Graves v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 June 1912
• Parties: GRAVES v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO. HENKEL et al. v. YAZOO & M. V. R. CO. et al. HENKEL v. SAME.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

148 S.W. 239

126 Tenn. 148

GRAVES v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO.

HENKEL et al. v. YAZOO & M. V. R. CO. et al.

HENKEL v. SAME.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 21, 1912

Appeal from Circuit Court. Lauderdale County; S. J. Everett, Judge.

Appeals from Circuit Court, Shelby County; A. B. Pittman, Judge.

Actions by L. R. Graves against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, and by Emelia Henkel and another and by Joseph Henkel against the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company and others. Judgment of dismissal in each case was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals, and defendants appeal. Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and judgment of the Circuit Court affirmed.

C. N Burch and W. M. Simonton, for appellant.

Craig & Bullock, for appellee.

Fitzhugh & Biggs and C. N. Burch, for appellants.

Bell Terry, Anderson & Bell for appellee.

In Graves Case:

In Henkel Cases:

GREEN J.

These three suits were brought to recover for damages arising from accidents at the crossing of railroad lines and public roads. The first suit involves damages to an automobile and suit case, resulting from a collision with a railroad train. The second suit involves damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by Mrs. Emelia Henkel in a grade crossing accident; and the third suit is brought by Mrs. Henkel's husband, Joseph Henkel, to recover his damages on account of his wife's injuries.

The declarations in the several cases charge that the accidents resulted by reason of the failure of the railroad companies through their servants in charge of the engines, to give warning of the approach of the trains before reaching the road crossings. It is averred that there was a failure to comply with statutory precautions or to give any warning of the approach of the trains.

It appears that the crossing in Shelby county, at which the accident occurred on which the Henkel suits are based, is marked by a sign with cross-arms upon it and the inscription "Railroad Crossing." It is not clear from the record whether there was such a sign at the crossing where the accident to the Graves automobile happened or not; but, for the purposes of this decision, it may be conceded that both of these crossings were marked with a sign such as the one described as appearing in the Henkel cases.

It is admitted that neither of these signs were put up by the road overseer in charge, and it is admitted that neither of these signs bore the legend prescribed in the statute: "Look out for the cars when you hear the whistle or bell."

A motion for peremptory instructions was made by the railroad companies in all the cases, and these several motions were granted, and the suits dismissed. In the Court of Civil Appeals, however, the cases were reversed and remanded for trial.

As we understand the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, that court holds that there is a common-law duty resting upon every railroad company to give notice of the approach of its trains to a grade crossing, if that crossing be what the Court of Civil Appeals refers to as a dangerous crossing, and that this duty rests upon the railroad company whether such crossing has been marked by the road overseer, as required by the statute, or not. It appears in these cases before us that the view of the railroad tracks from both these crossings was somewhat obscured--in the one case, by a growth of shrubbery or trees; in the other case, by the fact that the railroad track ran through a cut at the crossing. So it was that there was not a clear view of the railroad from the road approaching either crossing, nor was there a clear view of the road from the railroad approaching either crossing.

Our statute regulating the duties and liabilities of railroad companies at grade crossings is contained in Shannon's Code, § 1574, subsecs. 1 and 2, and sections 1575 and 1576. These provisions are as follows:

1574. (1) "The overseers of every public road crossed by a railroad shall place at each crossing a sign marked, 'Look out for the cars when you hear the whistle or bell,' and the county court shall appropriate money to defray the expenses of said signs; and no engine driver shall be compelled to blow the whistle or ring the bell at any crossing, unless it is so designated."

(2) "On approaching every crossing so distinguished, the whistle or bell of the locomotive shall be sounded at the distance of one fourth of a mile from the crossing and at short intervals till the train has passed the crossing."

1575. "Every railroad company that fails to observe these precautions, or cause them to be observed by its agents or servants, shall be responsible for all damage to persons or property occasioned by or resulting from any accident or collision that may occur."

1576. "No railroad that observes, or causes to be observed, these precautions, shall be responsible for any damage done to person or property on its road. The proof that it has observed said precautions shall be upon the company."

There was evidence in these cases tending to show that the engine drivers had not observed the precautions above, but had failed to blow the whistle or ring the bell on approaching these crossings. Upon a motion for peremptory instructions, the truth of this testimony was, of course, conceded.

The insistence of the railroad companies is that no requirements rests upon them to observe the precautions prescribed by the statute at such crossings, unless the crossings are marked by the road overseer, as prescribed in subsection 1 of section 1574.

We think that this contention for the railroad companies is well made, and it is difficult to see how any other conclusion can be reached, if we give a natural construction and effect to the provisions of the statute quoted.

It is not doubted that the Legislature has the right to pass laws regulating the duties and liabilities of railroad companies at grade crossings; such legislation being a valid exercise of the police power of the state. This was determined in Railroad v. Burke, 6 Cold. 45, and has never since been questioned.

These statutes undertake to define the duties of the railroad company respecting its trains crossing public roads. Certain obligations are imposed by the statute, both upon railroad companies and the public road overseers having in charge public roads crossed by railroad tracks. It is enacted that, if the railroad companies fail to observe the precautions prescribed, they shall be liable for all damages resulting from any accident. It is enacted that, if the railroad companies cause to be observed these precautions, they shall not be responsible for any damage done to person or property.

The language of these statutes is too plain to be mistaken. They provide that every railroad company which fails to observe certain precautions at public road crossings shall be liable if an accident ensues. The precautions required are, that, on approaching every crossing "so distinguished," the whistle or bell of the engine shall be sounded at a distance of one-fourth of a mile and at short intervals till the train has passed the crossing. How distinguished? The answer is found in subsection 1: Distinguished on designated by a sign erected by the road overseer and inscribed "Look out for the cars when you hear the whistle or bell."

On the other hand, the statutes provide that no railroad company shall be liable for damage done to person or property if it observes the precautions prescribed; that is to say, if on approaching every crossing "so distinguished" the whistle or bell is sounded at a distance of one-fourth of a mile and at short intervals till the train has passed the crossing. The requirement is that the precautions shall be observed on approaching crossings "so distinguished," and, as just stated, the meaning of the words "so distinguished" is explained in subsection 1 of section 1574.

The effect of this language is plain. If the crossing is marked as required by the statute, the railroad company, under the statute, is liable for failure to sound the whistle or bell upon approaching said crossing with its trains. If the crossing is not marked as required by the statute, the railroad company is not liable for failure to sound the bell or whistle at said crossing.

A railroad is not liable for its failure to observe statutory precautions at all crossings, but only for its failure to observe such precautions at crossings "so distinguished."

There really cannot be any controversy over the meaning of the language of this statute. It is too simple. We do not understand that the Court of Civil Appeals questions the foregoing construction. That court, however, as stated, was of opinion that, in addition to the duties imposed by the statute upon railroad companies at such crossings, a common-law duty rested upon them as well.

It is said that under the common law a duty rests upon every railroad company, at a road crossing where the view is obstructed, or where there is much travel, to give warning of the approach of its trains, and that this duty at common law rests upon such railroad companies, whether the crossing be marked in any way or not. It is doubtless true that this is the common-law rule. Authorities are cited to this effect in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, and in the opinion of this court in Railroad v. Sawyer, 114 Tenn. 84, 86 S.W. 386.

It is insisted that the statute from which the foregoing quotations are taken is but declaratory of the common law, and that it does not alter or vary or change the common-law duty resting upon railroads with respect to precautions to be observed when crossing public roads with their trains. For this we are cited to Railroad v. Finley, 122 Tenn. 127, 118 S.W 692...