O'Grady v. Safety-Kleen Sys.
| Decision Date | 30 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-11814-ADB |
| Parties | PATRICIA O'GRADY, individually and as Executrix of the Estate of JOHN W. PARSELS, Plaintiff, v. SAFETY-KLEEN SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
BURROUGHS, D.J.
In this wrongful death action, Plaintiff Patricia O'Grady ("O'Grady"), as the widow of John W. Parsels ("Parsels") and the executrix of his estate, alleges that Defendant Safety-Kleen Systems, Inc. ("Safety-Kleen") knowingly included carcinogens in its automobile parts solvents and cleaners, and that Parsels' exposure to Safety-Kleen products ultimately caused his death. .
Presently before the Court are Safety-Kleen's motion to dismiss, [ECF No. 8], and O'Grady's motion for remand to state court, [ECF No. 17]. For the following reasons, Safety-Kleen's motion to dismiss, [ECF No. 8], is DENIED, and O'Grady's motion for remand, [ECF No. 17], is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part, insofar as O'Grady requests jurisdictional discovery.
For the purposes of this motion, the facts are drawn from the amended complaint and evidence the parties have proffered in support of their jurisdictional arguments. Safety-Kleen manufactures, recycles, leases, and services "automobile parts washers and solvents" nationwide. [ECF No. 28 at 2; ECF No. 29-1 at 3]. Safety-Kleen is incorporated in Wisconsin, [ECF No. 28 at 2; ECF No. 1-3 at 1], and is registered as a foreign corporation in Massachusetts. [ECF No. 1-3 at 1].
On December 28, 2012, Safety-Kleen was acquired by Clean Harbors, Inc. ("Clean Harbors"). [ECF No. 28 at 3]. Clean Harbors is a "holding company organized in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with the sole function of owning a multitude of subsidiaries." [ECF No. 28 at 3]. According to Safety-Kleen, Clean Harbors does not have any of its own employees. [ECF No. 29-1 at 4]. It "operates a 'shared services' model for the various entities it owns." [ECF No. 28 at 3]. Under this model, Safety-Kleen and "its corporate siblings" share with Clean Harbors "certain executive operational components" such as the "location for corporate and tax-related filings . . ." [ECF No. 28 at 3; ECF No. 29-1 at 4].
O'Grady is, and Parsels was, a resident of Florida. [ECF No. 22 at 5; Am. Compl. ¶ 3]. Parsels routinely used Safety-Kleen's solvents and cleaners for automobile parts throughout his career as an auto mechanic in Florida and also for his "automotive restoration hobby work." [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-20]. O'Grady claims that Safety-Kleen's solvents and cleaners contained carcinogens, such as aromatic hydrocarbons, and that Parcels' exposure to these carcinogens caused him to be diagnosed with myelodysplastic syndrome in 2008 and acute myelogenous leukemia in 2017, resulting in his death on May 11, 2017. [Am. Compl. ¶ 5]. O'Grady nowasserts various causes of action against Safety-Kleen, including product liability, breach of warranty, unfair trade practices, negligence, wrongful death, and loss of consortium. [Id.].
O'Grady originally filed her complaint in Plymouth County Superior Court on May 10, 2019. [ECF No. 1-1.]. Safety-Kleen was served on July 25, 2019, and removed the case to this Court on August 23, 2019, asserting jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. [ECF No. 1 at 1].
On August 30, 2019, Safety-Kleen filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, [ECF No. 8], claiming, inter alia, that the company was not subject to suit in Massachusetts for the claims asserted therein. O'Grady filed her opposition on September 27, 2019. [ECF No. 22]. In the meantime, O'Grady filed a motion to remand to state court on September 23, 2019. [ECF No. 17]. Safety-Kleen opposed the motion to remand on October 23, 2019. [ECF No. 28].
O'Grady bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists over Safety-Kleen. A Corp. v. All Am. Plumbing, Inc., 812 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 2016) () (citing Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2008)). "When a district court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing . . . the 'prima facie' standard governs its determination." United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 618 (1st Cir. 2001). Under the prima facie standard, the plaintiff must proffer "evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to support findings of all facts essential to personal jurisdiction." A Corp., 812 F.3d at 58 (quoting Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d at 26). "[P]laintiffs may not rely on unsupported allegations in their pleadings," and are instead "obliged to adduce evidence of specific facts"supporting jurisdiction. Platten v. HG Berm. Exempted Ltd., 437 F.3d 118, 134 (1st Cir. 2006) (). The Court takes as true whatever properly documented facts a plaintiff proffers, construes those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and considers facts put forward by the defendant to the extent they are uncontradicted. See Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d at 26; Platten, 437 F.3d at 134.
O'Grady has seemingly staked her entire claim on the theory that a Massachusetts court would be able to exercise general jurisdiction over Safety-Kleen. [Am. Compl. ¶ 1]. She does not allege that this Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Safety-Kleen, and there is no apparent support for such in any case. If this Court can exercise general jurisdiction, however, the case will have to be remanded to Massachusetts Superior Court, as Safety-Kleen would then have its principal place of business in Massachusetts and thereby qualify as a citizen of Massachusetts, with the result that the case cannot be removed to federal court. See 28 U.S.C § 1441(b); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 2; Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014).
"To establish personal jurisdiction in a diversity case, a plaintiff must satisfy both the forum state's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." C.W. Downer & Co. v. Bioriginal Food & Sci. Corp., 771 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 204 (1st Cir. 1994)). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allows a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident only where the exercise of jurisdiction "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations omitted).
The Massachusetts long-arm statute also limits when courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents. Because "the long-arm statute imposes specific constraints on the exercise of personal jurisdiction that are not coextensive with the parameters of due process . . . a determination under the long-arm statute is to precede consideration of the constitutional question." SCVNGR, Inc. v. Punchh, Inc., 85 N.E.3d 50, 52 (Mass. 2017); see also Cossart v. United Excel Corp., 804 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2015) ().
O'Grady asserts that because Safety-Kleen is a resident of Massachusetts, the Court has personal jurisdiction over it under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 2, which allows a court to "exercise personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintaining his or its principal place of business in, this commonwealth as to any cause of action." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 2; [Am. Compl. ¶ 1]. O'Grady also argues that Parcels "was first injured by the wrongful acts and/or negligent conduct of the Defendant in [Plymouth County, Massachusetts]," [Am. Compl. ¶ 1], seemingly invoking Massachusetts General Laws ch. 223A, § 3(c), which provides personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant where the defendant "acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the person's . . . causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this commonwealth . . . ." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3(c).
Safety-Kleen denies that its principal place of business is in Massachusetts and asserts that none of the eight grounds for personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant underMassachusetts General Laws ch. 223A, § 3 subject Safety-Kleen to suit in Massachusetts.1 [ECF No. 9 at 6-7].
Because O'Grady only relies on Massachusetts General Laws ch. 223A, § 2 and § 3(c) to establish this Court's personal jurisdiction over Safety-Kleen, the Court will only evaluate O'Grady's arguments pursuant to those sections of the Massachusetts long-arm statute.
Under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 223A, § 2, a court may "exercise personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintaining his or its principal place of business in, this commonwealth as to any cause of action." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 2. Here, because Safety-Kleen is organized under the laws of Wisconsin, [ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 1-3 at 1], it would have to maintain its principal place of business in Massachusetts for this court to be able to exercise personal jurisdiction under ch. 223A, § 2.
O'Grady argues that Safety-Kleen maintains its principal place of business in Norwell, Massachusetts, thus making personal jurisdiction appropriate under ch. 223A, § 2. [ECF No. 22 at 3-4; Am. Compl. ¶ 1]. Safety-Kleen...
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