Graff v. Queen Insurance Company
| Decision Date | 12 June 1888 |
| Citation | 38 N.W. 696,38 Minn. 501 |
| Parties | Andrew De Graff, Executor, v. Queen Insurance Company |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Ramsey county, Kelly, J., presiding, refusing a new trial. The action was brought by plaintiff's testator, Charles A. De Graff, who died after verdict.
Order affirmed.
Spooner & Spooner, for appellant.
W. D Cornish, for respondent.
This was an action on a policy of insurance, to recover the value of a brood mare, which was killed by lightning, April 20 1886. The policy was issued in November, 1882, to plaintiff's testate, the owner of the farm described, and insured him, for the period of five years, against loss or damage by fire to the property described, to the amount of $ 7,500, distributed as follows: $ 1,000 on his one and one-half story wood dwelling; $ 250 on his household furniture therein; $ 3,000 on his wood barn; $ 2,500 on live-stock therein; $ 750 on his wood hog-house, -- all situated on N. E. 1/4 section 4, township 107, range 24 township of Aulton, Waseca county, Minn. It was stipulated in the policy that it should cover loss or damage by lightning whether fire ensued or not. The policy also provides "that the said company shall not be liable for more than the sum or sums insured, nor the interest of the insured, except as hereinafter provided, as specified upon the property described in the places herein set forth, and not elsewhere." At the time this policy was issued, the live-stock on the farm, (including this mare,) when housed, were usually kept in the barn described in the policy, but were turned out to pasture during the summer. After the policy was issued, and shortly before the loss, the insured built upon the farm a new barn, 200 or 300 feet distant from the old one. Four or five weeks before the loss, he put the mare in the new barn, where she remained until killed by lightning. The insured testified that this removal was temporary; but he stated no definite time when he intended to return the mare to the old barn, and the evidence shows that the only reason for the change was one of convenience in caring for the animal. No claim is made that the risks insured against were greater in one barn than in the other. The contentions of the appellant are (1) that, under the policy, the mare remained insured only when in the wood barn described, and not elsewhere; and, (2,) even if the policy is not construed thus strictly, she would remain insured only while removed temporarily for some purpose incident to the ordinary use and enjoyment of the property; and that the removal to the new barn, for a period of several weeks, for no particular reason except the matter of convenience, was not a temporary but a permanent removal. Under the view we take of the case, both of these contentions can be disposed of together. The appellant rests his construction of the policy mainly upon the two clauses which we have italicized.
In the construction of such policies, there are two elementary rules: First. The language of a condition in a policy, being that of the insurer, selected by him, and intended for his benefit, must be clear and unambiguous, and any reasonable doubt as to its meaning must be resolved in favor of the insured. The tendency of such stipulations is to narrow the range of the underwriter's principal obligation; and, again, if the meaning is ambiguous, it is his own fault in not making use of more definite terms in which to express it. Chandler v. St. Paul F. &. M. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85; Loy v. Home Ins. Co., 24 Minn. 315; Cargill v. Millers', etc., Ins. Co., 33 Minn. 90, (22 N.W. 6;) Boright v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co., 34 Minn. 352, (25 N.W. 796;) Olson v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 35 Minn. 432, (29 N.W. 125.) A second rule is that the language of a policy must be construed with reference to the nature of the property to which it is applied. Such policies must be presumed to have been made with reference to the purposes for which such property is ordinarily used, as well as the manner in which it is usually kept. Holbrook v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 25 Minn. 229; Boright v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co., supra. It may be added, as within this rule, that the terms and conditions of a policy should be construed, if possible, so as to give them a meaning reasonably applicable to the kind of insurance upon the particular species of property insured.
Turning now to the two clauses in the policy relied on by appellant and taking up the...
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