Graves v. H. L. Griffith Realty & Banking Co.

• Citation: 29 P. 344,3 Wash. 742
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 23 February 1892
• Parties: GRAVES v. H. L. GRIFFITH REALTY & BANKING CO.

29 P. 344

3 Wash. 742

GRAVES v. H. L. GRIFFITH REALTY & BANKING CO.

Supreme Court of Washington

February 23, 1892

Appeal from superior court, King county; R. OSBORN, Judge.

Action by Willard Graves against the H. L. Griffith Realty & Banking Company for real-estate commissions. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Wiley, Hale & Scott, for appellant.

Thompson, Edsen & Humphries, for respondent.

DUNBAR J.

The plaintiff in this case alleges that he was employed by the defendant (a corporation known as the "H. L. Griffith Realty & Banking Company") to sell certain real estate in Seattle, known as the "Gov. Semple Property;" "that defendant agreed with the plaintiff that, in case the plaintiff should sell said property for $3,500, $500 of which was to be paid cash, and $600 each year for five years, at 8 per cent. interest, with a mortgage to secure the deferred payments, that it would pay to the plaintiff the sum of $200 cash, as a commission for his services in finding a purchaser for said property and negotiating a sale therefor;" and that, in consideration of said agreement, the plaintiff found a purchaser who was ready and willing to comply with the terms of sale, and take said property, and offered to pay to defendant the sum of $500, and to execute his promissory notes secured by mortgage, etc., and in every respect offered to comply with the terms of the purchase; but the defendant refused to carry out the terms of the contract, refused to sell the said property to the purchaser, and abandoned the contract, and refused to pay the plaintiff the said $200 which it agreed to pay for the services rendered, to plaintiff's damage in the sum of $200, etc. The answer alleges that the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant was that if Gov. Semple the owner of said property, would agree to sell the same, and plaintiff could find a purchaser for the property, ready and willing to buy the same and comply with the terms of the sale as stated above, the plaintiff should receive the sum of $200 commission, provided Gov.

Semple would agree to receive for the land the consideration of $3,300, and that the plaintiff knew at the time the contract was entered into that it all depended upon the consent of the owner, which had not yet been obtained; and that the owner, being applied to, refused to sell said land; and that by the terms of the contract plaintiff was therefore not entitled to any commission or other compensation. This is denied by the reply, which alleges that the defendant, at the time of making the agreement, informed plaintiff that it had already made arrangements with Gov. Semple by which said Semple had agreed to sell said property, and that defendant had full power to close up said sale. Upon the issues thus made the parties went to trial, the case was tried by the judge without the intervention of a jury, and judgment was given to plaintiff for the amount asked for.

The main contention here is that the evidence does not support the findings. An appellate court, in a law case, will not usurp the functions of a jury, or of a judge acting in the capacity of a jury, and reverse the judgment because the weight of testimony seems to be on the other side, or because, in a case of conflict of testimony, the jury believed the testimony of witnesses that it does not believe. This doctrine is so elementary and so universally pronounced by the courts that it would be idle to enlarge on it or to discuss it further. It is sufficient to say that the jury is the judge of the facts. If the testimony on which the judgment is based is competent, and is legally introduced and if conceded to be true would sustain the judgment, the appellate court will not inquire further as to its sufficiency. The question to be answered here is, was there such testimony introduced in behalf of the plaintiff in this case? We think there was. The point in controversy was whether the duties devolving upon the agent under the agreement had been complied with when the purchaser was found who was ready and willing to buy the...