Grand Rapids City Coach Lines v. Howlett

• Decision Date: 16 December 1955
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 2859.
• Citation: 137 F. Supp. 667
• Parties: GRAND RAPIDS CITY COACH LINES, Inc., a Michigan corporation, Plaintiff, v. Robert G. HOWLETT, Donald V. Carey and Henry J. Van Wolvlear, individually and as members of a special commission appointed pursuant to the Michigan Labor Mediation Act, so-called, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

137 F. Supp. 667

GRAND RAPIDS CITY COACH LINES, Inc., a Michigan corporation, Plaintiff, v. Robert G. HOWLETT, Donald V. Carey and Henry J. Van Wolvlear, individually and as members of a special commission appointed pursuant to the Michigan Labor Mediation Act, so-called, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 2859.

United States District Court W. D. Michigan, S. D.

December 16, 1955.

Warner, Norcross & Judd, Grand Rapids, Mich., for plaintiff.

Thomas M. Kavanagh, Atty. Gen., of Michigan, for the Board.

Morse & Kleiner, Grand Rapids, Mich., for intervenors.

KENT, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Grand Rapids City Coach Lines, Inc., has filed a complaint and asks for a temporary restraining order, a temporary injunction, and a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from entering upon or conducting any hearings, proceedings, or investigations pursuant to the Statutes of the State of Michigan.¹ A temporary restraining order was granted and an order to show cause was issued requiring the defendants to appear and show cause why they should not be enjoined, individually and as a statutory special commission, from entering upon the duties outlined in the cited statute.

Defendants appeared by the Attorney General of Michigan, Thomas M. Kavanagh, and by Robert A. Siegrist, Assistant Attorney General. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and an answer. Also an appearance was filed on behalf of Division 836, Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, A.F.L., the Union which represents the employees of the plaintiff company. The Union also filed a motion for leave to intervene which motion was denied because of failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.

From the proofs produced by the plaintiff on the hearing relative to the issuance of a temporary injunction and from the pleadings, the Court is satisfied of the following facts. The plaintiff is a Michigan corporation having its principal place of business in the City of Grand Rapids, Kent County, Michigan. The company is engaged in the business of operating the bus system in the City of Grand Rapids as the only means of mass transportation of passengers in the City of Grand Rapids and contiguous areas and communities. The plaintiff through its operation of a bus system serves a large number of industries, including, Lear, Inc.; Aircraft Division of General Motors Corporation; Corduroy Rubber Company; Doehler-Jarvis Division of National Lead Company; Stowe-Davis Furniture Company; American Seating Company; General Motors Corporation, Diesel Equipment Division; Steelcase, Inc.; Kelvinator Division of American Motors Corp.; American Excelsior Corporation; American Box Board Company, and numerous other industries in the Grand Rapids area.

The Court takes judicial knowledge of the fact that the industries named and many other industries served by the plaintiff are actively engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.²

Briefs have been filed on behalf of the plaintiff and the defendant. The Union participated in the hearing through its counsel and was extended an invitation to file a brief amicus curiae which invitation was not accepted for reasons not pertinent to this opinion.

The plaintiff and the above named Union prior to December 1, 1955, had been engaged in negotiations for a new contract. The parties were unable to agree after extended negotiations with the assistance of representatives of the Michigan Labor Mediation Board. Pursuant to the Michigan Statute³ the Michigan Labor Mediation Board certified the dispute to the Governor of Michigan as a dispute involving a public utility, apparently after concluding as provided by Statute⁴ that the parties would not be able to settle their dispute by bargaining, mediation and conciliation, the parties having refused to submit to arbitration. Thereafter the Governor of the State of Michigan appointed the defendants as a Special Commission.⁵ The powers and duties of the Special Commission are outlined in the Michigan Statute.⁶

This Special Commission has authority to require the parties to appear, hold hearings, it is not bound by the rules of evidence, it has subpoena power and may invoke the aid of a Circuit Court to punish for contempt of court for refusal to obey a subpoena, refusal to be sworn or testify, or for contemptuous conduct during the course of the hearing. The Special Commission is authorized and required under the provisions of the statute to make just and reasonable findings and recommendations. The Commission is required to file its findings and recommendations with the Governor of the State of Michigan and the Governor is required to make such report and recommendations public. The statute then provides:

"The parties shall thereupon, and for a period of 10 days following the filing with the governor of the report of the special commission, resume collective bargaining, and shall in good faith attempt to settle their disputes by this means". (Emphasis supplied.)⁷

Other provisions of the statute require that existing wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment shall remain static during the pendency of the proceedings.⁸ And the statute makes any lock-out, strike, work stoppage, slow-down, and other such activities illegal until the termination of the activities of the Special Commission and for 10 days thereafter.⁹

It is the claim of the plaintiff that the Bus Company is engaged in activities which "affect interstate commerce" within the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, because of the services which it renders to the companies in the area which are engaged in interstate commerce. It is the claim of the plaintiff that since the activities of the Bus Company "affect interstate commerce" that necessarily the plaintiff is subject to the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 and is required and entitled to proceed in accordance with the provisions of that Act.

Plaintiff claims that Congress having legislated on the subject that a state agency or commission created by the action of the state legislature has no jurisdiction of any matters having to do with the labor relations of the plaintiff company, the activities of which "affect interstate commerce".

The defendants and the Union here involved have not strongly urged that the plaintiff's activities do not affect interstate commerce within the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Rather it is the claim of the defendants and the Union that the entire field of labor relations is within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board and that this Court has no authority nor jurisdiction to entertain a controversy involving labor relations in an industry whose activities affect interstate commerce except upon petition of the National Labor Relations Board.

It is further the theory of the Attorney General of the State of Michigan that this Court should require the plaintiff to exhaust its state court remedies and thereafter appeal to the United States Supreme Court. It is the theory and claim of the Attorney General of the State of Michigan that this United States District Court has no jurisdiction to enjoin the actions of a commission appointed by the Governor of the State of Michigan such as here involved.

Plaintiff claims that the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 is an Act which regulates commerce and that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1337.¹⁰

The defendants also assert that it would not be proper under circumstances such as outlined here for this Court to restrain the activities of the defendant Special Commission, regardless of the jurisdiction of such Commission where the activities of the industry involved affect interstate commerce.

There has also been a suggestion in open court that a constitutional question has been raised by the plaintiff and that a Three-Judge Court should hear the controversy as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2281.

After hearing it was agreed by all parties that the defendant Special Commission would take no further steps until this Court could render an opinion relative to the issuance of a preliminary injunction.

This Court is satisfied that the complaint of the plaintiff does not raise a question as to the constitutionality of the Michigan Statute here involved. Plaintiff's theory is that Congress has pre-empted the regulation of labor relations as to companies whose activities affect interstate commerce. The Court is satisfied that the determination of the constitutionality of the Michigan Statute involved is not required in this case. This same question was considered by the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 156 F.2d 33, wherein the Court stated at page 36:

"§ 266 of the Judicial Code must be complied with only where the injunction is sought `upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute,' and § 24(1) of the Judicial Code inhibits a federal court from taking jurisdiction where it is sought to enjoin the action of an administrative board, etc., where jurisdiction is based `solely upon the ground of diversity of citizenship, or the repugnance of such order to the Constitution of the United States.' It appears evident that neither of these provisions is controlling. Moreover, in the recent case of Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 786, 62 S. Ct. 491, 86 L.Ed. 754, the complaint alleged, as in the instant case, that the federal statute pre-empted and occupied the field so as to deprive the state agency of jurisdiction. The case was heard by a single judge.

The jurisdictional question was raised in the Court of Appeals, 5 Cir., 116 F.2d 227, 230, wherein the court stated: `The suit was not one for three judges. It did not attack the constitutionality of

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