Graves v. Horry-georgetown Technical Coll.

• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Decision Date: 03 November 2010
• Docket Number: Opinion No. 4757
• Citation: Graves v. Horry-Georgetown Technical Coll., Opinion No. 4757 (S.C. App. Nov 03, 2010)
• Parties: Dorothy M. Graves, Appellant, v. Horry-Georgetown Technical College, Respondent.

Dorothy M. Graves, Appellant,

v. Horry-Georgetown Technical College, Respondent.

Opinion No. 4757

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

Heard October 10, 2010

Filed November 3, 2010

Appeal From Horry County

G. Thomas Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

AFFIRMED

Shannon Lee Felder, of Winnsboro, for Appellant.

Charles J. Boykin, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: After resigning from her position, Dorothy M. Graves filed suit against her former employer, Horry-Georgetown Technical College (the College), for constructive discharge, and the circuit court directed a verdict in favor of the College. Graves appeals, arguing the directed verdict was improper because the College committed "official acts" that precipitated her discharge and excused her from the requirement that she exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit. We affirm.

FACTS

In 1974, Graves began working for the College in its accounting department. In 1999, after working at various positions within that department, Graves was promoted to Procurement Manager. As Procurement Manager, Graves ensured the College's purchases complied with the state-issued Procurement Code and prepared a brochure to assist College employees in understanding the Procurement Code's requirements.

In 2004, the College hired Harold Hawley as Vice President of Business Affairs. According to Graves, in her first meeting with Hawley, she learned he wanted to replace her as Procurement Manager. Graves testified that over the course of approximately six months, Hawley attempted once to re-assign her to a different job and encouraged her on three other occasions to resign. Graves noticed that people stopped coming to her for procurement issues and instead "would try to go around [her]." By her final month at the College, Graves noticed "not a whole lot of procurement" came through her.

In February 2005, following Graves's refusal to approve payment for an item Hawley wanted approved, Hawley called her and two other employees of the College into his office. Graves testified that Hawley told her "he was tired of [her] and he was not going to put up with [her] anymore," that employees from the maintenance department to Graves's own department had complained about her, and that Hawley himself had been hired "to take care of" Graves. Graves testified Hawley stated her attitude, her personality, and her management style "stank." According to Graves, he stated: "It's three o'clock. You got [until] 3:15 to do something – uh – put yourself together." Following this meeting, Graves testified, she felt her life was in danger and "was just too fearful to be around him anymore." She submitted her resignation to the personnel department on February 23, 2005, with an effective date of March 11, 2005. The College promptly acknowledged in writing its receipt and acceptance of her resignation. At the time of her resignation, Graves had participated in the Teacher and Employee Retention Incentive Program (TERI)¹ for two years and nine months.

In conjunction with her resignation, on March 7, 2005, Graves completed a termination questionnaire provided by the College. Her responses to the questionnaire did not mention Hawley's repeated suggestions that she resign or any harassment. She noted she resigned because of her working conditions and for a "reason that would appear to be discriminatory on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, age, handicap, or abuse." However, she did not explain these answers.

After delivering her letter of resignation to the personnel office, Graves telephoned the College's president, Neyle Wilson. Graves testified that when she met with Wilson a couple of days later, she told him Hawley had stated Wilson wanted her resignation. She explained that she needed her job to meet her financial obligations and that she felt what had been done to her was wrong. Graves asked him for a list of the complaints the College had received about her. According to Graves, Wilson responded in a letter stating he had discovered no complaints about her. Graves then asked Wilson to talk to the area commissioner, but he refused the request.

Graves initially filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. Her suit was assigned to a federal magistrate, who recommended granting the College's motion for summary judgment. On September 28, 2007, the federal court entered summary judgment in favor of the College as to Graves's claims under the Older Workers' Benefit Protection Act and the Equal Pay Act, then remanded the case to South Carolina's judicial system for determination of the constructive discharge claim.

The Court of Common Pleas for Horry County heard this matter on April 23, 2008. At the close of Graves's case, the College moved for a directed verdict based upon Graves's failure to prove the College intentionally caused her working conditions to be intolerable. The College also argued the circuit court should direct a verdict in its favor because Graves failed to avail herself of the grievance process either before or after resigning. According to the College, Graves failed to put forth evidence that the College intentionally caused her working conditions to be intolerable. Furthermore, the College argued Graves effectively waived her right to a judicial determination by failing to pursue her administrative remedies. On the other hand, Graves argued that, because she was forced to resign, the grievance process was not available to her, and her only recourse was to file an action for constructive discharge. Ultimately, the circuit court granted the College's motion. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An appellate court will reverse the trial court's grant of a directed verdict when any evidence supports the party opposing the directed verdict. Milhouse v. Food Lion, Inc., 289 S.C. 203, 203, 345 S.E.2d 739, 739 (Ct. App. 1986). The appellate court must determine "whether a verdict for a party opposing the motion would be reasonably possible under the facts as liberally construed in his [or her] favor." Erickson v. Jones St. Publishers, L.L.C., 368 S.C. 444, 463, 629 S.E.2d 653, 663 (2006). "When considering directed verdict motions, neither the trial court nor the appellate court has authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony or evidence." Id.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Graves asserts the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of the College on the ground that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. We disagree.

In ruling on motions for directed verdict, "the trial court is required to view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions and to deny the motions whe[n] either the evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in doubt." Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 368 S.C. 424, 434, 629 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2006). When either the evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in doubt, the trial court should deny the motions. McMillan v. Oconee Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 367 S.C. 559, 564, 626 S.E.2d 884, 886 (2006). "However, this rule does not authorize submission of speculative, theoretical, or hypothetical views to the jury." Proctor v. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 368 S.C. 279, 292-93, 628 S.E.2d 496, 503 (Ct. App. 2006). In essence, the trial court must determine whether a verdict for the opposing party "would be reasonably possible under the facts as liberally construed in his [or her] favor." Id. at 293, 628 S.E.2d at 503 (quoting Harvey v. Strickland, 350 S.C. 303, 309, 566 S.E.2d 529, 532 (2002)).

I. The Two Issue Rule

The College contends the two issue rule requires us to affirm the trial court because Graves failed to appeal the issue of whether working conditions at the College were so intolerable that a reasonable person would have been forced to resign. In support, the College states it argued in favor of a directed verdict not only because Graves failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, but also because Graves failed to prove the elements of constructive discharge. The College argues this court must affirm because although both bases for a directed verdict were before the trial court, Graves appealed only the exhaustion of administrative remedies.

"Under the two issue rule, where a decision is based on more than one ground, the appellate court will affirm unless the appellant appeals all grounds because the unappealed ground will become the law of the case." Jones v. Lott, 387 S.C. 339, 346, 692 S.E.2d 900, 903 (2010). Here, the record reveals little about the basis for the trial court's decision. Although the trial court briefly entertained arguments on the substantive issue, the principal discussion related to whether Graves had exhausted her administrative remedies. In any event, the basis for his ruling was largely unilluminating. In mentioning a possible relationship between the Tort Claims Act and the State Grievance Procedure, ² the trial court noted: "it seems to me that there is some comparison in terms of policy... that the [S]tate... limits the... type of actions that may be filed against the [S]tate... by statute." The trial court's Form 4 order directing a verdict in favor of the College stated no basis for the ruling.

In view of the arguments presented, the lengthy discussion regarding exhaustion of remedies, and the trial court's explanations, we find the trial court based its ruling upon procedure and did not evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence Graves presented regarding whether her working conditions were intolerable. The reference to statutory limitations upon the types of actions that individuals may bring against the State suggests the trial court agreed that Graves's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies precluded her from filing suit. It does not suggest that the trial court considered whether Graves...