Grandison v. State
| Decision Date | 17 September 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 1279,1279 |
| Citation | 363 A.2d 523,32 Md.App. 705 |
| Parties | Anthony GRANDISON a/k/a James Williams v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Robert F. Freeze, Assigned Public Defender, Baltimore, for appellant.
Deborah K. Handel, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., William A. Swisher, State's Atty. for Baltimore City and Roy W. Breslow, Asst. State's Atty. for Baltimore City, on the brief, for appellee.
Argued before GILBERT, * MENCHINE and MOORE, JJ.
Anthony Grandison, also known as James Williams, was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore under an indictment charging that he carried a handgun in violation of Article 27, § 36B. He was acquitted on two more serious charges.
Grandison had been indicted under the following six indictments:
Indictment No. Date of Offense Offense Charged
-------------- --------------- ---------------
57500867 November 6, 1974 Assault with intent to murder Samuel Mason
57500868 November 6, 1974 Robbery of Samuel Mason with a
dangerous and deadly weapon
57500869 November 18, 1974 Possession of a handgun in violation
of Article 27, § 36B
57500870 November 18, 1974 Obliterating serial number on handgun
57500871 November 22, 1974 Attempted escape
57500872 November 22, 1974 Assault.
Acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 734 the trial judge ordered indictments 57500867, 8 and 9 to be tried together. Grandison's motion for a severance was granted as to indictments 57500870, 1 and 2 pursuant to Rule 735.
At arraignment, Grandison pleaded not guilty to all three indictments but attempted to obtain a jury trial as to indictments 57500867 and 8 and a court trial as to 57500869. The trial judge declined to permit the case to be so divided, requiring the appellant to go forward as to the three joined indictments either with a jury or a non-jury trial as to all. The case then proceeded to trial before a jury. Grandison was acquitted as to indictments 57500867 and 8. He was convicted under indictment 57500869 and sentenced to a term of eighteen months imprisonment.
He thus suggests the questions presented on appeal:
'I. Was the appellant denied a speedy trial?
II. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction?
III. Should there have been a severance as to indictments?
V. Should the pretrial motions have
IV. Should the pretrial motions have been granted?
V. Should the court have granted a motion for mistrial?'
Appellant contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. He was arrested on November 18, 1974. His trial was commenced on July 23, 1975. We reject his contention and find it necessary only to examine that period of delay.
Following appellant's arrest on November 18, 1974, a preliminary hearing was scheduled for December 11, 1974. The hearing was postponed at the request of the accused to permit him to obtain private counsel.
A second hearing, scheduled for January 16, 1975, was postponed at the request of private counsel for the accused.
A third hearing, scheduled for February 7, 1975, was postponed when appellant's private counsel obtained permission to withdraw from the case because he had been informed by a prosecution witness that anonymous telephone calls had been received threatening the latter if he appeared at the next scheduled hearing.
On February 7, 1975, appellant was advised that he could speak to the public defender, but declined to do so because he did not care for representation by the office of the Public Defender.
Private counsel was not thereafter engaged. When it became apparent to assignment authorities of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City that Grandison had not arranged for private counsel, hearing was scheduled before Judge Shirley B. Jones on May 13, 1975. At that hearing the following colloquy between court and counsel occurred:
Notwithstanding the continued expression of dissatisfaction by the appellant, counsel was appointed for him under the Public Defender Art. (Article 27A). The appearance of an assistant public defender was entered for the appellant on that very date.
Thereafter, on June 5, 1975, an experienced panel attorney filed his appearance for the appellant. The trial, requiring eight trial days, began on July 23, 1975.
If any part of the delay is attributable to the State it is miniscule. We agree fully with the trial judge that under the circumstances shown by this record the delay does not reach constitutional dimensions. Accordingly, 'there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.' Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 117 (1972). There is no evidence that the State shirked 'its constitutional duty to make a diligent, good faith effort to bring (Grandison) to trial.' Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26, 94 S.Ct. 188, 190, 38 L.Ed.2d 185, 186 (1973).
The contention that the evidence was not legally sufficient is frivolous. Two police officers observed that the appellant was carrying a handgun and removed it from his person at the time of a lawful arrest. Seizure and use of the weapon as evidence was lawful.
Indictments 57500867 and 8 [as to which the appellant was acquitted] charged respectively (a) assault with intent to murder and (b) the robbery with a dangerous weapon, of one Samuel Mason.
At the severance hearing the State made the following proffer:
'MR. BRESLAW: The gun that was recovered on the 18th was missing a portion which was found at Mr. Mason's office on the 6th by the officers and they matched up to be the same gun, a portion of the same gun found on the 6th, matching the portion that was remaining portion found on the 18th and the State feels those four 2 charges should be tried together.'
At the conclusion of the appellant's motion for severance, the trial judge said:
At trial the proffer by the State was supported fully by evidence.
In Sutton v. State, 25 Md.App. 309, 334 A.2d 126 (1975), we said at 313, 334 A.2d 128-29:
The trial court's discretion clearly was properly exercised in the subject case.
In a second string to his severance bow, appellant attempted to accomplish, by election for a court trial as to indictment 57500869, the severance he was unable to achieve upon his motion for severance. The trial judge rejected his effort thus to divide the trial.
Maryland Rule 741 reads as follows:
'Jury Trial-Election.
An accused...
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