Grant v. Davis

• Decision Date: 23 November 1988
• Citation: 537 So.2d 7
• Parties: Lorenzo GRANT and Wood Gaston, Jr. v. Patricia DAVIS; and Tina Ingersoll, a minor, By and Through her father and next friend, Edward Ingersoll. 86-436.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 7

537 So.2d 7

Lorenzo GRANT and Wood Gaston, Jr. v. Patricia DAVIS; and Tina Ingersoll, a minor, By and Through her father and next friend, Edward Ingersoll.

86-436.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Nov. 23, 1988.

Jack F. Norton, Chief Counsel, and Jerry L. Weidler, Asst. Counsel, Alabama Highway Dept., Montgomery, for appellants.

Truman M. Hobbs, Jr., of Copeland, Franco, Screws & Gill, Montgomery, for appellees.

BEATTY, Justice.

This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of defendants' motion for JNOV or, in the alternative, for a new trial in an action for personal injuries suffered in an automobile accident caused by a defect in the road.

On December 10, 1984, Patricia Rogers Davis and her sister, Tina Ingersoll were traveling south on Highway 49 a few miles south of Dadeville. The right rear tire of the Chevrolet van in which they were riding slid off the road into a rut or drop-off. Davis attempted to guide the van back onto the road, but she lost control of the vehicle, causing it to flip. Davis and Ingersoll suffered personal injuries and the van was damaged beyond repair. They brought an action against certain individual supervisory employees of the State Highway Department ("the Department"), asserting that they were negligent and reckless or wanton in failing to properly inspect, maintain, or repair the shoulder of the road.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that they were immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the attendant governmental function immunity because, they claimed, all of the alleged acts or omissions by the defendants were done in good faith and in the performance of their discretionary administrative functions. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of three named defendants but denied the motion as to appellants Lorenzo H. Grant and Wood Gaston. The parties proceeded to trial on the claims against these defendants.

Lorenzo H. Grant is the District I engineer responsible for all construction and maintenance activities within his district. It is his job to ride the roads and, along with his superintendent, Wood Gaston, to determine what repairs or construction is needed. According to Gaston, who is the District I superintendent, he also inspects all the roads at least once a month. He and Grant share 37 maintenance activities. When a need for repair is determined, Grant and Gaston rank or prioritize the repair projects according to a number of factors including the type of defect, the particular road in question, and the economic resources and manpower available for allocation by them.

Gaston testified that in late November 1984 he drove down Highway 49, including the stretch where Davis was injured, inspecting the roadway. Gaston determined that some routine maintenance was needed along Highway 49 and sent a crew to start working. Gaston stated that, at that time, he did spot certain potholes and ruts on the shoulder on Highway 49 in isolated places. However, he did not discover any ruts or drop-offs in the entire stretch of the curve where Davis later had her accident.

The case was submitted to the jury, which returned separate verdicts for the plaintiffs. Judgment was entered on the verdict for plaintiff Davis for $16,000 and on the verdict for plaintiff Ingersoll, who sued through her father and next friend, Edward Ingersoll, for $2,500. The court denied the defendants' motion for JNOV or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The defendants appeal, asserting that they are entitled to discretionary function immunity and, therefore, as a matter of law, are not liable for the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs. Thus, the defendants argue that they were entitled to JNOV based upon the immunity defense as to all counts in the complaint. We agree.

Discretionary function immunity is just what its label implies: immunity from tort liability afforded to public officials acting within the general scope of their authority in performing functions that involve a degree of discretion. See, DeStafney v. University of Alabama, 413 So.2d 391 (Ala.1981), adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 895D, "Public Officers" (1974). The applicability of the doctrine of qualified immunity must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Under this Court's decision in Barnes v. Dale, 530 So.2d 770 (Ala.1988), whether a particular defendant is engaged in a protected discretionary function, and is thereby immune from liability for injuries he causes, is a question of law to be decided by the trial court.

In Bell v. Chisom, 421 So.2d 1239, 1241 (Ala.1982), this Court discussed at length the elements of, and factors for determining, the applicability of discretionary function immunity in a given case:

"As the Restatement 's comments suggest, the courts have at times found the discretionary function standard difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, in many cases this standard's proper application will be readily apparent. Two such cases will serve to illustrate the conflicting policy considerations the courts must apply. On the one hand, in DeStafney itself we had no difficulty in rejecting the immunity claim of the individual defendant, an aide at the University day care center who allegedly allowed the plaintiff's child to fall off playground equipment. This defendant's function clearly required due care rather than difficult decision making. On the other hand, we accepted the claim of immunity in Gill v. Sewell, Ala., 356 So.2d 1196 (1978), where the director of a work release center was sued for his decision to release a convicted felon who shot the plaintiff. That decision was...