, they are more properly analyzed as arguments and alternative phrasing of a single issue: whether the trial court correctly held that, under the undisputed facts established by the pleadings, the attack on Plaintiff did not fall within the WCA's "personal animus" or "third party attack" exclusion and that Plaintiff's action was therefore barred by Employer's immunity under the WCA.¹ Employer argues that the trial court correctly held that the personal animus/third party attack exception did not apply to Plaintiff's claims and that Plaintiff's action is also barred as a matter of law by her receipt of workers' compensation benefits for this attack and the approved C & R Agreement.

Our standard of review of the trial court's grant of judgment on the pleadings is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown , 212 A.3d 1055, 1061 (Pa. Super. 2019). Judgment on the pleadings is properly entered where the pleadings and documents admitted in the pleadings establish that there are no disputed issues of fact and that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or where accepting the well-pleaded factual averments of the plaintiff's complaint as true, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kote v. Bank of New York Mellon , 169 A.3d 1103, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2017) ; Front Street Development Associates, L.P. v. Conestoga Bank , 161 A.3d 302, 307-08 (Pa. Super. 2017).

Under the WCA, an employer is required to pay workers' compensation benefits to an employee who sustains an injury in the course of her employment. 77 P.S. § 431 ; Whitmoyer v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Mountain Country Meats) , 646 Pa. 659, 186 A.3d 947, 948 (2018) ; LeDonne v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Graciano Corp.) , 936 A.2d 124, 129 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Workers' compensation replaces common law tort actions between employees and employers as a means for obtaining compensation for work injuries. Markle v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Caterpillar Tractor Co.) , 541 Pa. 148, 661 A.2d 1355, 1357 (1995).

The Legislature ... enacted the [WCA] to provide employees with compensation for injuries sustained within the scope of their employment. In exchange for the right to compensation without the burden of establishing fault, employees gave up their right to sue the employer in tort for injuries received in the course of employment.

Abbott v. Anchor Glass Container Corp. , 758 A.2d 1219, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2000) (quoting Snyder v. Specialty Glass Products, Inc. , 441 Pa.Super. 613, 658 A.2d 366 (1995) ).

Section 303(a) of the WCA provides in relevant part:

The liability of an employer under [the WCA] shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employes, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin or anyone otherwise entitled to damages in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death ....

77 P.S. § 481(a). Accordingly, where an injury is covered by the WCA, workers' compensation is the employee's sole remedy against her employer and the employee may not bring a tort action against her employer. 77 P.S. § 481(a) ; Kohler v. McCrory Stores , 532 Pa. 130, 615 A.2d 27, 30, 32 (1992) ; Burrell v. Streamlight, Inc. , 222 A.3d 1137, 1139 (Pa. Super. 2019) ; Soto v. Nabisco, Inc. , 32 A.3d 787, 790-91 (Pa. Super. 2011).²

The WCA excludes from its coverage injuries intentionally inflicted by third-parties for personal reasons that are unrelated to the employee's employment. 77 P.S. § 411(1) ; Kohler , 615 A.2d at 30-31 ; Krasevic v. Goodwill Industries of Central Pennsylvania, Inc. , 764 A.2d 561, 565 (Pa. Super. 2000) ; LeDonne , 936 A.2d at 129. Section 301(c)(1) of the WCA provides in relevant part:

The term "injury arising in the course of his employment," as used in this article, shall not include an injury caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employe because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an

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