Grace v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 3:08 MD 1932.

Decision Date27 February 2012
Docket NumberNo. 3:08 MD 1932.,3:08 MD 1932.
Citation845 F.Supp.2d 653
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
PartiesIrene GRACE, Plaintiff, v. FAMILY DOLLAR STORES, INC., Defendant.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Amy Schaeffer Ramsey, David K. Haase, Shanthi V. Gaur, Littler Mendelson PC, Chicago, IL, James Norman Boudreau, Philadelphia, PA, Jerry Howard Walters, Jr., Stephen D. Dellinger, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Charlotte, NC, Margaret Parnell Hogan, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Denver, CO, for Defendant.

ORDER

GRAHAM C. MULLEN, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support (Doc. No. 148); Plaintiff's Response in Opposition (Doc. No. 174); Defendant's Reply (Doc. No. 189), and Defendant's Supplement to its Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 784).1 For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.

FACTS2

Plaintiff, Amanda Echols (“Echols”) began working at Family Dollar, Store Number269,3 in 2002 as an assistant manager.4 (Doc. No. 149, Echols Dep. at 23.) 5 It was not long before Echols was offered a promotion to store manager, which she accepted. ( Id. at 26.) At the time Echols became a store manager, Family Dollar paid her a salary of $545 per week. (Doc. No. 149, Morgan Decl. ¶ 4; Echols Dep. at 30.) 6 In November 2000, she received a pay increase to $575.46 per week. ( Id.) In November 2004, she received another pay increase to $615 per week. ( Id.) In October 2005, she received another pay increase to $635 per week, which she received throughout the remainder of her employment with Family Dollar. ( Id.) Echols resigned from her employment with Family Dollar in July of 2006. (Doc. No. 149, Echols Dep. at 40.) During the relevant time period, Echols worked an average of 55.24 hours per week as store manager. (Doc. No. 784, Debrocq Decl. ¶ 4.)

The record shows that of the thirty-five (35) nonexempt employees who worked in the store where Echols was the store manager from 2004 to 2006, approximately twenty-six (26) earned $6.25 or less per hour (even using the highest wage for those employees whose wages changed over time, the nonexempt employees working at Echols' stores received an average hourly wage of $6.28 per hour). ( Id. at ¶ 6.) Echols, on a daily basis, directed the work of her employees. (Doc. No. 149, Echols Dep. at 44.) Family Dollar's records reflect that Echols managed at least 80 employee hours 97.54% of the time she was a store manager during the relevant time period. (Doc. No. 149, Morgan Decl. ¶ 5.)

Echols contends that she devoted 99% of her time to performing nonexempt work, but admitted that she was also the person responsible for the overall management of the store for the entire time she was in the store. (Doc. No. 149, Echols Dep. at 42, 126, 189–90.) For example, Echols confirmed that she often supervised and directed her employees while she was performing non-managerial tasks. ( Id. at 46, 98–100)

Echols' managerial tasks included training, supervising, and directing employees ( Id. at 16, 42, 44, 46, 87–88, 93–94, 98–101), completing the store's financial paperwork ( Id. at 15, 160, 162–63), apportioning hours to employees ( Id. at 32, 35, 37), and being responsible for both employee and customer safety ( Id. at 155, 157). Echols also decided how to adjust the schedule ( Id. at 32, 35); how to assign and apportion work among herself and her employees ( Id. at 42, 44); how to review employment applications and interview candidates ( Id. at 47–50); how to discipline employees ( Id. at 112, 130–33, 136–39); how to conduct performance reviews of her employees ( Id. at 101–03, 107, 141); how to arrange and decorate certain displays ( Id. at 33); and how to deal with problems with merchandise, including markdowns of damaged merchandise ( Id. at 33). Additionally, Echols conceded that she had the flexibility to choose what tasks to perform herself and what tasks to delegate to her employees. ( Id. at 42, 44.)

Echols specifically testified that she was actively involved in the interviewing and employee screening process, and that her district manager almost always followed her recommendations. ( Id. at 47–52, 54, 76–77.) Echols selected who she interviewed by first sifting though stacks of employment applications and weeded out anybody she did not want to interview. ( Id. at 47–49) Additionally, the district manager did not veto Echols' recommendations to interview candidates. ( Id. at 51.) Echols also made recommendations for the promotion and demotion of employees. ( Id. at 149–50.) Specifically, Echols recommended that clerk Mark Cagle be promoted to the Assistant Manager position, and the district manager followed that recommendation. ( Id.)

As store manager, Echols reported to a district manager. Echols testified that her district manager would visit the store once a week, ranging from 10–15 minutes to half a day. ( Id. at 193, 195–96.) Additionally, Echols testified that she spoke to her district manager daily by telephone and e-mail. ( Id. at 193.) Moreover, based on Family Dollar's records, District 129, which included the store managed by Echols during the relevant time period, included approximately twenty-one (21) stores. (Doc. No. 149, Morgan Decl. ¶ 3.) The district spanned approximately 40 miles from north to south and approximately 100 miles from east to west. ( Id.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party always bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion,” and identifying the matter “it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the movant has met the initial burden, “the non-moving party ‘may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1381 (4th Cir.1995) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). This is particularly important where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof. Hughes, 48 F.3d at 1381. A genuine issue for trial exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict.

When considering summary judgment motions, courts must view the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Austin v. Clark Equip. Co., 48 F.3d 833, 835 (4th Cir.1995). In reviewing the whole record, the Court must remember to “disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe” and therefore only “give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that [the] evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

DISCUSSION

The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) requires that an employee receive overtime pay if he or she works more than forty hours a week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The FLSA, however, exempts from this requirement “any employee employed in a bona fide executive ... capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). The Department of Labor (“DOL”) has promulgated regulations which further describe and interpret the scope of this exemption. Due to the time span of Echols' claims, two different sets of DOL regulations apply to this analysis: the regulations in effect prior to August 23, 2004 (the “pre–2004 regulations”) and the regulations that went into effect on August 23, 2004 (the “current regulations”).

The pre–2004 regulations set forth both a “short” and “long” test for determining whether an employee qualifies as an exempt executive. See29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (pre–2004). The short test is used for employees who are compensated on a salary basis at a rate of at least $250 per week.729 C.F.R. § 541.1(f) (pre–2004). Under the short test, an employee qualifies as an executive if (1) her primary duty consists of the management of the enterprise and (2) includes the customary and regular direction of the work of two or more other employees. 29 C.F.R. § 541.119(a) (pre–2004); 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(f) (pre–2004).

Similarly, the current regulations 8 provide that an employee qualifies as an executive if: (1) she is compensated on a salary basis at a rate of at least $455 per week; (2) her primary duty is management of the enterprise; (3) she customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other employees; and (4) she has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight. 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a).

The DOL has also promulgated additional regulations which further describe and define these tests; these additional regulations are discussed below. Because Echols' claim covers the period of July 4, 2004 9 to July 2006, it is governed, in differing degrees, by both pre–2004 and current regulations. The application of the different regulations, however, is not material to the outcome of this case.

1. Family Dollar Satisfies the Salary Basis Test

At the time Echols became a store manager, Family Dollar paid her a salary of $545 per week. (Doc....

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