Grant v. Bodwell

• Decision Date: 11 December 1886
• Citation: 7 A. 12,78 Me. 460
• Parties: GRANT v. BODWELL and others.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

7 A. 12

78 Me. 460

GRANT

v. BODWELL and others.¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

December 11, 1886.

On exceptions by appellees from supreme judicial court, Knox county.

This was an appeal from a decree of distribution made by the judge of probate. At nisi prius the appeal was sustained, and the decree reversed, to which ruling the appellees alleged exceptions.

True P. Pierce, for appellants. C. E. Littlefield, for appellees.

HASKELL, J. Priscilla E. Cables died intestate, leaving an only daughter, who died in her minority, unmarried, without issue, and prior to distribution of her mother's estate, leaving a grandmother, Priscilla E. Prescott, her sole heir. Cables v. Prescott, 67 Me. 582. The grandmother, Mrs. Prescott, died testate, and afterwards, the administrator of Mrs. Cables settled his account in the probate court, showing a balance of personal estate in his hands for distribution amounting to $2,092.46, which, on petition, the judge of probate ordered distributed among all the heirs of Mrs. Cables. From that decree an appeal was taken to this court, and at nisi prius the decree was reversed, and the administrator of Mrs. Cables was ordered to pay the balance named in the estate of the grandmother, Mrs. Prescott, and the case comes up on exception. At the death of Mrs. Cables, her real estate descended to her heirs, and her personal estate to her administrator to be administered, and the balance distributed among her heirs,—heirs living at her decease, instead of such only as may have survived at the time of distribution.

The judge of probate could only decree distribution among the heirs of the intestate as they existed at her death, and this he should do by naming each one in the decree; and, if any heir had died prior to distribution, then its share should have been ordered to be paid to its legal representative, that it might be administered and subjected to the payment of any debts existing against the estate of such deceased heir; for, without administration upon the estate of such deceased heir, it cannot be judicially known what sum ought to be distributed, and to whom it should be paid. If the decree of the judge of probate bad directed the estate in question to be paid to the legal representative of the intestate's deceased daughter and sole heir, no fault could be found with it; but it is treated as meaning that distribution shall be made among the intestate's next of kin, living at the date of the decree, as they are entitled by the law of descent. Given such meaning, its scope was beyond the power of the judge of probate to decree, and it could not protect an administrator who should obey it. True, in this case, the sole heir was a minor, who died unmarried and without issue, and there can be little or no risk in the administrator's disposing of the estate in his hands in the same manner that her adminstrator would do if there had been one; that is, by paying it to the executor of the grandmother's will, who would then dispose of it lawfully. But the rule is inflexible: an heir takes his share of the realty at the death of his ancestor, and then acquires a right to his distributive share of the personalty, whatever it may prove to be; and, when acquired, it becomes subjected to his debts, by means of the proper administration upon his estate. If the share of one heir may be treated as extinguished in a decree for distribution, why may not all be imperiled for such prudential reasons as have weight with a judge of probate? The decree must conform to the statute, and order distribution among the heirs of the deceased who were living at his death, and, if any of them be dead, then that the share of that one be paid to his legal representative. Rev. St. c. 65, § 27; Id. c. 75, §§ 1, 8; Knowlton v. Johnson, 46 Me. 489.

In this view of the case, the exceptions must be sustained, and a decree should be...