Granite Construction Co. v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 01 December 1983
• Docket Number: No. F,F
• Citation: 149 Cal.App.3d 465,197 Cal.Rptr. 3
• Parties: , 45 A.L.R.4th 1011 GRANITE CONSTRUCTION CO., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF FRESNO COUNTY, Respondent, The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. 002297.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 3

197 Cal.Rptr. 3

149 Cal.App.3d 465, 45 A.L.R.4th 1011

GRANITE CONSTRUCTION CO., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF FRESNO COUNTY, Respondent, The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

No. F 002297.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Dec. 1, 1983.

Hearing Denied Jan. 26, 1984.

[149 Cal.App.3d 466] Cooper, White & Cooper, Mark L. Tuft & Jed E. Solomon, San Francisco, McInerney & Dillon, Robert L. Leslie, Oakland, for petitioner.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., David De Alba, Clayton S. Tanaka, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for real party in interest.

OPINION

WOOLPERT, Associate Justice.

In this petition, we are asked to exempt corporations from prosecution for manslaughter. We refuse, holding that corporations may be prosecuted for manslaughter under existing California law.

Petitioner, a corporation, is building a power plant known as the "Helms Pumped Storage Project." On January 23, 1981, seven construction workers were killed in an accident at that project. After evidence regarding this accident was presented to the Fresno County Grand Jury, petitioner was indicted for manslaughter.

The issue is whether the California Penal Code exempts corporations from prosecution for manslaughter under Penal Code section 192. This is a question of legislative intent. (1 Witkin, Cal.Crimes (1963) § 11, p. 13.)

The Penal Code applies to corporations. The code defines "person" to include a corporation as well as a natural person. (Pen.Code, § 7.) The Penal Code's sections on persons liable for crime, using unqualified language, make corporations proper defendants in any criminal case. Under section 26, any person is capable of committing crimes except children, idiots and those lacking mens rea through mistake of fact, etcetera. Under section 27, any person who commits a crime is liable for punishment. Thus the California Penal Code applies to corporations, and if they commit crimes, they are liable for punishment.

California courts have recognized that corporations are proper criminal defendants. As early as 1907 a California court held that "Private corporations in respect to their liability for the acts of their agents or servants stand before the law on the same footing as individuals. [Citation.]" (People v. Palermo Land & Water Co. (1907) 4 Cal.App. 717, 721, 89 P. 723, 725 (hg. den. Mar. 28, 1907, as reported in 4 Cal.App. at p. 722, 89 P. 723, 725); see generally, 17 Cal.Jur.3d § 39, and cases cited therein.)

Petitioner claims surprise at the prosecution of a corporation for manslaughter, asserting that the indictment was "totally unforeseeable," and that a corporation may be charged with crimes against "property," but "not against the person." This attempt to distinguish crimes against property from crimes against the person relies on the corporation's nature as an economically motivated entity. While a corporation may directly benefit from a crime against property, crimes against persons are not as directly linked to the profit motive. This argument is unsuccessful. It overlooks the substantial indirect economic benefits that may accrue to the corporation through crimes against the person. To get these economic benefits, corporate management may shortcut expensive safety precautions, respond forcibly to strikes, or engage in criminal anticompetitive behavior. If any such risk-taking is a corporate action, the corporation becomes a proper criminal defendant.

Manslaughter is defined in Penal Code section 192:

"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice. It is of three kinds:

"1. Voluntary--upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.

"2. Involuntary--in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection ...."

This statute does not rule out the prosecution of corporations. Unlike other states' definitions, it does not limit itself to natural persons by defining the act of manslaughter as the killing "of a human being ... by another."

Petitioner has argued that the absence of the word "person" in section 192 indicates that this statute was not intended to reach corporations. This argument is not convincing. Section 192 defines a crime. It does not define its own scope of application; this is unnecessary in light of sections 7 and 26, supra. Though many sections of the Penal Code are in the form "any person who does X is guilty of Y," this would be an irrational statutory basis for distinction between crimes that can be committed by corporations from crimes that can only be committed by natural persons. If so, mayhem, kidnaping and assaults with intent to do great bodily harm could be committed by corporations, but murder and manslaughter could not. (Pen.Code, §§ 187, 192, 203, 207, 220.) These results show that the use of "any person who" language does not provide a distinguishing factor that bars prosecution of corporations for manslaughter. When interpreting statutes, we prefer constructions that do not lead to absurd consequences. (See In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 537, 159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549; Clements v. T.R. Bechtel Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 227, 233, 273 P.2d 5; see also Pen.Code, § 4.)

Petitioner's underlying assumption is that the legislature did not consider making corporations responsible for crimes against persons when it enacted the Penal Code. Although the code's language expresses no such exception, we are asked to rewrite apparently clear language to conform to the unexpressed assumptions of the 1872 legislators. Because we find no contrary expression in the statute or in the California code commissioners' notes accompanying the 1872 codes, we find it more appropriate to follow the apparently clear language of these statutes. Although courts have assumed in dicta that there is some category of crime that "cannot" be committed by corporations (see, e.g., United States v. John Kelso Co. (D.C.Cal.1898) 86 F. 304), there is no provision in the Penal Code that makes this distinction. Under Penal Code section 31, principals chargeable with an offense need not directly commit the act constituting the offense. Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are not offended by applying the clear meaning of statutory terms, even when there is mistaken dictum to the contrary. (People v. Sobiek (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 458, 474-476, 106 Cal.Rptr. 519, cert. den. 414 U.S. 855, 94 S.Ct. 155, 38 L.Ed.2d 104.)

Where a statute's language is clear, its plain meaning should be followed. (Great Lakes Properties, Inc. v. City of El Segundo (1977) 19 Cal.3d 152, 155, 137 Cal.Rptr. 154, 561 P.2d 244.) In that case the court refused to alter the Public Resource Code's definition of "person" in various contexts. The court commented: "We deem the fact the Act itself defines 'person' to be of importance. 'When a statute prescribes the meaning to be given to particular terms used by it, that meaning is generally binding on the courts. [Citation.]' " (Id., at p. 156, 137 Cal.Rptr. 154, 561 P.2d 244.)

Legislative history that might support conflicting inferences does not justify departing from clear legislative language, unless it would inevitably result in "absurd consequences" or frustrate the "manifest purposes" of the legislation as a whole. (People v. Boyd (1979) 24 Cal.3d 285, 294, 155 Cal.Rptr. 367, 594 P.2d 484.) Denying this petition will not result in absurd consequences or disrupt the Penal Code. We have searched for legislative or policy reasons which would exclude corporations from prosecution for manslaughter. None have been found, and none have been presented by petitioner.

California Penal Code section 193 prescribes imprisonment as the ordinary punishment for manslaughter, but does not impose a fine. Petitioner argues that absence of an appropriate punishment for corporations at this juncture indicates that section 192 does not reach corporate defendants.

Section 672 provides appropriate punishment for corporate crimes. ¹ (People v. Charter Thrift & Loan (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 412, 414, 106 Cal.Rptr. 364; cf. United States v. Union Supply Co. (1909) 215 U.S. 50, 30 S.Ct. 15, 54 L.Ed. 87.) This catchall fine section was enacted in 1872 along with the rest of the Penal Code and California's other general codes. These codes are to be construed as parts of the same statute. (Civ.Code, § 23.2.) When construing a statute with several provisions, constructions that give effect to all are preferred. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1858.) ²

Petitioner contends that this prosecution violates due process principles by unforeseeably enlarging Penal Code section 192. To the contrary, the present issue is whether section 192 applies to corporations. If it does, even if this is the first time it is actually used, there is no "enlargement" involved, and no peril to petitioner's due process rights. (People v. Sobiek, supra, 30 Cal.App.3d 458, 474-476, 106 Cal.Rptr. 519.) This case has been compared to Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617. The comparison does not hold up on examination. Keeler involved a situation where the language of the statute was being expanded. Penal Code section 187 referred, at that time, to the killing of a "human being." At common law, "human being" did not include a fetus, and the code commissioners' notes attached to Penal Code section 187 indicated that this tradition was to be preserved. (See Keeler, supra, at p. 630, 87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617.)

The code commissioners' notes on Penal Code sections 7, 26 and 192 are silent on the issue before this court. There is no announced intention to preserve some common law limiting doctrine. Moreover, the code language is unambiguous. It does not use "human being," or refer to "another" human being when referring to proper defendants. Because Penal Code section 7 defines "person" to include corporations, and...