Grafton v. Cnty. of Nassau, Armor Corr. Health of N.Y., Inc.
| Decision Date | 15 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | 15-CV-4564 (SJF)(GRB) |
| Parties | KENNETH GRAFTON, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF NASSAU, ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH OF NEW YORK, INC., JOSE ARMAS, M.D., and CHILDA MARGOS, M.D., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Pending before the Court is the motion of defendants Armor Correctional Health Services of New York, Inc. ("Armor"), the County of Nassau ("the County"), Jose Armas, M.D. ("Dr. Armas") and Childa Margos, M.D. ("Dr. Margos") (collectively, "defendants") seeking dismissal of all claims asserted against them by plaintiff Kenneth Grafton ("plaintiff") pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 12(b)(6)") and the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted.
At all relevant times, plaintiff was an inmate confined to the Nassau County CorrectionalCenter ("NCCC"). . Armor is a private company that provides medical services to inmates at the NCCC pursuant to a contract with the County. (Id., ¶¶ 4-5). Dr. Armas is allegedly the sole owner and shareholder of Armor, (id., ¶ 6); and Dr. Margos is allegedly the chief medical officer of Armor at the NCCC. (Id. ¶ 8).
Plaintiff alleges that he "suffers from Rheumatoid Arthritis, Osteo-Arthritis, Osteoporosis, Osteopenia, Neuralgia, Neuritis, Neurasthenia, Neurosis, Dermatitis, Mental and Emotional injury as well as bodily injury." (Compl., ¶ 12). According to plaintiff, he "has chronic pain throughout his entire body, a loss of cartlidge [sic] in between joints, deteriation [sic] and weakness of bones, no full range of motion, deformity, loss of strength, back pain and spasms and a big long nasty looking [sic] scar that runs from the right side of the chest, under the right armpit and all over the right side of his back which was received while in the care of [Armor]." (Id., ¶ 13). Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, (1) that he "was denied his right to be taken to the hospital and have test [sic] ran [sic] on him to see what caused his skin to break out with an infection of open sores[,]" (id., ¶ 14); (2) that Armor staff members told him "that they will not send him out to see a Dermatologist for treatment of his skin for the permanent scars that he received in their (Armor/Armas) care . . . ," (id.); (3) that he "has also been denied the right to see a pain management specialist and a neurologist for his condition which is not improving in the care of [Armor]," (id., ¶ 15); and (4) that he "is not receiving the proper pain medication for his chronic pain from the chronic disease that he suffers from, as prescribed by specialist in that field." (Id., ¶ 16).
On July 2, 2015, plaintiff "put in a sick call slip requesting to be seen by [Dr. Margos]," (Compl., ¶ 17), and was seen by Dr. Margos that same day. (Id.) According to plaintiff, he askedDr. Margos "to override the Armor/Armas policies of blanket denial [of] 1) pain management medication; and 2) access to a specialist[,]" (id., ¶ 18), but Dr. Margos responded "in sum and substance, [that] the only time [she] will override the pain medication policy is if [an inmate] ha[s] 'something like terminal cancer' and the only time [she] will send [an inmate] out to the hospital to see a specialist [is] if it is 'something life threatning [sic].'" (Id., ¶ 19). Plaintiff further alleges, inter alia, that Dr. Margos commented, (Id., ¶ 20).
On or about July 22, 2015, plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983")2 alleging, inter alia, (1) that the County was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by adopting a "policy to outsource the medical care of inmates confined in the NCCC" to Armor, (Compl., ¶ 4; see also id., ¶ 22); (2) that Armor and Dr. Armas were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by "develop[ing] and promulgat[ing] official policies or customs . . . [of] [b]lanket denial[s] of pain management medication . . . [and] access to community-based providers, both specialist and facilities, notwithstanding medical needs," (id., ¶ 7; see also id., ¶ 23); and (3) that Dr. Margos was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by "refus[ing] to exercise her authority to override Armor/Armas policy, notwithstanding [his] medical needs[,]" (id., ¶ 24). Plaintiff seeks, inter alia: (1) judgment declaring that the policies of the County, Armor and Dr. Armas, and "the acts of [Dr. Margos] in refusing to exercise her authority to override the policies of Armor and Armas," (id., §VII(A)(3)), subject him "and others" to cruel and unusual punishment; (2) injunctive relief (a) enjoining the policies of the County, Armor and Dr. Armas, and (b) compelling defendants (i) "to have a Dermatologist treat [his] skin," (id., § VII(B)(3)), (ii) to have him "diagnosed by a Neurologist to see if he is being treated properly by [Armor and Dr. Armas] for his nerve condition," (id.), and (iii) to have him "see a Rheumatologist and a pain management specialist so he can receive better and stronger pain medication since no treatment plan or diagnoses of [Armor and Dr. Armas] is improving or helping [his] condition[,]" (id.) (emphasis added); and (3) "compensatory, punitive and special damages" in the total amount of ten million dollars ($10,000,000.00), together with interest, "reasonable attorney fees" and costs. (Id., § VII(C)).
Defendants now move pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and the PLRA to dismiss plaintiff's claims in their entirety for failure to state a claim for relief and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The standard of review on a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that a plaintiff plead sufficient facts "to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The plausibility standard requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has actedunlawfully." Id.
"A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. at 1959.
In deciding a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must liberally construe the claims, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Aegis Ins. Servs., Inc. v. 7 World Trade Co., L.P., 737 F.3d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 2013); Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2013). However, this tenet Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937. "In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id.; see also Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010).
Nonetheless, a plaintiff is not required to plead "specific evidence or extra facts beyond what is needed to make the claim plausible." Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120-1 (2d Cir. 2010); accord Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. ex rel. St. Vincent Catholic Med. Ctrs. Ret.Plan v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 729-30 (2d Cir. 2013). "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937.
In deciding a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must limit itself to the facts alleged in the complaint, which are accepted as true; to any documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference therein; to matters of which judicial notice may be taken; or to documents upon the terms and effect of which the complaint "relies heavily" and which are, thus, rendered "integral" to the complaint. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002); see also ASARCO LLC v. Goodwin, 756 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 715, 190 L. Ed. 2d 441 (2014).
Moreover, although a pro se complaint "must be construed liberally to raise the strongest arguments it suggests[,] * * * [it] must state a plausible claim for relief." Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir.2013) (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted)).
Section 1997e(a) of the PLRA provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional...
To continue reading
Request your trial