Grant v. Oceans Healthcare, LLC
| Decision Date | 09 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-00642 |
| Parties | WANDA L. GRANT v. OCEANS HEALTHCARE, LLC AND OCEANS ACQUISITION, INC. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
MAG. JUDGE RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff, Wanda Grant's ("Plaintiff" or "Grant") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. 31). Defendants, Oceans Healthcare, LLC, Oceans Acquisition, Inc. and Oceans Behavioral Hospital of Baton Rouge, LLC ("Defendants" or collectively "Oceans"), opposed the motion. (Doc. 36). Plaintiff replied. (Doc. 40). Also before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 32). Plaintiff opposed the motion. (Doc. 37). Defendants replied. (Doc. 39). The Court has carefully considered the law, the facts in the record, and the arguments and submissions of the parties and is prepared to rule. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgement is denied. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
Plaintiff instituted suit against Defendants on September 14, 2017. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleged that Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq, ("ADA"), (Doc. 1, p. 1), and Louisiana state law "for disability discrimination", La. R.S. 23:323. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff characterizes herself as a "cancer survivor" and asserts that she was perceived to have a disability and was discriminated in her workplace on the basis of a past diagnosis. (Id.).
Plaintiff is a Licensed Professional Counselor ("LPC") and was hired as a therapist by Oceans Behavioral Hospital of Baton Rouge ("Hospital") on November 29, 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 3). Eight years prior to being hired by the Hospital, Plaintiff "was diagnosed with stage 0 cancer (pre-cancer) and underwent treatment". (Id.). On January 10, 2017, Plaintiff underwent a mammogram and ultra sound to investigate a lump. Because of her prior history, Plaintiff was concerned. Prior to undergoing her mammogram and ultra sound, Plaintiff alleges that she advised her immediate supervisor, Joyce Garon, of her reason for a need to take leave. (Doc. 1, pp. 3-4). Ms. Garon does not recall Plaintiff's request for time off for a mammogram or a disclosed history of breast cancer. (Doc. 39-1, p. 3).
When Plaintiff returned to work after her appointment on January 11, 2017, she alleges that she "was approached" by "her administrator", Valerie Dalton, regarding the "results of her mammogram". (Doc. 1, p. 4). Ms. Dalton, Administrator for the Hospital, claims that Plaintiff approached her and volunteered that she had recently been absent for a mammogram and was concerned because of a breast cancer history. (Doc. 32-4, p. 4).
On January 12, 2017, Plaintiff's employment was reduced from full-time therapist to an as-needed status ("PRN"). Plaintiff claims that Dalton told her that she would remain on PRN status "until she could find another job, because her current position was being phased out". Plaintiff claims that she was "[u]ltimately" "forced to resign". (Id.). Dalton denies stating "until [you] can find another job" or that the position of therapist was being phased out. The reason for the demoted work status was decreased patient attendance evidenced by a recent patient census and resulting downward fiscal trends and decreased revenue. Two other employees, a nurse and a driver, were also demoted in status due to the planned reduction in force. (Doc. 32-4).
Plaintiff alleges that she was "later informed" by "a human resources representative" that she was "in fact forced out of her position" due to "the fear of a cancer relapse, which would cause her to miss work". (Id.). Defendants deny this statement.
Plaintiff amended her Complaint on October 10, 2017. (Doc. 5). The amended Complaint did not alter the allegations summarized above from the original Complaint; however, Plaintiff identified the various Oceans Defendants as "Defendant 1", "Defendant 2" and "Defendant 3", asserting that any one of the Defendants or collectively are potentially responsible. (Doc. 5).
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the mover bears his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of fact, See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (internal citations omitted). The non-mover's burden is not satisfied by "conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a 'scintilla' of evidence." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(citations and internal quotations omitted). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment may not sit on his hands, complacently relying on the pleadings. Weyant v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 917 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1990). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587. General allegations that fail to reveal detailed and precise facts will not preventthe award of summary judgment. Walton v. Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350, 1352 (5th Cir. 1994). Further:
In resolving the motion, the court may not undertake to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes; so long as the evidence in the record is such that a reasonable jury drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party could arrive at a verdict in that party's favor, the court must deny the motion.
Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991).
On her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiff asks the Court to find that she prevails on her claim of disability discrimination under the ADA. Plaintiff does not seek a finding related to her claim under the LEDL. Plaintiff argues her prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA supported by record evidence and argues that Defendants' legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for reducing her employment status was a pretext.
Plaintiff is a Licensed Professional Counselor. She was hired as a therapist on November 29, 2016, to work at Oceans' Intensive Out-Patient Clinic ("IOP"). (Doc. 31-2, p. 1 (citing Doc. 31-4)). In 2002, Plaintiff claims that she was "diagnosed with breast cancer". (Doc. 31-2, p. 1 )). On January 9, 2017, Plaintiff underwent a mammogram and ultrasound to investigate a lump. (Doc. 31-2, p. 1 )). When she returned to work, she provided her supervisor with a note from her doctor regarding the reason for her absence. (Doc. 31-2, p. 1 )). On January 11, 2017, Plaintiff claims that the facility administrator, Valerie Dalton, approached her regarding the results of her medical appointment. (Doc. 31-2, p. 1 (citing Doc. 31-1, p. 120, pp. 6-15)). On January 12, 2017,Plaintiff met with Dalton and the facility human resources director at the time, Edward Hannie, at which time, Plaintiff's employment was reduced to PRN status. Plaintiff alleges that Dalton advised her that she could remain at this status until she found other employment. (Doc. 31-2, p. 2 )). Plaintiff resigned instead. (Doc. 31-2, p. 2 (citing Doc. 31-4)). Hannie later advised Plaintiff that she was "forced out of her position" by Dalton due to a fear of cancer relapse and being left short-handed. (Doc. 31-2, p. 2 (citing Doc. 31-4, pp. 144-145)).
Plaintiff first argues that she is a "qualified individual by being regarded as disabled". (Doc. 31-2, p. 5). Plaintiff avers that: she discussed with her supervisor that she was a cancer survivor and there was a concern of relapse, (Doc. 31-2, p. 5 ; )); she experienced a "prohibited adverse action" when her employment was reduced from full time to "'as needed'" presumably based on the assumption that she would take time off for medical care related to cancer, (Doc. 31-2, p. 5 (citing Doc. 31-4, pp. 134-36)); she requested a leave of absence to attend a medical appointment, (Doc. 31-2, p. 5 )); she submitted a note from her doctor upon return to work, (id.); Dalton later inquired about Plaintiff's diagnosis and treatment, (id.); Dalton indicated that Plaintiff should provide her with the test results, (id.); Dalton and Hannie then informed Plaintiff of her change in employment, (Doc. 31-2, pp. 5-6 )); and the close proximity in time of Plaintiff notifying her employer of her medical status and the change in employment status is a "sufficient inference that Defendants regarded Plaintiff as disabled". (Doc. 31-2, p. 6 (citing Suggs v. Cent. Oil of Baton Rouge, LLC, Civ. A. 13-25, 2014 WL 3037213, at *6 (M.D. La. July 3, 2014)).
Plaintiff also relies upon Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 1999); Heyman v. Queens Vill. Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty. Adolescent Program, Inc., 198 F.3d 68, 73 (2nd Cir. 1999); Price v. Dolphin Servs., Inc., No. 99-3888, 2000 WL 1789962, at *10 (E.D. La. Dec. 5, 2000); and Costello v. St. Francis Hosp., 258 F. Supp. 2d 144 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) for the premise that a close proximity in time between when a medical condition arises or is disclosed and the change in employment status infers...
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