Graves v. Purcell

• Citation: 85 S.W.2d 543,337 Mo. 574
• Parties: W. W. Graves, Prosecuting Attorney of Jackson County, v. Eugene I. Purcell, Battle McCardle and J. W. Hostetter, Members of the County Court of Jackson County, Appellants
• Decision Date: 30 July 1935
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

85 S.W.2d 543

337 Mo. 574

W. W. Graves, Prosecuting Attorney of Jackson County, v. Eugene I. Purcell, Battle McCardle and J. W. Hostetter, Members of the County Court of Jackson County, Appellants

Supreme Court of Missouri

July 30, 1935

Rehearing Denied July 30, 1935.

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court; Hon. Daniel E. Bird Judge.

Reversed.

John B Pew and Rufus Burrus for appellants.

(1) The act in question is constitutional and does not violate Section 28 of Article IV of the Constitution of Missouri. 59 C. J., pp. 804, 808; 25 R. C. L., sec. 100, p. 855, sec. 101, p. 856, sec. 104, p. 858, secs. 242, 243, p. 999; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 444, 13 S.W. 678; State ex rel. v. Price, 229 Mo. 670, 129 S.W. 651; State v. Mullinix, 257 S.W. 123, 301 Mo. 385; State ex rel. Lorantos v. Terte, 23 S.W.2d 131, 324 Mo. 402; State ex rel. Dept. of Penal Institutions v. Becker, 47 S.W.2d 782, 239 Mo. 1081; Forgrave v. Buchanan County, 222 S.W. 756, 282 Mo. 599; State ex rel. v. Buckner, 272 S.W. 942, 308 Mo. 390; State ex rel. v. Hendrick, 241 S.W. 408, 294 Mo. 21; State ex rel. Keshlear v. Slover, 134 Mo. 10, 31 S.W. 1054, 34 S.W. 1102; Coffey v. Carthage, 200 Mo. 621, 98 S.W. 563; State ex rel. Wiles v. Williams, 232 Mo. 76, 133 S.W. 1; Booth v. Scott, 276 Mo. 1, 205 S.W. 633; Asel v. Jefferson City, 229 S.W. 1048; State ex inf. Barrett v. Imhoff, 238 S.W. 122; State ex rel. v. Hackman, 267 S.W. 611, 292 Mo. 27; City of Columbia v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 43 S.W.2d 816; 6 R. C. L., p. 78, secs. 77, 79, 80; Greene Co. v. Lydy, 263 Mo. 77, 172 S.W. 376; Pitman v. Drabelle, 267 Mo. 78, 183 S.W. 1055; State v. Mead, 71 Mo. 266; Rowe v. Stanley Co., 219 N.W. 122. (2) The Budget Law confers no additional powers on the county courts but merely directs how powers already possessed should be exercised. Sec. 1, Art. X, Const. of Mo.; Secs. 11, 12, Art. X, Const. of Mo.; Sec. 22, Art. X, Const. of Mo.; Sec. 36, Art. VI, Const. of Mo.; Secs. 2096-2106, R. S. 1929; State ex rel. Buckner v. McElroy, 274 S.W. 749. (3) If the court finds that any one or more section or sections of this act are void, such should not affect the validity of the other section. The same is true as to a part of any section. State v. Addington, 12 Mo.App. 214, affirmed 77 Mo. 110; State ex rel. Dept. of Penal Institutions v. Becker, 47 S.W.2d 781; State ex rel. Neidermeyer v. Hackman, 237 S.W. 742; State v. Mitts, 289 S.W. 935; State ex rel. McDonald v. Loomis, 33 S.W.2d 98, 326 Mo. 644; State v. Adams, 19 S.W.2d 671; Clark v. Grand Lodge, 43 S.W.2d 404, 328 Mo. 1084.

John T. Barker and Frank Brockus for respondent.

(1) The Budget Law violates Section 28 of Article IV of the Constitution of Missouri; the title is defective, for the reason that the act contains more than one subject, and such subject is not clearly expressed in the title. Laws 1933, p. 350; State ex rel. v. Becker, 47 S.W.2d 781; State ex rel. v. Walker, 34 S.W.2d 124; Vice v. Kirksville, 217 S.W. 79; State v. Hackman, 237 S.W. 742; Hardware Co. v. Fisher, 190 S.W. 576. (2) The act allows the circuit court and the circuit clerk to request any amount of money, which, in their judgment, is necessary for their departments; the county court is denied the right to reduce such appropriations or requests, without the consent of the circuit court and the circuit clerk; this deprives the county court of its right to transact all county business, and renders the act unconstitutional. State ex rel. v. McElroy, 309 Mo. 595; 15 C. J., p. 456. (3) The authority given the circuit court and the circuit clerk to demand and receive any part of the county revenue which it deems necessary, and the prohibition upon the county court to reduce such request, delegates to the circuit court and the circuit clerk the power to tax, and, therefore, renders such act unconstitutional. State ex rel. v. Smith, 49 S.W.2d 74. (4) The Prosecuting Attorney of Jackson County is the chief law officer of the county; he represents the sovereignty of the county; outside of the fact that his office is involved and that he has a personal interest in the matter he is the proper party to question the constitutionality of this act. State ex rel. v. Hughes, 104 Mo. 459; State ex rel. v. Williams, 221 Mo. 227; State ex rel. v. Huston, 27 Okla. 606, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 380.

OPINION

Coles, J.

This is a suit instituted in the Circuit Court of Jackson County by the respondent as Prosecuting Attorney of Jackson County seeking to enjoin the appellants as members of the county court of Jackson County from proceeding to enforce and put into effect Sections 9 to 21, both inclusive, of an act of the General Assembly designated as the "County Budget Law" on the ground that the sections of the act mentioned contravene certain specified provisions of the Constitution of Missouri. After the filing of the original petition the trial court granted a temporary restraining order. Later, by leave of court, respondent filed an amended petition and appellants filed a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order and also a demurrer to the amended petition. The trial court overruled both the motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order and the demurrer. Appellants elected to stand upon their demurrer and the overruling of their motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order and thereupon the court below entered a final decree granting a permanent injunction substantially as prayed. Thereupon appellants in due course perfected an appeal to this court.

Appellants contend that respondent, as the Prosecuting Attorney of Jackson County, has no legal standing to enjoin the enforcement of the statute here in question and also that injunction is not the proper remedy to arrest the execution and enforcement of the act. The petition filed in the circuit court, among other things, alleged in substance: that plaintiff is the duly elected, qualified and acting Prosecuting Attorney of Jackson County, Missouri, and brings this suit for and on behalf of the citizens and taxpayers of Jackson County; that defendants, purporting to act under the provisions of the act here involved, contemplate making expenditures of money and making a levy of taxes to meet such expenditures which will obligate the property of the citizens and taxpayers of Jackson County and that before any such levy is made the constitutionality of this act should be determined; that unless defendants are enjoined from enforcing the questioned provisions of the act, irreparable damage and injury will result to the citizens and taxpayers of Jackson County and to their property; and that unless prevented the defendants will proceed to enforce the unconstitutional and void provisions of the act to the detriment, injury and damage of the citizens and property owners of Jackson County; that no adequate remedy at law is available and that unless the court issues its writ of injunction the citizens and property owners of Jackson County will be wholly without remedy.

It is of course a well-recognized and elementary general principle that courts have no power to enjoin public officers from taking action under an alleged unconstitutional statute unless they are about to do some act, which, if not authorized by a valid law, will constitute an unlawful interference with complainants' rights (14 R. C. L. 434, sec. 135). But in Missouri it seems to be well settled that the prosecuting attorney of a county is the representative of the sovereign or state within his county to such an extent as to authorize him to institute and maintain a suit on behalf of the property owners and taxpayers to enjoin the officers of the county from taking action under an unconstitutional law in instances where the threatened action will injuriously affect the property rights of the property owners and taxpayers generally and where, in the opinion of the court, no other adequate remedy is available. [State ex rel. v. Saline County, 51 Mo. 350; Rubey v. Shain, 54 Mo. 207; Matthis v. Town of Cameron, 62 Mo. 504; Ranney v. Bader, 67 Mo. 476; Ewing v. Board of Education, 72 Mo. 436, l. c. 440; State ex rel. v. Hughes, 104 Mo. 459, l. c. 471, 16 S.W. 489.] We are of the opinion that under the well-settled law of this State respondent was authorized to institute and prosecute the present suit.

The principal contention made here is that the "County Budget Law" (Laws 1933, p. 340) contravenes Section 28 of Article IV of the Constitution of Missouri which provides that "no bill . . . shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title." The title of the act here in question is as follows: "AN ACT to provide for a County budget placing certain duties upon the County Court of the several Counties of this State, upon the County Clerks, the County Treasurer, and State Auditor; authorizing the County Court to designate someone to prepare a budget estimate, providing that certain officers shall furnish certain information, providing for the time that such estimate shall be furnished, providing for the settling out of the estimated receipts and expenditures, providing for the classification of expenditures and for priority of payment, giving to the County Court power to review such estimates, requiring the filing of such estimates with certain officers, providing certain penalties for the violation of the provisions of this act and repealing all laws in conflict herewith." The act under consideration contains twenty-two sections. The first eight sections of the act are applicable to counties "having a population of 50,000 inhabitants or less" and as we understand it the validity of these sections is not challenged here. Sections 9 to 20 of the act, both inclusive, are expressly declared to be applicable to counties "having a...