Grace v. Wainwright

• Decision Date: 28 March 1991
• Docket Number: No. 85-530-Civ-J-16.,85-530-Civ-J-16.
• Citation: 761 F. Supp. 1520
• Parties: Jerry Thomas GRACE, Plaintiff, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

761 F. Supp. 1520

Jerry Thomas GRACE, Plaintiff, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, et al., Defendants.

No. 85-530-Civ-J-16.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division.

March 28, 1991.

Jerry Thomas Grace, pro se.

Cecilia Bradley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, Fla., for defendants.

OPINION

JOHN H. MOORE, II, District Judge.

I. Status

Plaintiff, an inmate of the Florida penal system proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 9, 1985. On June 13, 1985, Plaintiff paid $2.00 as a partial filing fee and thereafter paid $118.00 on October 19, 1989. Plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis in the action. On June 14, 1985, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint because he had failed to set forth his claims adequately in his original complaint. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on June 28, 1985. Thereafter, on July 8, 1985, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on August 16, 1985.

II. Plaintiff's Allegations/Claims as Set Forth in the Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff was confined, as a prisoner of the state of Florida, at Florida State Prison in Starke, Florida, at the time he filed the complaint. Plaintiff is now confined at Union Correctional Institution, in Raiford, Florida. He names as the Defendants the following individuals and/or entities: Louie L. Wainwright, the former Secretary of the Department of Corrections; Richard L. Dugger, the former Superintendent of Florida State Prison and the current Secretary of the Department of Corrections; Dr. Nguyen, W.F. Mathews; the state of Florida; and, the Florida Department of Corrections. Plaintiff states the state of Florida and the Florida Department of Corrections are joined as Defendants for the purposes of assessing attorneys' fees pursuant to Glover v. Alabama Department of Corrections, 734 F.2d 691 (11th Cir.1984).

In January 1980, Plaintiff was transferred to Florida State Prison. "For the most part of this five (5) year period", Plaintiff was denied outside physical exercise, sunshine, and fresh air. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at 2. At the time of the filing of the complaint, Plaintiff was confined twenty-four (24) hours a day in a protective confinement wing (V wing) within Florida State Prison because of his inability to live safely in open population. In this type of confinement, he was forced to relinquish all opportunities to acquire outside exercise, sunshine, and fresh air. Defendants Wainwright and Dugger are aware that Plaintiff does not receive any outside exercise, sunshine, and fresh air, but have continuously refused to eliminate these deprivations. Plaintiff claims that, as a result of the denial of outside exercise, sunshine, and fresh air, he suffers physical, emotional, and psychological injuries. Specifically, he states he has been physically injured by "contracting emphysema and weakness of joints and muscles." Id. at 3.

Plaintiff alleges he was diagnosed with emphysema in April 1985, but has not received any treatment for it. He states, in July 1982, his neck, back, and shoulder were injured, and he was examined by Defendant Mathews on that same day, but "no exrays or serious examination of these complaints until Xrays taken June 1985 that show damage." Id. at 4. He concedes he was given motrin for his shoulder in August 1985, but no examination of his back or neck have been done. He further asserts he has ankle, knee, and leg problems and was examined by Dr. Nguyen in January or February of 1985. Plaintiff concludes:

The conditions, restrictions and constraints and injuries suffered by plaintiff at the hands of the defendants constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in contravention of plaintiffs rights under the Eight Amendment of the United States Constitution, and is punishment without due process in violation of plaintiffs rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Id. at 5.

III. Pending Motions for Summary Judgment

On February 18, 1986, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff responded on March 14, 1986. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment was denied on May 16, 1986. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on August 11, 1986. Defendants filed a Response and Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment on August 20, 1986. Plaintiff responded on September 4, 1986, November 24, 1986, and November 26, 1986. In support of their motions for summary judgment, the Court, on April 17, 1987, ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding Plaintiff's exercise claim. Plaintiff submitted a supplemental brief on May 13, 1987, and Defendants submitted their supplemental brief on May 18, 1987. On November 2, 1987, the Court denied Plaintiff's August 11, 1986, Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' August 20, 1986, Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment.

On December 21, 1989, the Court granted Defendants' December 4, 1989, Response to Court order, requesting five months to file a motion for summary judgment. "This time was to allow Defendants' sic to have Plaintiff examined by physicians in order to properly address the issue of whether lack of outside exercise had caused a serious illness to Plaintiff." Defendants' Motion for Enlargement of Time, filed August 13, 1990, at 1. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on August 31, 1990. The Court, on November 7, 1990, ordered Plaintiff to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment and notified him to respond by referring to the Court's orders of March 13, 1986, and August 21, 1986, which contained instructions on how to properly respond to summary judgment motions. Plaintiff responded on November 28, 1990, and filed his own Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants responded to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on December 10, 1990, and adopted by reference their August 31, 1990, Motion for Summary Judgment.

Summary judgment should be entered only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Warrior Tombigbee Transportation Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir.1983) (quoting rule). "The party seeking summary judgment bears the exacting burden of demonstrating that there is no dispute as to any material fact in the case." Id. "In assessing whether the movant has met this burden, the courts should view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Id. (quoting Clemons v. Dougherty County, Georgia, 684 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir.1982)). See also Thrasher v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 734 F.2d 637 (11th Cir.1984).

Mere verification of a party's own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment for

when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). See also Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984). The "mere possibility that a factual dispute may exist, without more, is not sufficient to overcome a convincing presentation by the moving party." Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 445 (2nd Cir.1980). More importantly, summary judgment is not only proper, but required, when a party's response to the court's notice consists of nothing "more than a repetition of his conclusional allegations." Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034 (11th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1010, 102 S.Ct. 2303, 73 L.Ed.2d 1306 (1982). Because there are no genuine issues of material fact, this Court is of the opinion that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted and judgment should be entered in favor of the Defendants.

IV. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Federal courts are normally reluctant to interfere with matters of internal prison administration. Hooks v. Kelley, 463 F.2d 1210, 1211 (5th Cir.1972); see also Newman v. Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir.1982). As the Supreme Court stated in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1878, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (citations omitted):

The problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a corrections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison administrators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.

In recognition of the judiciary's deference, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated:

Such considerations of prison administration are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 547-48, 99 S.Ct. at 1878-79, quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2806, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974); see Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2539, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977).

Of course, a policy of judicial restraint does not include failure to take cognizance of prisoners' valid constitutional claims. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974). "When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal...