Graves v. Dretke, 05-70011.

Decision Date03 March 2006
Docket NumberNo. 05-70011.,05-70011.
Citation442 F.3d 334
PartiesAnthony GRAVES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Doug DRETKE, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Roy E. Greenwood, Jr. (argued), Austin, TX, Jay William Burnett, Houston, TX, for Graves.

Kelli L. Weaver (argued), Austin, TX, for Dretke.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before DAVIS, WIENER, and GARZA, Circuit Judges:

W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Anthony Graves appeals the district court's denial of his writ of habeas corpus. Because we conclude that the statements suppressed from the defense were both exculpatory and material, we reverse the judgment of the district court with instructions to grant Graves' writ of habeas corpus.

I.

Anthony Graves was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in 1994 for the capital offense of murdering six people in the same transaction. The procedural history of Graves' conviction, post-conviction appeals and writ petitions is presented in our previous opinions addressing Graves' application for certificate of appealability. This court originally granted COA only on Graves' Brady claim that the state failed to disclose to Graves that key prosecution witness and Graves' co-defendant Robert Earl Carter informed the district attorney that Graves was not involved in the charged crime on the day before he testified to the contrary at Graves' trial. Graves v. Cockrell, 351 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Graves I"). On rehearing, this court modified its order and also granted COA on Graves' claim that the state's failure to disclose Carter's alleged statement implicating his wife in the crimes violated Graves' rights under Brady. Graves v. Cockrell, 351 F.3d 156 (5th Cir.2003) ("Graves II"). The case was remanded to the district court

for an evidentiary hearing to determine: (1) the substance of the alleged statement described above, along with Carter's statement allegedly exonerating Graves; (2) whether Graves was aware of these statements or exercised due diligence to discover these statements; (3) whether the state's failure to disclose these statements was material to Graves' defense under Brady; and (4) for a determination of whether Graves is entitled to relief on these claims.

Graves II, 351 F.3d at 159. COA was denied on all other claims.

On remand, an evidentiary hearing was held before Magistrate Judge Froeschner who, after reviewing briefly the facts of the crime, made the following factual findings in his report and recommendation.

Carter's wife, Cookie, was also indicted for the offense of capital murder. Attorneys Calvin Garvie and Lydia Clay-Jackson, who defended Graves at trial, believed this indictment to be a sham based on false evidence presented to the grand jury and obtained only in order to pressure Carter to testify against Graves. Evidentiary Hearing Transcript ("EHT") at 129, 168. Nevertheless Burleson Country District Attorney Charles Sebesta, who prosecuted Graves, insisted that the State believed from early on that Cookie participated in the killings and that all evidence pointed to the involvement of three people. Id. at 57, 98. Indeed, the State's theory from the beginning of the trial was that at least three people had acted together in the murders. Id. at 174.1 Texas Ranger Coffman testified at trial that his investigation showed "at least three and possibly four" perpetrators were in the Davis home when the murders occurred. Trial Transcript ("TT"), vol. 38 at 3728.

Prior to the beginning of Graves' trial, the District Attorney's office had been in negotiations with Carter and his appellate attorney for Carter's testimony against Graves. According to Sebesta, no final agreement on the terms had been reached prior to Carter's arrival in Brazoria County for Graves' trial, although any final plan was to involve the use of a polygraph exam before he testified. Id. at 51. The early discussions also involved Carter's condition that the State would not ask him questions about his wife's role in the murders. Id. at 54.

Sebesta met with Carter in the early evening of October 21, 1994.2 According to Sebesta, Carter almost immediately claimed, "I did it all myself, Mr. Sebesta. I did it all myself." Id. at 60. When Sebesta stated that he knew that was not true because of the number of weapons used, Carter quickly changed his story and claimed that he committed the murders with Graves and a third man called "Red." Id. at 61, 94, 95. Carter had earlier implicated a person named "Red" during the murder investigation, and the State believed that Theresa Carter may have been known by that nickname. Petitioner's Ex. 9 at 24. When Sebesta proposed that "Red" was actually Cookie, Carter denied it and agreed to take a polygraph exam. EHT at 95.

Since the polygraph examiner had been out sick that day, he was called to come in to administer the exam. Id. at 96. The report states that Carter signed a polygraph release statement, had the exam explained to him, and then changed his story once more before the exam was given by stating that he had killed the Davis family with Graves but without "Red." Petitioner's Ex.9 at tab 4. The interviewer then posed the following questions to Carter: (1) "[W]as your wife, Theresa, with you [at the time of the murders]?" and (2) "[W]hen you refer to `Red' in your statement, are you taking about your wife, Theresa?" Id. Carter answered "no" to both questions. The polygraph examiner concluded that Carter was not being truthful in either response. Id. When the polygraph results were explained to him, Carter once more changed his story. He now admitted that Cookie was involved in the murders with himself and Graves. He also stated that he had invented the character "Red" but later admitted that Cookie was sometimes called "Red." Id. When Sebesta asked him if Theresa had used the hammer in the murders, Carter answered "yes." EHT at 96.

In addition to the tentative deal to forego questions about Cookie in exchange for testifying against Graves, the State had also been working on a broader agreement that would allow Carter to accept a life sentence rather than death if his case were reversed in appeal. This required Carter to testify against both Graves and Cookie. Id. at 67. By the time the October 21 meeting concluded, he had tentatively assented to do so, though no final agreement was reached. Id. at 62, 103, 105. The next morning, however, Carter refused to testify against Cookie and reverted to the initial terms already worked out with the State. Both Carter and Sebesta then accepted the tentative agreement as the final deal for his testimony.

At the evidentiary hearing, Garvie denied that he knew before, or at any time during, trial that Carter had told Sebesta he killed the Davis family himself. Sebesta testified that he mentioned the statement to Garvie on the morning Carter testified. Id. at 149. The Court accepts Garvie's version of this event based on his credibility as a witness and as being consistent with his vigorous defense of Graves at trial. Sebesta did reveal part of the polygraph results on the morning of October 22 when he told the trial judge: "last night at 8:30 Mr. Carter took a polygraph[,] and the basic question involved his wife, Theresa. It shows deception on that polygraph examination. But, obviously, we can't go into polygraphs here, but I think counsel is certainly entitled to know that." TT, vol. 35 at 3360. Garvie asked no questions about what the polygraph involved. Garvie's co-counsel testified that it did not occur to the defense to inquire into Sebesta's statement because they believed the indictment against Cookie was unfounded. EHT at 134. Nor did it fit the defense's theory of the case. According to Ms. Clay-Jackson, the defense thought that at least two people were involved in the killings but that Cookie was not one of them. Id. at 122. The State then called Carter to the stand and revealed to the jury that he was testifying in exchange for an agreement that questions would not be asked about his wife. TT, vol. 35 at 3429.

Graves' habeas attorneys appear to have first learned of Carter's statement, "I did it all myself," in 1998. On June 19, 1998, Graves' former attorney took a deposition from Carter in which he claimed to have acted alone. Ex parte Graves, No. 40,812-01 at 97 ff. That statement was excluded from the record by the state court as inherently unreliable because Graves' attorney failed to notify the State, as required by law, in order to allow cross-examination. Carter again recanted his trial testimony in a May 18, 2000, deposition attended by both Sebesta and Graves' current counsel. Sebesta later appeared on the Geraldo Rivera show Deadly Justice on September 3, 2000, and repeated Carter's self-confession. Sebesta stated: "yes, and at that point he [Carter] did tell us, `Oh, I did it myself. I did it.' He did tell us that." Petitioner's Ex. 1.

The magistrate judge found that Sebesta did not reveal Carter's statement that he committed the murders alone to the defense and that because Graves' attorneys had no way of knowing about the statement, they had no reason to exercise due diligence to discover it. The magistrate also found that this statement was not material because Carter's claim that he acted alone contradicted the evidence and because the jury already had considerable evidence of Carter's multiple inconsistencies and credibility issues.

As to the statement linking Carter's wife Cookie as a direct participant in the crimes, the magistrate found that the defense did not exercise due diligence to discover the statement after Sebesta told them about the polygraph results. He also found that the statement is not exculpatory because it implicated Graves based on the government's three person theory. The statement...

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