Hughes v. Epps

• Decision Date: 03 March 2010
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 2:05CV51-SA.
• Citation: 694 F. Supp.2d 533
• Parties: William Ray HUGHES, Petitioner v. Christopher EPPS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

694 F. Supp.2d 533

William Ray HUGHES, Petitioner v. Christopher EPPS, et al., Respondents.

Civil Action No.: 2:05CV51-SA.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Delta Division.

March 3, 2010.

C. Jackson Williams, C. Jackson Williams, Attorney, Oxford, MS, Keir M. Weyble, Blume Weyble & Lominack, LLP, Columbia, SC, for Petitioner.

Marvin L. White, Jr., Mississippi Attorney General's Office, Jackson, MS, for Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SHARION AYCOCK, District Judge.

William Ray Hughes is an inmate confined to the Mississippi Department of Corrections who has filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the otherwise final capital murder conviction and sentence of death imposed on him by the Circuit Court of Tate County, Mississippi.

Facts and Procedural History

Sixteen year-old Ashley Galloway was last seen alive getting into a black pick-up truck at 7:30 a.m. on January 9, 1996. When she did not report to school that morning or come home that evening, her mother contacted law enforcement officials. A search began for Ashley the next day. On January 22, 1996, Ashley's body was discovered underneath the floor boards of an abandoned house. An autopsy performed on the body revealed that Ashley had died of manual strangulation and stab wounds to the abdomen, and that she had been raped. Multiple bruises were found on her face, torso, and limbs, and she also sustained multiple injuries to her genital area. A groove was found over the front, left and right sides of her neck, and her neck showed extensive bruising. Additionally, there was a burned area of skin on the left side of her chest in which two stab wounds were located, and there were stab wounds measuring seven or eight centimeters deep to her abdominal area. All of the injuries to Ashley's body were determined to have occurred prior to her death, with the exception of the burning to her chest, which occurred post-mortem.

On March 27, 1996, Panola County landowner, Jimmy Lewallen, discovered Ashley's class ring on his property. Using a metal detector, police found a second ring of Ashley's, and a dinner knife was also found. Across the street from Mr. Lewallen's property was the home of William Ray Hughes, a known sex offender. Investigators went to the Hughes home and learned that Petitioner lived there along with Julie Hughes Sanders and her two children. Julie had been married to Petitioner's father, who had died the previous year. Julie and Petitioner were lovers. The investigators were told that Petitioner was at work at Aluminum Extrusions in Senatobia, Mississippi, which is approximately 1.2 miles away from where Ashley was last seen getting into a pickup truck. The investigators went to Petitioner's place of employment and requested that Petitioner follow them to the police station. Petitioner agreed.

Petitioner was interviewed, and he stated that he sometimes drove Julie Hughes Sanders' black Ford Ranger to work. He also stated that he had not missed any work days in the month of January. At the request of an investigator, Petitioner consented to the taking of blood, saliva, and hair samples. These samples were later delivered to GenTest laboratories for DNA testing. Petitioner also consented to the search of his house and vehicles.

A check of the employment records at Aluminum Extrusions showed that Petitioner arrived at work at 6:00 a.m. but left sick at 7:31 a.m. on January 9, 1996, and that he missed work the next three days. Investigators also learned that one of Petitioner's work uniforms was missing, and they obtained a statement from Julie Hughes Sanders that Petitioner returned home at 6:45 p.m. on the day of Ashley's disappearance with blood on his pants. The DNA sample taken from Petitioner was later determined to have the same characteristics as semen samples taken from Ashley's body, and he could not be excluded as a source of the semen. Seven genetic markers yielded results, and Petitioner was match on all seven. The statistical probability of this match on the markers occurring randomly in the population is 1:86,000 white males.

Witness, Stella Rowe, contacted authorities after she saw Ashley's picture in the paper on January 24, 1996, and she reported that she had seen Ashley around 12:50 p.m. on January 9, 1996, about two miles from where Ashley's body was found. Ms. Rowe stated that she came upon a small black pickup as she was traveling on Simpson Road, with a young female leaning out of the driver's side window waving her arms as Rowe passed. After she saw Petitioner's picture in the newspaper, she again contacted authorities and told them that Petitioner was driving the small black pickup she had seen on January 9, 1996.

Petitioner was indicted for capital murder while engaged in the crime of kidnapping and forcible rape, and he was charged as an habitual offender on both counts based on his previous convictions for rape and fondling. Petitioner presented a mistaken identity defense, and he presented a witness who testified that she had seen Ashley alive on January 11, 1996.

After deliberating almost three hours, the jury found him guilty of capital murder and rape. At the sentencing hearing, the jury learned Petitioner had prior convictions for the rape of a seven year old child in 1979, child fondling in 1988, and fondling as an habitual offender in 1990. The jury sentenced Petitioner to death after deliberating for two hours and ten minutes for the murder of Ashley Galloway during the commission of a kidnapping.¹ The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. Hughes v. State, 735 So.2d 238 (Miss.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1083, 120 S.Ct. 807, 145 L.Ed.2d 680 (2000). Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, which was denied. Hughes v. State, 892 So.2d 203 (Miss.2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1130, 125 S.Ct. 2935, 162 L.Ed.2d 870 (2005). Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court on February 8, 2006, alleging thirteen separate claims of error. After partially granting Petitioner's request for discovery and granting his motion to expand the record, the Court entered an order setting an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's claim of mental retardation. Prior to the hearing, Respondents filed a notice conceding that Petitioner has mental retardation and is exempt from execution. The Court will grant relief on Petitioner's claim of mental retardation. The remaining claims are dismissed with prejudice or dismissed as moot for the reasons set forth below.

Applicable Law

This petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 324-26, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) (AEDPA applies to all federal habeas applications filed on or after April 24, 1996). Pursuant to the AEDPA's scope of review, habeas corpus relief cannot be granted in connection with any claim adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless that adjudication (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the presented evidence. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2). The factual findings of the State court are presumed correct, and Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) have been held to have independent meanings. See, e.g., Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001). Federal habeas relief may be granted under the "contrary to" clause where the State court (1) arrives at a conclusion opposite that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law; or (2) decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal court may grant relief where the State court applies the correct legal principle to the facts in an unreasonable manner. See id. at 407-08, 120 S.Ct. 1495; See also Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S.Ct. 1432, 161 L.Ed.2d 334 (2005). Whether a decision is "unreasonable" is an objective inquiry, and it does not turn on whether the decision is merely incorrect. See Schriro, 550 U.S. at 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933 ("The question under the AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable — a substantially higher threshold."); Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Morrow v. Dretke, 367 F.3d 309, 313 (5th Cir.2004) (habeas relief merited where state decision both incorrect and objectively unreasonable).

Habeas relief does not generally lie for rules of constitutional law which have not been announced or that were announced after the challenged conviction became final on direct review. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). A new rule is not retroactively applied unless the United States Supreme Court holds the rule to be retroactive. See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001). It is a violation of the principles of Teague for a federal court to create new constitutional rules on habeas review. See Wheat v. Johnson, 238 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir.2001).

A petitioner must exhaust his remedies in State court prior to seeking federal habeas relief. See Martinez v. Johnson, 255 F.3d 229, 238...