Grant v. State
| Decision Date | 09 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 45615,45615 |
| Parties | GRANT v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
John W. Davis, Brunswick, for James E. Grant, Jr.
Richard H. Taylor, Asst. Dist. Atty., Glenn Thomas, Jr., Dist. Atty., Jesup, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., for the State.
In 1985 James E. Grant, Jr. entered guilty pleas to two counts of violations of OCGA § 16-13-30, which prohibits the sale of cocaine. He was sentenced to serve three years in prison. In 1987, after his release from prison, he sold cocaine to an undercover police agent. He was indicted, tried by a jury, and found guilty. Under the mandatory sentencing provision of OCGA § 16-13-30(d), he was sentenced to life in prison. 1
Grant contends that the evidence does not support the verdict and that OCGA § 16-13-30(d), which mandates a sentence of life imprisonment upon a second conviction for selling cocaine, is unconstitutional in that it violates both the Fourteenth and the Eighth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
1. From the evidence in this case a rational trier of fact could have found Grant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime for which he was tried, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. In Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-285, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1144-1145, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980), a twice-convicted felon who was convicted a third time for stealing $120.75 was sentenced to life imprisonment under the Texas recidivist statute. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held:
The purpose of a recidivist statute such as that involved here is not to simplify the task of prosecutors, judges, or juries. Its primary goals are to deter repeat offenders and, at some point in the life of one who repeatedly commits criminal offenses serious enough to be punished as felonies, to segregate that person from the rest of society for an extended period of time. This segregation and its duration are based not merely on that person's most recent offense but also on the propensities he has demonstrated over a period of time during which he has been convicted of and sentenced for other crimes. Like the line dividing felony theft from petty larceny, the point at which a recidivist will be deemed to have demonstrated the necessary propensities and the amount of time that the recidivist will be isolated from society are matters largely within the discretion of the punishing jurisdiction. We therefore hold that...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Butler v. State
...pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-30(d) for repeat drug offenders, Rucks v. State24 held that under the Supreme Court of Georgia's decision of Grant v. State25 (which relied on the United States Supreme Court decision of Rummel Estelle26), such a punishment did not violate the Eighth Amendment. See ......
-
Ortiz v. State, S96A0585
...the punishing jurisdiction. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285(III), 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1145, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980); Grant v. State, 258 Ga. 299, 300(2), 368 S.E.2d 737 (1988). In Rummel, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a recidivist statute providing a life sentence for a th......
-
Hailey v. State, S93A0186
...prior offense, before mandating a life sentence under OCGA § 16-13-30(d) for a second offense. As we pointed out in Grant v. State, 258 Ga. 299, 300, 368 S.E.2d 737 (1988), citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-285, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980), the purpose of a recidivist st......
-
Stephens v. State
...cruel and unusual punishment under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Grant v. State, 258 Ga. 299, 300(2), 368 S.E.2d 737 (1988). However, he argues that, under Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVII of the 1983 Georgia Constitution, § 16-13-30(d) constitutes cruel ......
-
Crimes and Offenses Hb 200
...2011). 100. See O.C.G.A. § 35-3-4.3(b) (Supp. 2011). 101. Id. 102. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Grant v. State, 258 Ga. 299, 368 S.E.2d 737 (1988). 144 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:1 primary thrust of the Act is to raise penalties on those persons resp......