Gravely v. Jeffreys

• Decision Date: 23 January 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:11-cv-500
• Parties: MICHAEL T. GRAVELY, Petitioner, v. ROB JEFFREYS, Warden, Ross Correctional Institution, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

MICHAEL T. GRAVELY, Petitioner,

v. ROB JEFFREYS, Warden, RossCorrectional Institution, Respondent.

Case No. 2:11-cv-500

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

January 23, 2013

District Judge George C. Smith

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner Michael T. Gravely brought this habeas corpus action to obtain relief from his conviction in the Franklin County common Pleas Court and consequent sentence of thirty-six years imprisonment, which he is serving in Respondent's custody.

Gravely pleads the following Grounds for Relief:

Ground One: Petitioner was denied due process when the evidence was insufficient.

Supporting Facts: The evidence is insufficient when no witness by the State of Ohio identified Petitioner as the suspect that fired shots at Columbus police officers.

Ground Two: Petitioner was denied due process when the trial court overruled Petitioner's motion to sever the indictments.

Supporting Facts: Petitioner was prejudiced by the joinder of the indictments. Trial counsel argued to the court that the joinder prejudiced the petitioner by limiting his ability to present certain defenses by possibly taking the stand in his own defense on the felonious assault charges he could be put in a situation to criminate [sic] himself on the drug charges.

Ground Three: Petitioner was denied a fair trial when the evidence should have been suppressed in violation of the 4th and 14th amendments of the United States Constitution.

Supporting Facts: Petitioner's trial counsel filed a motion to suppress the search warrants obtained in this case. The first was defective in this case even when the detectives knew the address was wrong, they continued obtaining search warrants with incorrect addresses.

Ground Four: Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal when he failed to raise insufficiency of the evidence.

Supporting Facts: The petitioner was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel when counsel failed to raise on appeal regarding the fact that petitioner's drug convictions lacked sufficiency of the evidence to convict him.

Ground Five: Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel when he failed to raise on appeal the suppression of the unreliability of the admissibility of identification.

Supporting Facts: Petitioner argues that the confidential informant who identified him at trial incorrectly described the person who sold him crack cocaine. The confidential informant described the petitioner as 6 foot 1 205 pounds; when counsel at trial demonstrated that he was not 6'1 206 lbs.

(Petition, Doc. No. 3, PageID 32-42.)

Analysis

Ground One: Insufficiency of the Evidence

In his First Ground for Relief, Gravely contends there was insufficient evidence to convict him of felonious assault on two Columbus police officers, each of whom was shot through the back door of the house in which Gravely was arrested.

An allegation that a verdict was entered upon insufficient evidence states a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Johnson v. Coyle, 200 F.3d 987, 991 (6th Cir. 2000); Bagby v. Sowders, 894 F.2d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 1990)(en banc). In order for a conviction to be constitutionally sound, every element of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.

[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319; United States v. Paige, 470 F.3d 603, 608 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Somerset, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76699 (S.D. Ohio 2007). This rule was recognized in Ohio law at State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, 574 N.E. 2d 492 (1991). Of course, it is state law which determines the elements of offenses; but once the state has adopted the elements, it must then prove each of them beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, supra.

In cases such as Petitioner's challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and filed after enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214)(the "AEDPA"), two levels of deference to state decisions are required:

In an appeal from a denial of habeas relief, in which a petitioner challenges the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him, we are thus bound by two layers of deference to groups who might view facts differently than we would. First, as in all sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, we must determine whether, viewing the trial testimony and exhibits in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). In doing so, we do not reweigh theevidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the jury. See United States v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 1993). Thus, even though we might have not voted to convict a defendant had we participated in jury deliberations, we must uphold the jury verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty after resolving all disputes in favor of the prosecution. Second, even were we to conclude that a rational trier of fact could not have found a petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, on habeas review, we must still defer to the state appellate court's sufficiency determination as long as it is not unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6th Cir. 2009). In a sufficiency of the evidence habeas corpus case, deference should be given to the trier-of-fact's verdict under Jackson v. Virginia and then to the appellate court's consideration of that verdict, as commanded by AEDPA. Tucker v. Palmer, 541 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 2008).

We have made clear that Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference. First, on direct appeal, "it is the responsibility of the jury -- not the court -- to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set aside the jury's verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury." Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U. S. 1, ______, 132 S. Ct. 2, 181 L. Ed. 2d 311, 313 (2011) (per curiam). And second, on habeas review, "a federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision was 'objectively unreasonable.'" Ibid. (quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U. S. ______, ______, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 176 L. Ed. 2d 678 (2010)).

Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. ______, ______, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012)(per curiam).

The felonious assault charges were tried to a jury which found Gravely guilty. He raised this claim on direct appeal to the Tenth District Court of Appeals which held as follows:

While not clearly articulated, appellant appears to argue that the state failed to prove that he committed felonious assault because the state failed to prove that he was the one who fired agun at the officers. We disagree.

Derrick Foster was the only person inside the house at the time of the shooting that testified. Although he heard shots fired from inside the house, he did not see appellant shoot a gun. In fact, no one testified that appellant fired a gun that night. However, it is well-established that circumstantial evidence possesses the same probative value as direct evidence. Id. at P92 (citing Treesh). The state presented circumstantial evidence linking appellant to a gun that was fired inside the house that night.

Foster testified that before he fired his gun, another person inside the house fired a gun. Foster also testified that appellant was one of only two other men inside the house that had a gun that night. Mark Hardy testified that there were two guns fired from inside the house: Foster's gun, and the Springfield Armor USA XP .45. A picture of that gun introduced at trial shows a two-tone gun, green on the bottom and black on the top. That is how Foster described the gun appellant had with him that night. Jamie Armstrong testified that appellant was the major donor of DNA on the Springfield Armor USA XP .45. This is evidence demonstrating appellant's connection to this gun. The state also presented evidence indicating that the Springfield Armor USA XP .45 was fired inside the house that night. Hardy testified that a bullet fragment found inside the house was fired from the Springfield Armor USA XP .45. Five other casings found inside the house had marks indicating that they were at some point chambered in the Springfield Armor XP .45.

In light of this circumstantial evidence, the jury did not clearly lose its way in concluding that appellant fired a gun at the officers. Accordingly, appellant's convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. This resolution is also dispositive of appellant's claim that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence. Sowell. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's third and fourth assignments of error.

State v. Gravely, 188 Ohio App. 3d 825, ¶¶ 47-50 (Ohio App. 10th Dist., July 20, 2010). As this was the last reasoned state court decision on this Ground for Relief, it is the decision this Court...