Grant-Overton v. Fort Wayne Urban League, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO.1:20-CV-0128 HAB-SLC |
| Parties | COSETTE GRANT-OVERTON. Plaintiff, v. FORT WAYNE URBAN LEAGUE, INC., and NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, INC. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Plaintiff, Cosette Grant-Overton, initiated the present discrimination suit in state court alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §2000e), 42 U.S.C §1981, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Family Medical Leave Act. (ECF No. 4). Plaintiff asserts that she was wrongfully terminated from her position as Chief Executive Officer of Fort Wayne Urban League ("FWUL"). FWUL removed the action to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Thereafter, Defendant National Urban League ("NUL") moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. (ECF No. 17). The parties conducted jurisdictional discovery and Plaintiff moved for, and was granted leave, to amend her Complaint to assert that Plaintiff was employed jointly by FWUL and NUL. (ECF Nos. 49, 55, 56). NUL has now renewed its Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (ECF No. 61) with respect to the Amended Complaint. For the following reasons, NUL's Motion to Dismiss will be DENIED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an African American female, was hired on May 21, 2018, to serve as the CEO of FWUL, a not-for-profit organization located in Fort Wayne, Indiana. NUL is a historic civil rights organization founded in 1910 dedicated to "economic empowerment, equality of opportunity, and social justice." (Decl. of Herman Lessard, Jr., ECF No. 62-1, at ¶ 2). NUL has approximately 90 affiliates serving 300 communities in 36 different states and the District of Columbia. (Id. at ¶ 6). FWUL is one of NUL's affiliates and their relationship is governed by a written Affiliate Agreement. (Id. at ¶ 7).
Plaintiff alleges she was terminated as CEO on May 2, 2019 and that her termination was the result of race and sex discrimination by FWUL and NUL. (Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 56). The Amended Complaint further alleges that FWUL and NUL are joint employers as they were "involved in her hiring and her termination, she had to maintain contact with both NUL and FWUL in her capacity as CEO, she had to correspond with and be accountable to both FWUL and NUL, and she was disciplined and advised by both FWUL and NUL with respect to her responsibilities and operations as CEO for FWUL." (Id. at ¶ 3).
Along with her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff attached her thirteen-page EEOC Complaint. It is a fair representation that Plaintiff thoroughly details what she believes is discriminatory conduct by FWUL, whom she specifically names as her employer. (Charge of Discrimination (Charge), ECF No. 56-1 at 1). She asserts that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and retaliation for "refusing to go along with illegal practices regarding financials and by refusing to go along with the covering up of fiscal discrepancies and by reporting those discrepancies to [FWUL's] leadership." (Charge, ¶ I). She alleges that she suffered disparate treatment compared to white men who had served as CEO at FWUL. (Charge, ¶II). She assertsthat she was treated in a hostile manner when she was required to report the gross negligence of the Board of Directors to NUL. Finally, she asserts that she reported a serious health condition to Defendants for which she intended to take FMLA leave when she was eligible under the FMLA but FWUL terminated her 19 days prior to her qualifying to take such leave.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) requires dismissal of a claim where personal jurisdiction is lacking. "[A] complaint need not include facts alleging personal jurisdiction." Steel Warehouse of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Leach, 154 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 1998). However, once the defendant moves to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of jurisdiction. See Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2000); Steel Warehouse, 154 F.3d at 715; RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1276 (7th Cir. 1997).
When a district court rules on a defendant's motion to dismiss based on the submission of written materials, without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff "need only make out a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction." See Hyatt Int'l Corp. v. Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 713 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Weidner Communications, Inc. v. H.R.H. Prince Bandar Al Faisal, 859 F.2d 1302, 1306 n. 7 (7th Cir. 1988); Nelson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1983) (). In evaluating whether the prima facie standard has been satisfied, the plaintiff "is entitled to theresolution in its favor of all disputes concerning relevant facts presented in the record." Nelson, 717 F.2d at 1123; see also RAR, 107 F.3d at 1275 ().
In a federal question case such as this one, a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant if either federal law or the law of the state in which the court sits authorizes service of process to that defendant. Mobile Anesthesiologists Chicago, LLC v. Anesthesia Associates Houston, 623 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2010). Congress did not provide for national service of process for either of Plaintiff's claims here. See Nathan v. Morgan Stanley Renewable Development Fund, LLC, No. 11 C 2231, 2012 WL 1886440, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2012) (); Cuff v. Trans States Holdings, Inc., No. 10 C 1349, 2010 WL 2698299, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2010) (). Accordingly, this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant only if it is amenable to service under Indiana law. Personal jurisdiction under Indiana law "extends to the limits allowed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Weston v. Big Sky Conference, 466 F.Supp.3d 896, 905 (N.D. Ill. 2020); E & A Holdings, LLC v. Leviton Mfg. Co., No. 1:18 CV 02400 SEB-MJD, 2018 WL 6659729, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 24, 2018); Ind. Trial P. Rule 4.4(A).
Federal law recognizes two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 n.8-9 (1984). General jurisdiction exists when the defendant has "continuous and systematic" contacts with the forum state. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416; Hyatt Int'l, 302 F.3d at 713. If such contacts exist, "the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even in cases that do not arise out of and arenot related to the defendant's forum contacts." Hyatt Int'l, 302 F.3d at 713. On the other hand, specific jurisdiction is more limited and exists for controversies that "arise out of" or "relate to" a defendant's forum contacts.
"Specific personal jurisdiction is appropriate where (1) the defendant has purposefully directed his activities at the forum state or purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in that state, and (2) the alleged injury arises out of the defendant's forum-related activities." Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2010). "[T]he nature of the purposeful-direction/purposeful-availment inquiry depends in large part on the type of claim at issue." Felland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 674 (7th Cir. 2012).
To be subject to specific jurisdiction, a defendant need only have sufficient "minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). "Jurisdiction is proper . . . where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a substantial connection with the forum State." Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts look to the defendant's "conduct and connection with the forum State" to determine if he should "reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
DISCUSSION
As indicated, NUL's motion challenges this Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over it. NUL contends there is no basis for the Court to exercise either general or specific jurisdiction, as Grant-Overton's claims arise from her employment by FWUL, one of NUL's 90 affiliates, and not from any actions of NUL. NUL emphasizes that under its Affiliate Agreement with FWUL,FWUL has certain reporting obligations to NUL and NUL has the right to conduct periodic audits of FWUL, but FWUL has its own board of directors, makes its own employment and operational decisions independent of NUL, and bears the sole responsibility for its own day-to-day operations. NUL contends that it did not participate in FWUL's decision to hire or fire Grant-Overton and did not control any aspect of her employment by FWUL.
Although she makes arguments in favor of both general and specific jurisdiction, the thrust of Plaintiff's proposed basis for jurisdiction is NUL's specific contacts with Indiana as it relates to her employment at FWUL. She asserts that NUL participated in the decisions of its Fort Wayne affiliate with respect to the hiring process, controlled the terms and...
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