Graham v. Wilkins

• Decision Date: 21 January 1958
• Citation: 145 Conn. 34,138 A.2d 705
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: John GRAHAM v. Helen I. WILKINS. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 705

138 A.2d 705

145 Conn. 34

John GRAHAM [Albert Francis, Executor, Substituted Plaintiff] v. Helen I. WILKINS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Jan. 21, 1958.

J. Warren Upson, Waterbury, with whom, on the brief, was Kenyon W. Greene, Waterbury, for appellant (defendant).

Hugh J. McGill, Waterbury, with whom, on the brief, was Francis J. Butler, Waterbury, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before BALDWIN, DALY, KING and MURPHY, JJ.

KING, Associate Justice.

John Graham, Earl Erikson, the defendant Helen I. Wilkins, and her husband, Vincent R. Wilkins, were all employees, in different capacities, of Quaker Farms Poultry Company, hereinafter referred to as the company, a Pennsylvania corporation with its headquarters in that state. While a passenger in a truck owned by the defendant and operated by Erikson in the course of his employment, Graham sustained personal injuries in a collision, in Sheffield, Massachusetts, between the truck and a utility pole. The company had paid for having its name lettered on the truck, with the consent of the defendant, in such a manner as to indicate that the truck was owned by the company.

Graham instituted this action in his lifetime and recovered a verdict, but during the pendency of the appeal died from causes unrelated to the collision, and his executor was substituted as party plaintiff. In the interest of brevity and clarity, Graham will be referred to as the plaintiff.

The action was predicated on the liability of the defendant, as lessor of the truck to the company, under our automobile rental statute. General Statutes, § 2479. ¹ This statute has been construed as imposing on one who rents or leases a motor vehicle to another the same liability as that of its operator, provided the vehicle, at the time in question, is being operated by one in lawful possession of it pursuant to the terms of the contract of rental. Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 336, 143 A. 163, 61 A.L.R. 846; Connelly v Deconinck, 113 Conn. 237, 240, 155 A. 231; Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Kohn Bros. Tobacco Co., 141 Conn. 539, 542, 107 A.2d 406. As pointed out in the cases cited, the statutory liability is imposed, ex contractu, by making it a necessary term of every contract for the rental of a motor vehicle. 'The statute gives, in terms, the injured person a right of action against the defendant which rented the automobile. * * * It was a right which the statute gave directly, not derivatively, to the injured person as a consequence of the contract of hiring.' Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., supra. [108 Conn. 336, 143 A. 164.]

The defendant claimed that there was no contract of rental between her and the company, and that even if there was one it was made in Pennsylvania, at the headquarters of the company, and so would be unaffected by our statute, the applicability of which she claim is confined to contracts of rental entered into in Connecticut.

The court charged, in effect, that there would be no liability on the part of the defendant unless there was a contract of rental or leasing between herself as owner and the company as lessee. It then proceeded to define rental or lease and made it clear to the jury that personal property such as a motor vehicle could be the subject of a rental agreement; that to rent or lease was 'to grant the possession and enjoyment of a thing for rent,' 'to let or to hire out'; that such a renting must be 'for a specified rent or compensation'; and that if such an agreement was made it would be valid even though it was oral. Under the facts of this particular case, the charge was an adequate explanation of a rental or lease within the terms of the statute.

The defendant's claims of proof were that she had orally arranged with the company to allow it the use of her truck whenever it was necessary for the business of the company, that in consideration she was to be reimbursed for expenses for gasoline, oil, tires and repairs incurred in such use and that in fact she was so reimbursed from time to time after sending to the company, in Pennsylvania, itemized bills for the expenses. Furthermore, a portion of the finding not subject to correction discloses that the plaintiff offered evidence that the defendant was reimbursed for the use of the truck on a mileage basis, an arrangement which could not have amounted to an exact reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses. The evidence was thus sufficient to warrant a finding by the jury that there was a rental of the truck within the meaning of the statute. The principal contention of the defendant on this issue is that the compensation for the use of the truck had to exceed reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses in order for there to be a rental. There is no merit in this claim. Whether the rental, as an isolated transaction, was profitable or unprofitable to the defendant would not be conclusive of its character. Furthermore, it was undisputed that the defendant and her husband were employees of the company, and whether the defendant felt that it was good business for her to rent the truck to the company for the out-of-pocket operating cost, or even for a lesser amount, was a matter for her to determine. She could not nullify what would otherwise be a rental agreement merely by making the rental low. There is nothing in Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. Walsh, 135 Conn. 37, 69, 61 A.2d 89, greatly stressed by the defendant, which gives any support to her claim. That case involved the construction of a taxing statute in which out-of-pocket operating expenses of trucks rented from another corporation were quite properly added to the charges for rental in determining the total cost of operating the trucks.

The court charged that it made no difference whether the actual contract of leasing, if there was one, came into existence in Pennsylvania or in Connecticut, since on the defendant's own claims of proof of the contract of rental, if the jury found there was one, was to have its beneficial operation and effect in Connecticut. The defendant in effect conceded in her brief that the truck, although registered in Rhode Island, was garaged in Waterbury, Connecticut, where the defendant and her husband resided. Her claims of proof were that she still was domiciled in Rhode Island, where she and her husband had resided prior to coming to Waterbury, and that the truck was used not only in Connecticut but also in Massachusetts and New York, as the business needs of the company dictated. The truck could not be operated in either Massachusetts...