Grandey v. Casey

• Decision Date: 19 December 1887
• Citation: 93 Mo. 595,6 S.W. 376
• Parties: GRANDEY v. CASEY.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

6 S.W. 376

93 Mo. 595

GRANDEY v. CASEY.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

December 19, 1887.

1. DEED — DESCRIPTION — TITLE FROM COMMON SOURCE.

Plaintiff and defendant in ejectment claimed title from a common source. The land as originally owned by the common grantor was triangular in shape, and the

grantor conveyed first the property claimed by plaintiff, describing it as the "north half" of the lot, beginning in the middle of one of the sides, and running back parallel to another side of the triangle, and subsequently conveyed the residue of the lot, describing it as the "south half." The lots were afterwards conveyed by the description of "north half" and "south half," and were so assessed for taxes, and, upon failure of the owner of the "south half" to pay the taxes, it was sold at tax collector's sale, and conveyed to defendant, under the description of "south half." Held, that the common grantor had fixed upon the words "north" and "south half" a conventional meaning, and they must be considered to have been so used in the muniment of title under which both parties claimed, and defendant could claim no greater portion than was designated therein.

2. EJECTMENT — LIMITATION OF ACTION — TO WHAT CASES APPLICABLE.

Section 55 of the charter of Kansas City, Missouri, limits the time of redemption from sales for delinquent municipal taxes to two years. Held, that this special limitation does not apply to an action of ejectment wherein plaintiff seeks to recover, not the lot conveyed by tax deed, but a portion not so conveyed.

Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county; FRANCIS M. BLACK, Judge.

Ejectment by William Grandey against Philip Casey. Trial without jury. Judgment against defendant, who appealed.

Boggess & Moore, for appellant. Lathrop & Smith, for respondent.

BRACE, J.

This is an action of ejectment for the recovery of a triangular piece of ground in lot 298, in block 32, in Kansas City, represented by the triangular A, C, D, on the following plat, which is a correct representation of said lot and block:

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINING TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

The petition is in the usual form; the answer, a general denial; the case was tried before the court without a jury; no declarations of law were given; and judgment went for the plaintiff, from which defendant appeals. The only question before us is whether the evidence supports the finding and judgment. The facts were undisputed. On the first day of April, 1852, Fry R. McGee and wife by deed of that date, recorded August 10, 1852, in Book T, at page 128, conveyed to John McDowell "the north half of lot No. two hundred and ninety-eight (298) in the town of Kansas, Jackson county, Missouri. Said lot is to be divided in the middle of the front of said lot on Market street, and back eastwardly, parallel with the north line of said lot," represented on the plat by the triangle E, B, C. B, C, is the north line, and E, B, is the front line of said lot on Market street, now Grand avenue. The point A is the middle of said line. The line A, D, is a line run back eastwardly from the said middle of the front of said lot on Market street, parallel with the line B, C, the north line of said lot. Consequently, this deed conveyed to John McDowell the piece of ground represented by the figures A, B, C, D, on the plat. Afterwards, on the fourteenth day of December, 1853, by his deed of that date, recorded April 5, 1854, the said Fry R. McGee and his wife conveyed to Richard W. Sherwood "the south half of lot two hundred and ninety-eight, (298,) in block thirty-two, in the town of Kansas." As McGee and wife had previously conveyed to McDowell all that part of lot 298 contained within the figure A, B, C, D, this deed conveyed to Sherwood only that part of said lot (E, B, C,) contained within the triangle A, D, E; and as the premises in controversy, A, C, D, are wholly within the figure A, B, C, D, and within the boundaries of McDowell's purchase, McDowell acquired all McGee's title thereto, and Sherwood acquired none to any part of it, by this deed. In 1852, John McDowell died intestate, leaving a widow and several children, all of whom afterwards conveyed all their right, title, and interest in the north half of lot 298, in block 32, in the town of Kansas, to Julius, Louis, and Edward Hammerslough; and afterwards, on the thirteenth of April, 1881, the said Hammersloughs and their wives, by their deed of that date, recorded March 2, 1881, conveyed "the north half of lot two hundred and ninety-eight, (298,) in block thirty-two, (32,) in old town, now city, of Kansas," being the same property conveyed by Fry R. McGee and wife to John McDowell by deed dated April 1, 1852, and recorded in Book T, at page 128, to the plaintiff in this suit. In the several deeds of six of the eight children and heirs at law of John McDowell, they conveyed, in addition to said north half of said lot, all their interest in and to the estate of their deceased father to the Hammersloughs; and in the deed to two of the interests the description of the property conveyed was simply the "north half of lot 298;" and it is contended that the Hammersloughs, as to those two interests, by their deed acquired only their title to the areal half of said lot, being that part of it contained within the lines A, B, C.

There is nothing in this contention. The deed of their ancestor contained two descriptions of said lot, — a general and a partial one. The general one was the north half; the particular description was practically one by metes and bounds, which showed that the north half, as used in the deed, was not the areal half, but a half to be measured by the front line of said lot on Market street, which was to be divided in the middle, and from the middle point a line running eastward by parallel with the north line should be the south boundary of said north half. This conventional meaning of the words "north half" was apparent on the face of their ancestor's deed. It was the meaning which he and his grantor had given to those words in the muniment of title under which they claimed, and which they could not look upon and fail to read aright; and when they made a deed of the property by the same general description contained in the deed of their ancestor it must be held that they intended to convey, and did convey, the same land which he and they acquired by that general description. It is as though their ancestor had acquired an estate called "Blackacre," described by certain metes and bounds, and they (his heirs) should convey the estate by its general name of "Blackacre." Can there be a doubt that the grantee would take all the land included within the metes and bounds of the estate of Blackacre as limited in the grant to their...