Grant v. State, 23229.
| Decision Date | 21 July 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. 23229.,23229. |
| Citation | 170 S.E. 394,47 Ga.App. 234 |
| Parties | GRANT. v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
1. A person who counsels and encourages the commission of a misdemeanor by promising to buy the fruits of a larceny is guilty as a principal, although he did not act as one of the actual perpetrators of the crime, and he may be tried in the county in which the larceny was committed, although he lives in another county.
2. The evidence supports the verdict, and the judge did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.
Error from Superior Court, Baker County; C. W. Worrill, Judge.
J. Wiley Grant was convicted of larceny from the house, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
P. Z. Geer and W. I. Geer, both of Colquitt, for plaintiff in error.
Robt. B. Short, Sol. Gen., of Newton, for the State.
[I] 1. J. Wiley Grant was convicted of the offense of a misdemeanor (larceny from the house). Only the material parts of the evidence necessary to a decision of the case will be set out. The defendant and Sam Spires, Green Smith, Crawford Long, and F. E. Wid-ner were jointly indicted for the offense of larceny from the house, in that, "on the 15th day of March, in the year 1931, " they "did then and there, after entering the mule barn and corn crib of G. W. Kelly, unlawfully, privately, wrongfully and fraudulently take and carry away therefrom with intent to steal the same, 1005 pounds of white Spanish pea-nuts of the value of forty dollars, contrary to the laws of said State, the good order, peace, and dignity thereof." G. W. Kelly, sworn in behalf of the state, testified that he was the owner of some white Spanish peanuts in sacks along about the date of the alleged larceny, and that they were stored in his barn, next to his house, which was in Raker county, and that along about that time he lost them; that he tracked a truck from his barn to the defendant's house. This statement was corroborated by two other witnesses. He further swore that empty sacks were found in the crib of the defendant. It was shown by three witnesses for the state that a truck was seen to have driven into the yard of the defendant some time after midnight on the night of the larceny.
Green Smith and Sam Spires, jointly accused with the plaintiff in error here, testified materially that they had both been tried and convicted for the theft of the peanuts of Mr. Kelly; that they were guilty of the crime. They further swore that the plaintiff in error promised them that, if they would steal the peanuts from Kelly, he would buy them at a reasonable price, and that he assisted them in unloading the peanuts after they had stolen them; that before they stole the peanuts they had an agreement with him that he would buy them, and that he discussed the matter with them; that in the discussion he told them to get Kelly's peanuts. An amendment to the motion for new trial contained two grounds: One that the venue of the crime was not proven, in that it was not shown that any crime was committed by the defendant in Baker county, he being a resident of Miller county; and the other that it affirmatively appears from the evidence that, if the defendant was guilty of any crime, it was that of receiving stolen goods and not larceny from the house as alleged, and that he was guilty of that offense in Miller county. The movant also insists on the general grounds. We shall discuss the first two propositions together.
Sections 44 and 45 of the Penal Code of Georgia read as follows: "An accessory is one who is not the chief actor in the offense, nor present at its performance, but in some way concerned therein, either before or after the act committed.
"An accessory before the fact is one who, being absent at the time of the crime committed, doth yet procure, counsel, or command another to commit a crime."
The defendant here is charged with the commission of a misdemeanor. If he would bear the relation of accessory before the fact to the crime charged, if the crime were a felony, then he would be guilty as if a principal, as all who procure, counsel, command, aid, or abet the commission of a misdemeanor are regarded by the law as principal offenders. Loeb v. State, 6 Ga. App....
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State v. Yelle
...a murder committed in Mississippi, the complaint alleging the murder was committed in Mississippi and not in Louisiana. In Grant v. State, 47 Ga.App. 234, 170 S.E. 394, by appellant, the defendant Grant was convicted of a misdemeanor (larceny from the house). It was shown that Grant was not......
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Kemp v. State
... ... 338. There ... [6 S.E.2d 198] ... are no accessories in misdemeanors. All persons aiding or ... abetting are chargeable as principals. Grant v ... State, 47 Ga.App. 234 (1), 170 S.E. 394; Sirmans v ... State, 48 Ga.App. 159 (1), 172 S.E. 93 ... 2. A ... ...
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Kemp v. State
...(1), 64 S.E. 338. Thereare no accessories in misdemeanors. All persons aiding or abetting are chargeable as principals. Grant v. State, 47 Ga.App. 234 (1), 170 S.E. 394; Sirmans v. State, 48 Ga.App. 159 (1), 172 S.E. 93. 2. A representation by one that he has title to a certain automobile, ......
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Dunn v. State
... ... When one counsels and encourages others to commit crimes by promising to buy the fruits of the crime, he is guilty as a principal. Grant v. State, 47 Ga.App. 234(1), 170 S.E. 394 ( [245 Ga. App. 848] ... 1933). Although Dunn did not specifically select places to be burglarized, that ... ...