Grace v. Maine Employment Sec. Commission

• Citation: 398 A.2d 1233
• Parties: Joann C. GRACE v. MAINE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION.
• Decision Date: 19 March 1979
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 1233

398 A.2d 1233

Joann C. GRACE v. MAINE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 19, 1979.

Childs, McKinley, Emerson & Rovzar by Roderick R. Rovzar, Portland (orally), for plaintiff.

Patricia M. McDonough (orally), Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for defendants.

Fred E. Hanscom, Rumford, for Rumford Community Hospital.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and POMEROY, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY, GODFREY and NICHOLS, JJ.

McKUSICK, Chief Justice.

Claimant Joann C. Grace appeals from an order of the Superior Court affirming a decision of the Maine Employment Security Commission (hereafter Commission) disqualifying claimant from receiving unemployment compensation benefits on grounds that Grace refused to accept an offer of suitable employment as required by 26 M.R.S.A. § 1193(3) (Supp.1978). The sole issue on appeal to the Superior Court, and again to this court, is whether the Commission was correct in concluding that the part-time employment offered to Grace was "suitable" as defined by the applicable statutory provision.

We deny the appeal.

The relevant facts are not disputed. Grace had been employed full time as a lab technician by Rumford Community Hospital at an hourly rate of $2.73. On July 12, 1975, she was laid off. On September 18, 1975, while Grace was still unemployed, Rumford Community Hospital offered her a part-time job as an E.K.G. technician at an hourly wage of $2.40 for a 20-hour week. Grace did not accept the job offer. The Commission ¹ subsequently disqualified her from receiving unemployment compensation on the ground that "the claimant refused to accept an offer of suitable work for which she was reasonably fitted . . . ." Grace appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. § 1194(9), and the Superior Court affirmed the Commission's decision.

26 M.R.S.A. § 1193 provides that "(a)n individual shall be disqualified for benefits . . . (f)or the duration of his unemployment subsequent to his having refused to accept an offer of suitable work for which he is reasonably fitted . . . ." Further, section 1193(3)(A) delineates the factors to be considered by the Commission in determining whether the proffered employment is suitable:

"In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, the commission shall consider the degree of risk involved to his health, safety and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, his experience and Prior earnings, his length of unemployment and prospects for securing local work in his customary occupation, and the distance of the available work from his residence." (Emphasis added)

Grace argues that the Superior Court erred in calculating the prior earnings factor. The reviewing court observed that the proffered job involved a wage cut of only 33cents per hour and concluded that "the offer was of suitable work as the cut was only 13cents on an hourly basis." Grace contends that instead of comparing hourly wage rates, the Superior Court should have compared her total weekly earnings (I. e., hours X hourly wages) in her old job with her expected total weekly earnings in the proffered position. Since the new job was only part time, application of Grace's formula would have led to the conclusion that the new job entailed a reduction in total earnings of 56%.

We agree with the Superior Court's decision. An examination of section 1193(3) reveals that the Commission must compare Both wage rates and total earnings in the old and proffered jobs in determining whether the proffered employment is suitable. That section directs the Commission to consider not only the "prior earnings" of the claimant, but also his "prior training" and "experience," I. e., the claimant's particular job skill. In the employment market, equivalent skills generally command equivalent wages. Consequently, comparing wage rates in the old and proffered jobs provides a rough measure of whether the new job matches the claimant's prior experience and training.

For example, in the instant case, claimant testified that although she had not previously worked as an E.K.G. technician, she had received preliminary training for the job in connection with her previous position as a lab technician. The similarity in the skill requirement for each position is reflected in a wage differential of only 33cents per hour. In short, the Superior Court's comparison of the wage rates in the old and proffered jobs was entirely proper.

The sole remaining question is whether the Commission was correct in concluding that a reduction in total earnings of 56% Did not render the proffered job unsuitable. Again, we agree with the Superior Court's decision. The Commission's assessment of the suitability of a proffered position rests on an evaluation of all the factors included in section 1193(3). Lowell v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 159 Me. 177, 190 A.2d 271 (1963). No single factor is determinative. As stated in Lowell, supra, the claimant's length of unemployment may influence the Commission's assessment of whether a particular job offer is suitable:

" '(W)hile a woman may be justified in refusing as unsuitable, work offered to her immediately after her separation from her job, the situation may change after the lapse of a considerable time during which she has remained unemployed. Work which was unsuitable at the beginning of her unemployment may become suitable when consideration is given to the length of unemployment and the...