Grasso v. Phillips
| Decision Date | 11 December 1962 |
| Parties | , 46 Lab.Cas. P 50,686 Frank GRASSO, Carleton Faler, Harry Scott, Patrick Harte, George McGrew, Nicholas Vrataric, Frank Schaeffer, Wilbur Johnson, John McMillan, William Swanwick, Walter Weil, Fred Peyser, Salvatore Del Gatto, Addison R. Gibbs, Jr., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Paul PHILLIPS, as President, and Joseph Addy, as Secretary-Treasurer of the United Papermakers and Paperworkers, an unincorporated association of more than seven members, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Benjamin Wyle, New York City, of counsel (Steven J. Goldsmith, New York City, Warren Woods, Washington, D. C., Samuel L. Rothbard and Abraham L. Friedman, Newark, N. J., on the brief; Luxemburg & Wyle, New York City, attorneys) for defendant-appellant.
Caesar C. Guazzo, New York City, of counsel (Guazzo & Frechtman, New York City, attorneys) for plaintiffs-respondents.
Before BREITEL, J. P., and RABIN, McNALLY, EAGER, and BERGAN, JJ.
Judgment in favor of plaintiffs affirmed with costs to respondents.
All concur except BERGAN, J., who dissents and votes to reverse and dismiss the complaint.
Plaintiffs who are a group of officers and members of the United Papermakers and Paperworkers, an international labor union, have sought and obtained from the New York Supreme Court a judgment passing on a disputed point of interpretation of the Union's constitution, with resulting affirmative and injunctive relief.
The intervention by the court in the internal affairs of the Union with radical judicial directions undoing the acts of its officers because the plaintiffs demonstrate a difference with the Union administration as to policies and acts permitted by the constitution, is not warranted on this record. Plaintiffs, suing for themselves and others said to share their opinions, show no impairment of any property right of their own or of the others said to be similarly situated.
The Union was formed in 1957 by a merger of A. F. of L. and C. I. O. unions and on the merger 13 regions were created for administrative purposes, each having a vice president. There is proof that the establishment of this number of regions was to minimize the dislocations within the constituent unions resulting from the merger and to provide a continuance of officers of both previous separate organizations; and that it would be expected as time went on that the number of regions would be reduced.
The constitution, adopted in 1957 and amended in 1960, provided for '15 International Vice Presidents' and for the election of vice presidents, known in such case also as 'Regional Directors' by the resions 'now established'. The number of such regions at the times of adoption and amendment of the constitution was 13. The other two vice presidents were 'at large'.
The constitution (Article VI, § 1[a]) vested in the international president powers in respect of revision of the regions. The one significant to this litigation is: 'He may establish or revise regional boundaries to advance the efficient operation of the organization.' The power of constitutional interpretation is vested in the president: 'He shall interpret this Constitution.' (Article VI.) His official acts are made subject to the approval of the Executive Board (Article VI, § 1[c]).
This constitutes a clear delegation to the president of an arbitral or judicial power within the Union to pass definitively and with authority on issues of meaning and intent of constitutional language when disputes, such as this one is, arise between contending factions. On February 7, 1961 Donald Thoms, vice president, regional director, of Region X died. This region embraced the states of Oklahoma, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, Colorado, and Nebraska. Thereafter, the international president, defendant Phillips, eliminated Region X and, by adjusting contiguous regional areas, absorbed the territory of Region X into certain other regions. This action was approved by the Executive Board of the Union; and the vacancy in the office of vice president caused by Mr. Thom's death was filed by the Executive Board until the next International Convention on the theory that although there were then 12 regions the number of vice presidents continued at 15 and there was a vacancy.
The president has interpreted the constitutional language, 'establish or revise regional boundaries' to embrace a power to eliminate a region; and his order in respect of Region X was in pursuance of this interpretation. The Court at Special Term has read this language in a narrower sense to exclude any possibility of eliminating a region and has granted judgment accordingly for broad equitable relief.
Unless the president's interpretation is altogether arbitrary and unreasonable, it must be sustained; and even if his interpretation goes very far afield from the sense in which a lawyer or judge would read the Union charter, the president's interpretation must be followed, absent some clearly demonstrated adverse effect upon a 'property right' of the protestants who come to court claiming to be aggrieved.
Nothing is better settled in American decisional law than the refusal of the court in equity to intervene point by point in issues of constitutional interpretation of union charters at the instance of contending groups within the union walls who show no greater a 'property' right than the desire for an enlarged influence in the dynamic flow of union affairs.
Equitable intervention in the internal affairs of labor organizations has been justified on the same general grounds that have warranted it in fraternal or other membership groups, i. e., because some 'property' right of the complaining member or members has been found adversely affected.
Since the modern labor organization exercises so large an influence on the economic life of its members, and, indeed, often controls their ability to make a living, it has not been difficult to find a property right adversely affected in expulsion proceedings by unions or in the diversion of union funds by officers and committees. But unless some such direct economic right is seen affected in the controversy brought before the court, there remains a marked judicial reluctance to adjudicate internal union disputes.
The general rule is stated in 87 C.J.S. Trade Unions § 48, p. 854 that 'interference by the courts is not warranted unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of power above and beyond some internal controversy merely involving a debatable question.' (p. 855). 'Generally, however, courts should intervene in the internal affairs of unions only in case of grave necessity or where a patent injustice will be redressed' (p. 856).
A good illustration of this rule is in Harris v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., D.C., 1 F.Supp. 946. There a...
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