Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. City of Fenton, 89354

• Decision Date: 27 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. 89354,No. 2,89354,2
• Parties: GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF FENTON, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar439 Mich. 240, 482 N.W.2d 706
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 706

482 N.W.2d 706

GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF FENTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 89354.

Calendar No. 2.

439 Mich. 240, 482 N.W.2d 706

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 8, 1992.

Decided March 27, 1992.

[439 MICH 241] Gregory A. Roberts, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff, appellee.

Douglas J. Callahan, Fenton, Mich., for defendant, appellant.

Michael H. Feiler, Farmington Hills, Mich., for Mich. Mun. League.

[439 MICH 242] Feiler, Joelson, Lakind & Rosenberg by Michael H. Feiler, Farmington Hills, Mich., for amicus Mich. Mun. League.

OPINION

MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, Chief Justice.

We address in this case the validity of a municipal speed-limit ordinance applied to freight trains operating within city limits. We find the ordinance preempted by federal law, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The relevant facts in this case are undisputed. The City of Fenton, a small community in Genesee County, is bisected by a major freight train line operated by the Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company. Approximately twenty-four trains pass through Fenton on this track each day, operating at speeds up to fifty miles per hour. Several automobile crossings exist within Fenton city limits. The busiest of these, the North Leroy Street crossing, is heavily traversed and has been the scene of a number of fatal accidents over the years.

On October 13, 1986, in response to the safety problems posed by the crossings and the perceived failure of Grand Trunk to address those problems adequately, Fenton passed an ordinance that imposed a speed limit of twenty-five miles per hour on freight trains operating within city limits. The ordinance provides that any violation "shall be considered a misdemeanor punishable by up to 90 days in jail and/or a fine of not to exceed $500.00," and that "[t]he person in immediate charge and control of a train and/or any railroad company or corporation, owning or operating any railroad in violation of the provisions of this ordinance may be charged with the violation of the provisions of this ordinance."

On February 26, 1987, Grand Trunk filed a complaint in the Genesee Circuit Court, seeking an injunction against enforcement of Fenton's ordinance on the ground that the ordinance is void under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2, because it is preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 45 U.S.C. Sec. 421 et seq., and regulations enacted pursuant to it by the Secretary of Transportation. ¹ On March 13, 1989, following a number of procedural complications not relevant here, the circuit court granted summary disposition for Grand Trunk, and the requested injunction was issued on April 6, 1989. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an opinion per curiam, 184 Mich.App. 166, 457 N.W.2d 120 (1990), and this Court granted leave to appeal, 437 Mich. 1035 (1991).

II. ANALYSIS

The general principles governing federal preemption are well established:

"Our cases have established that state law is pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause, US Const, art VI, cl 2, in three circumstances. First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law. Pre-emption fundamentally is a question of congressional intent, and when Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the courts' task is an easy one.

"Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively. Such an intent may be inferred from a 'scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it'....

"Finally, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law." English v. General Electric Co, 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275, 110 L.Ed.2d 65, 74 (1990) (citations omitted).

In this case, the Federal Railroad Safety Act provides a clear basis for applying the first form of preemption noted above:

"The Congress declares that laws, rules, regulations, orders, and standards relating to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force any law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary [of Transportation] has adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the subject matter of such State requirement. A State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard, and when not incompatible with any Federal law, rule, regulation, order, or standard, and when not creating an undue burden on interstate commerce." 45 U.S.C. Sec. 434.

It is clear under this provision that Congress generally intended to preempt any and all state or local regulation of railroad safety, except for regulations authorized under either of the two exceptions set forth in the statute. See, e.g., Donelon v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 474 F.2d 1108, 1112 (CA 5, 1973). Fenton argues that both exceptions apply, and that either one is sufficient to validate its ordinance. Grand Trunk makes several arguments against the application of either exception. First, it contends that both exceptions apply only to regulations adopted by a "State," and not regulations adopted by cities or other units of local government. ² Furthermore, with regard to the first exception, Grand Trunk contends that the Secretary of Transportation has indeed "adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the subject matter" of Fenton's ordinance, namely the federal train-speed regulations embodied in 49 CFR 213. With regard to the second exception, Grand Trunk contends that the ordinance, even if directed toward an "essentially local safety hazard," ³ is incompatible with the federal regulations and imposes an "undue burden on interstate commerce." ⁴

We agree with Grand Trunk that the first exception cannot save Fenton's ordinance, in light of 49 CFR 213. This regulation sets forth a detailed and comprehensive framework of speed limits for freight and passenger trains. See, e.g., 49 CFR 213.9(a), and part 213, appendix A. Fenton contends, however, that these provisions only regulate speed in relation to track and roadbed conditions, with the primary goal of preventing derailments and without regard to the issue of crossing safety in congested urban areas, the primary concern of Fenton's ordinance.

This issue was recently addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Easterwood v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 933 F.2d 1548 (CA 11, 1991). Presented by the appellant in that case with essentially the same argument presented here by Fenton, the court in Easterwood stated:

"[As] the Supreme Court held in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142; 83 S.Ct. 1210, [1217]; 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), ... it is irrelevant to pre-emption analysis whether the state law's objectives are similar to or different from the federal law's objectives. Pre-emption analysis turns on Congress' intent to pre-empt state law and on the nature of the federal regulations. The Florida Lime & Avocado Growers Court noted that a comparison of the similarities and divergences in the objectives of the federal and state regulations is simply a poor predictor of whether the federal regulations will pre-empt state law. Id. Moreover, [the appellant] does not point to any legislative history for the speed limits and therefore she asks us to guess at the motives behind the Secretary of [Transportation's actions]. Such guessing is inherently suspect. While [the appellant] assumes that the speed limits are designed to prevent derailments, it is equally valid to assume that the speed limits were set low enough that, in conjunction with adequate grade crossing signals and gates, the speed limits were intended to lessen the number of grade crossing accidents as well as lessen the chances of derailments." 933 F.2d at 1554.

We find Judge Johnson's opinion in Easterwood to be soundly reasoned and persuasive, and we therefore conclude that the Secretary of Transportation has covered the subject matter sought to be addressed by Fenton's ordinance.

With regard to the "local safety hazard" exception of Sec. 434, we conclude that, even assuming all other conditions were met, Fenton's ordinance is necessarily "incompatible with" the regulatory framework of 49 CFR 213. The parties agree that the current speed limit under the federal regulations for freight trains passing through Fenton is fifty miles per hour, in contrast with the twenty-five-mile-per-hour limit imposed by the ordinance. While it is possible for trains to obey both the federal and local limits, it is clear that enforcement of the much lower local limit would substantially interfere with the carefully wrought federal scheme. It is undisputed that trains take many miles and a substantial amount of time to shift between substantially different speeds. Authorizing local speed limits like Fenton's would raise the specter of a patchwork of conflicting local rules interfering with the uniformity and smooth operation of the federal regulatory framework. As one federal district court has stated:

"Congress was concerned that the existence of fifty separate [railroad] regulatory systems in the fifty states would undermine safety. If so, separate regulation by every city, village, township, or hamlet along the mainline would undermine safety infinitely more. Separate municipal regulation of speed is so greatly at odds with the Congressional purpose of uniformity as to need no further argument." Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Smith, 664 F.Supp. 1228, 1238 (N.D.Ind., 1987), a...