Granger v. City of Tulsa

Decision Date17 September 1935
Docket NumberCase Number: 26544
Citation174 Okla. 565,51 P.2d 567,1935 OK 801
PartiesGRANGER et al v. CITY OF TULSA et al.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court
Syllabus

¶0 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -- Tulsa City Charter Provision Held to Reserve to People no Greater Initiative Powers Than are Reserved by State Constitution.

Section 25, article 3, charter of the city of Tulsa, Okla., reserves no greater or additional initiative powers to the people of said city than are reserved to them by article 5, and section 4(a), article 18, of the State Constitution.

2. SAME -- Initiated Ordinances Subject to Constitutional Limitations -- Amendment and Repeal by Legislative Body of City.

Laws proposed and enacted by the people of the city of Tulsa under the initiative provisions of the State Constitution and the charter of said city are subject to the same constitutional limitations as are other statutes and may be amended or repealed by the legislative body of the city at will.

Original action by Raymond W. Oranger and others, against the Board of Commissioners of the City of Tulsa and the Excise Board of Tulsa County. Writ of mandamus denied.

John R. Woodard and Robert L. Davidson, for plaintiffs.

H. O Bland, E. M. Gallaher, and Milton W. Hardy, for defendants

GIBSON, J.

¶1 This is an original proceeding commenced in this court by petitioners wherein a writ of mandamus is sought against the respondents commanding them to provide proper appropriations for the salaries of petitioners for the fiscal year 1935-1936.

¶2 The petitioners are members of the fire department of the city of Tulsa. They complain that the mayor and board of commissioners, the legislative body of said city, and the excise board of Tulsa county intend, and are about, to appropriate insufficient funds for the payment of the salaries of petitioners as are now fixed by ordinance of said city. It is the contention of petitioners that their lawful salaries are fixed by initiated ordinance No. 2, enacted in 1928, whereas respondents are seeking to appropriate for and pay to petitioners salaries as provided for in ordinance No. 4110, enacted by the mayor and board of commissioners of Tulsa in 1985, wherein salaries of petitioners and others similarly situated are purported to be reduced in the aggregate sum of approximately $ 62,000 annually.

¶3 The legal question presented in this proceeding is whether or not the legislative body of the city, consisting of the mayor and board of commissioners, may, under the Constitution of the state and the charter of the city of Tulsa, repeal, alter, or change an ordinance adopted by the voters of the city as an initiative measure. If such power rests in the city board, then the petition must be denied.

¶4 It is conceded for the purposes of this litigation that initiated ordinance No. 2, of 1928, fixing salaries as now claimed by petitioners, is valid. It is the contention of petitioners that ordinance No. 4110, enacted by the legislative body of the city, wherein salaries were reduced, is unauthorized and void.

¶5 The legislative authority of the state is vested in the Legislature and the people by section 1, article 5, of the Constitution as follows:

"The legislative authority of the state shall be, vested in a Legislature, consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives; but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls independent of the Legislature, and also reserve power at their own option to approve or reject at the polls any act of the Legislature."

¶6 Section 7, article 5, of the Constitution is as follows:

"The reservation of the powers of the initiative and referendum in this article shall not deprive the Legislature of the right to repeal any law, propose or pass any measure, which may be consistent with the Constitution of the state and the Constitution of the United States."

¶7 Section 2, article 5, of the Constitution reserves to the people the power of the initiative and referendum. Section 5 of said article reserves the same power to every county and district therein. Section 4 (a), article 18, of the Constitution reserves the same power to the people of municipal corporations, as follows:

"The powers of the initiative and referendum, reserved by this Constitution to the people of the state and the respective counties and districts therein, are hereby reserved to the people of every municipal corporation now existing or which shall hereafter be created within this state, with reference to all legislative authority which it may exercise, and amendments to charters for its own government in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution."

¶8 Statutes have been enacted vitalizing these provisions. Section 25, article 3, of the charter of the city of Tulsa reads as follows:

"All the powers vested in this charter in the board of commissioners of the city of Tulsa, in regard to ordinances and all legislative authority vested in said board, are subordinate and subject to said powers of the initiative and referendum set forth in the Constitution and statutes of the state of Oklahoma, which are now in force and effect, or which may be hereafter passed to carry out the provisions of the Constitution in regard to the initiative and referendum."

¶9 There is no express provision in the State Constitution prohibiting the Legislature or a municipal legislative body from repealing or amending the measures initiated by the people of the state or the municipality, respectively. And the charter of the city of Tulsa contains no such provision unless it be found in section 25, article 3, thereof, supra. It is argued that the city board is prohibited from repealing an initiative ordinance by the provision in said section that its legislative authority is "subordinate and subject to said powers of the initiative and referendum set forth in the Constitution and statutes of the State of Oklahoma." This provision accomplishes no more than to reserve to the people of the city the power of the initiative and referendum and has no greater or other force or effect than the provision in section 1, article 5, supra, wherein the people of the state "reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution, and to enact or reject the same at the polls independent of the Legislature, and also reserve power at their own option to approve or reject at the polls any act of the Legislature."

¶10 The rights reserved to the people of Tulsa relative to the initiative and referendum under the city charter are no different from the rights reserved to the people of the state by the Constitution. Section 25, article 3, of the city charter reserves no greater powers to the people of Tulsa than had already been reserved to them by the Constitution. Therefore, a question involving the repeal of an initiated ordinance enacted by the people of Tulsa as a legislative measure presents a question in all respects analogous to a question involving repeal of a legislative measure enacted by the people of the state at large, and the two questions may be disposed of upon a parity of legal reasoning.

¶11 The question here presented has been touched Upon to some degree by this court in State ex rel. Caldwell v. Hooker, 22 Okla. 712, 98 P. 964. In that case the basic premise upon which all legislative acts are considered was stated as follows:

"The legislative department of a state is not made a special agency for the exercise of specifically defined legislative powers, but is entrusted with the general authority to make laws at discretion. Cooley's Const. Lira. (7th Ed.) 126."

¶12 And it was...

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9 cases
  • State ex rel. Wright v. Oklahoma Corp.
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • October 2, 2007
    ...Fund. 17. For example, in Terry v. Bishop, 2007 OK 29, ¶ 12, 158 P.3d 1067, we said that "Our decision in Granger [v. City of Tulsa, 1935 OK 801, 174 Okla. 565, 51 P.2d 567] is consistent with the holding in State v. Coyle, 1912 OK CR 126, 7 Okla.Crim. 50, 122 P. 243 which recognized the fu......
  • Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Smith, 55079
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • May 5, 1980
    ...submitting thereby that the proper analysis of this action required the authority of the case of Granger et al. v. City of Tulsa et al, 174 Okl. 565, 51 P.2d 567 (1935). The Commission's response to the equal protection argument submitted that the taxpayer is the classifying party, not the ......
  • Luker v. Curtis
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • April 28, 1943
    ...construction, that the respective legislative bodies are either expressly or impliedly prohibited repealing initiated laws. (See Granger v. City of Tulsa, supra.) places great reliance on the case of Don v. Pfister, 172 Cal. 25, 155 P. 60. That case is not thought to be in point here, for t......
  • Cox v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • April 16, 1946
    ... ... premises as an existing dance hall ...          Irvine ... E. Ungerman, of Tulsa, for plaintiff in error ...          E. L ... Mitchell and W. F. Speakman, both of ahoma City, Attys ... for Tax Commission, for defendant in error ...          BAYLESS, ... of the stability of government. 11 Am.Jur. 633; Granger ... v. City of Tulsa, 174 Okl. 565, 51 P.2d 567. Such a ... change is pro tanto repudiation ... ...
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