Graniteville Co. v. Williams

• Decision Date: 05 August 1946
• Docket Number: 15863.
• Citation: 39 S.E.2d 202,209 S.C. 112
• Parties: GRANITEVILLE CO. v. WILLIAMS et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

39 S.E.2d 202

209 S.C. 112

GRANITEVILLE CO. v. WILLIAMS et al.

No. 15863.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

August 5, 1946

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Aiken County; M. M. Mann Judge.

Action by the Graniteville Company against L. E. Williams and others for an adjudication of title to certain property and for possession thereof. From a judgment in favor of defendant Effie Williams, plaintiff appeals.

Henderson & Salley, of Aiken, for appellant.

Williams & Busbee, of Aiken, for respondents.

OXNER, Justice.

This case involves the question of title to a lot of land measuring fifty by one hundred feet, located in the village of Graniteville, in Aiken County, upon which a combination store and dwelling is situated. Claiming title to said property and alleging that respondents were unlawfully in possession, appellant commenced this action in March, 1945 for the purpose of seeking an adjudication that said property belonged to it and securing possession thereof. Respondent L E. Williams alleged in his answer that he now claimed no interest in said lot of land, having sold and conveyed same by fee simple deed to his wife, respondent Effie Williams, in 1934. Respondent Effie Williams denied in her answer that appellant had any interest in said property and asserted that she was in possession of and owned said premises. She alleged that she entered into possession in 1934 under claim of title from her husband and has since occupied the property in dispute 'openly, adversely, continuously and exclusively, for a period of more than ten years' and thereby had acquired title by adverse possession. She further alleged that appellant had not within ten years before the commencement of this action been seized or possessed of the premises and was barred by the statute (Section 375, Code of 1942) from bringing this action.

It appears that respondents Love, Brantley and Mrs. Fowler, who were formerly tenants, never claimed any interest in the property. They have now moved from the premises and may be eliminated from the case. The contest, therefore, is one between appellant and respondent Effie Williams. At the close of all the evidence, each of these parties moved for a directed verdict. Both motions were refused by the trial Judge, who held that the record title to the property was in appellant, but submitted to the jury the question of whether respondent Effie Williams had acquired title by adverse possession. The jury rendered a verdict for said respondent. Appellant further made a motion, which was refused, for a verdict non obstante veredicto. By appropriate exceptions, appellant contends that the trial Judge erred in refusing its motion for a directed verdict and that he further erred in refusing one of its requests to charge.

Appellant operates, and has operated for approximately one hundred years, a textile plant at Graniteville, in Aiken County. (Its corporate name was formerly Graniteville Manufacturing Company but was changed in 1937 to that of the Graniteville Company by proper amendment to its charter.) Appellant owned and was in possession of the parcel of land in dispute, together with that part of the village of Graniteville which surrounds it, for many years prior to 1902. During that year it conveyed to the Augusta-Aiken Railway and Electric Corporation a right-of-way over its property for the construction and operation of an interurban electric trolley line between Aiken and Augusta. In 1920, it conveyed to the same grantee a small parcel of land in the village of Graniteville upon which to build a freight station and side track. This lot deeded in 1920 for the freight station and side track, together with the width at this point of the original right-of-way granted in 1902, makes up the lot in dispute. It was stipulated in each of these deeds that in the event that the trolley line was ever abandoned, the property described therein would revert to the grantor. The Augusta-Aiken Railway and Electric Corporation was merged into the South Carolina Power Company in 1924. The property conveyed was used in connection with the electric trolley line until 1929, when the trolley line was abandoned and the tracks removed. Under the terms of the conveyances mentioned, the grantee had the right to remove any buildings placed on the property within sixty days after the interurban electric trolley line was abandoned.

L. E. Williams, the husband of respondent Effie Williams, testified that sometime during 1929, about the time of the abandonment of the line, he purchased the parcel of land in dispute from the South Carolina Power Company and that a deed conveying the property was executed and delivered to him by the freight agent of the South Carolina Power Company at Graniteville, which was deposited by him in his safe and thereafter lost or misplaced. Williams went into possession at the time he claims to have purchased the property and used the building situated thereon as a warehouse to store groceries. At this time he was operating a grocery store nearby. In 1934, he suffered a nervous breakdown and lost his health. Shortly thereafter, on May 21, 1934, he sold and conveyed to his wife the lot in dispute and seven other parcels or tracts of land, together with certain personal property, for the sum of $1200. The deed was prepared and executed in the office of the Clerk of Court for Aiken County and was recorded on the same day it was executed. Mrs. Williams testified that she paid the consideration at the time the deed was executed and produced a receipt to that effect. This deed recites a consideration of $1200.00 and the granting clause is to 'Mrs. Effie Williams, her heirs and assigns forever in fee simple.' Six of the parcels or tracts of land are described in the deed without any qualifying words. However, in conveying the parcel of land in dispute and another parcel known as the 'barber shop' lot, it is stated that the grantor conveys 'all my right, title, interest and estate in and to' these two parcels. The deed contains a full description of the lot in controversy, following which it is stated that this is 'the same property purchased by L. E. Williams about the year 1929 from South Carolina Power Company.' The habendum clause is in the usual form used for a conveyance in fee simple and the deed contains a general warranty clause.

Immediately after purchasing the property in controversy and receiving the deed, Mrs. Williams took possession and commenced the operation of a grocery store. A sign bearing the name 'Mrs. L. E. Williams' was placed over the front door of the store. Shortly after moving into the building, Mrs. Williams added three rooms, a screened back porch, and a pump, at an estimated cost of $700. She, her son, and her daughter worked in the store. Her husband did not assist in any manner. Since 1934 she has had the exclusive management and control of the property. In 1942, she closed the store and made three rooms of the store building by inserting partitions and cutting windows at a cost of approximately $100. Since that time she has rented these rooms and collected the rents. She testified that no one ever undertook to disturb her in her possession or to assert any claim to the property prior to the commencement of this action, and that until then she did not know appellant was claiming any interest in the property.

One of the witnesses for appellant, Mr. Griffis, testified that he had been connected with the appellant since 1926; that he was made secretary in 1934 or 1935 and remained in this capacity for a period of four or five years; that for several years he lived within about a block of the property in dispute; that he recalled when the improvements were made on the building in 1934; that he passed by this property quite frequently; that his wife traded at this store, but he never entered the building; that while he understood that Mrs. Williams, her son and daughter worked in the store, he assumed that the store was being operated by Mr. Williams, although he admitted never seeing Mr. Williams around the premises; and that he did not recall seeing the sign over the front door of the store.

On October 30, 1936, at the request of appellant, Mr. Williams signed a letter in which he acknowledged that he occupied the property in question by permission of appellant and agreed to surrender possession when requested to do so. At the same time he signed a similar letter relating to the 'barber shop' property which he occupied under lease from appellant. The two letters were identical with the exception of the description of the property which was inserted at the bottom of each letter below the place for his signature. His explanation of this was that he read the description at the bottom of the letter relating to the 'barber shop' property and signed that letter, but signed the other letter without reading the description, thinking that it was a copy. There is no testimony showing that Mr. Williams had any authority to act for his wife in this transaction or that she had any knowledge of his having done so.

It appears that appellant had no actual knowledge of the execution of the deed by Williams to his wife prior to the commencement of this action. The action was originally commenced against Williams alone and the tenants on the property. When he asserted in his answer that the property had been deeded to his wife, the complaint was then amended by making her a party defendant. The witnesses for appellant testified that no effort was made to secure possession of the property until shortly before the commencement of this action because appellant had no particular need for it, but now desired possession in order to carry out a planned program of street and village improvements...