Graham v. Com'Th.

• Decision Date: 29 January 1855
• Citation: 55 Ky. 587
• Parties: Graham <I>vs.</I> The Commonwealth.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

55 Ky. 587

Grahamvs.

The Commonwealth.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

January 29, 1855.

APPEAL FROM M'CRACKEN CIRCUIT.

O. Turner and L. S. Trimble for appellant —

James Harlan, Attorney General, for Commonwealth —

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Judge STITES delivered the opinion of the Court.

At the November term, 1855, of the McCracken circuit court, John Graham was tried and convicted of the murder of his wife.

The defense relied on by the prisoner was insanity at the time of the commission of the act, and some evidence was introduced in support of that defense. After the evidence was closed, the prisoner's counsel moved the following instruction: "That if the jury believed from the evidence that there was a rational doubt growing out of the evidence, as to whether Graham was insane, or non compos mentis, at the time he committed the homicide, then they should give the prisoner the benefit of that doubt, and acquit him."

This instruction was refused, and an exception taken by the prisoner's counsel, who then moved the court to instruct the jury upon the whole law of the case; and thereupon the court gave the following instructions:

"1st. The court instruct the jury that if they believe from the evidence that Graham killed the deceased, they must find him guilty of murder, unless they believe from the evidence that at the time he did the act he was laboring under insanity of mind.

"2d. That if they believe from the evidence Graham did kill his wife, and that he was laboring under insanity on the subject of love and jealousy, yet if they believe from the evidence he had sufficient reason to know that he was doing wrong and would be liable to punishment, and that he had sufficient power to control his actions and refrain from killing her, the law is against him, and they must find him guilty.

"3d. The court instruct the jury that the law presumes every man to be sane until the contrary is shown by the evidence; and before the prisoner can be excused for killing the deceased on the plea of insanity, the jury must be satisfied from the evidence that the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of murder; or if he did know it, that he did not know to commit murder was wrong.

"4th. That the true test of responsibility is whether the accused had sufficient reason to know right from wrong, and whether or not he had a sufficient power of control to govern his actions. That if they should believe from the evidence he was a monomaniac, yet if they should believe from the evidence he knew it was wrong to kill, and had sufficient power of control to govern his actions, and to refrain from committing the homicide, then the law is against him, and they must find him guilty.

"5th. That if they have a rational doubt as to whether said case is murder or manslaughter, they must find him guilty of the latter as the lesser offense; and if they have such rational doubt as to his guilt or innocence, they must acquit him.

"6th. That a rational doubt is one growing out of the evidence, and not a mere chimera existing in the juror's mind; and to acquit on mere light and trivial doubts existing in the juror's mind, and not growing out of the evidence, tends to the encouragement of malefactors, is detrimental to the best interests of society, and a virtual violation of the juror's oath."

And after the instructions were read over to the jury, the court inquired if there was any other point upon which an instruction was desired, and none was requested; but an exception was taken to each of the foregoing.

The jury having found the prisoner guilty, and the circuit eourt having refused a new trial, he has brought the case up by appeal.

The only question for consideration presented by the record, is the propriety of the refusal of the instruction asked for by the prisoner, and granting of others in lieu thereof.

It is earnestly contended in behalf of the appellant, and that is the main ground relied on for reversal, that the humane principle adopted in favor of life, which forbids a conviction whilst there is a rational doubt of guilt, has been violated in this case, by withholding from the jury the instruction asked for, and telling them, in the third instruction granted, that before they could acquit upon the ground of insanity, they must be satisfied that the accused was insane when he committed the homicide.

The importance of the case to the appellant has induced a thorough examination of the authorities, within our reach, bearing upon the question, and after full consideration, we feel convinced, from the unbroken current of adjudications upon the subject, as well as from the reason of the rule, that it has not been impinged upon, and that no error was committed by the circuit court, of which the appellant can justly complain.

The rule in question is founded upon the benign presumption of law in favor of innocence until the contrary is satisfactorily established, a presumption which continues in force in behalf of the accused, and remains his shield and protection, as long as a rational doubt exists as to his guilt. To the benefit of this presumption he is always entitled, and it has been extended to the prisoner in this case, for the jury are told in the 5th instruction, that "if they have such rational doubt as to his guilt or innocence, they must acquit him."

This presumption of the law in favor of innocence, is alike essential to the safety of the individual citizen and the security of society, and is universally recognized in all criminal and penal cases. — But there are other legal presumptions alike important, and indispensable to the well-being and safety of society, and as necessary in their application in criminal cases. Among these is the presumption of sanity. Every man is presumed to be sane, and accountable, as such, for the...