Gravitt v. Ga. Cas. Co, (No. 4098.)

• Decision Date: 22 July 1924
• Docket Number: (No. 4098.)
• Parties: GRAVITT. v. GEORGIA CASUALTY CO. et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

158 Ga. 613

123 S.E. 897

GRAVITT.

v.GEORGIA CASUALTY CO. et al.

(No. 4098.)

Supreme Court of Georgia.

July 22, 1924.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Certified Questions from Court of Appeals.

Proceedings under the Workman's Compensation Act by W. L. J. Gravitt, claimant, opposed by the employer and the Georgia Casualty Company, insurance carrier. The Industrial Commission awarded compensation, and the insurance carrier brought error to the Court of Appeals, which certified questions to the Supreme Court. Questions answered.

H. H. Perry and W. N. Oliver, both of Gainesville, for plaintiff in error.

I. L. Oakes, of Lawrenceville, and Charters. Wheeler & Lilly, of Gainesville, for defendant in error.

HILL, J. The Court of Appeals desires instruction from the Supreme Court upon the following questions necessary to a determination of the case:

"(1) Has the Industrial Commission of this state, upon its own motion or upon application of the employer and the claimant, but not of the contesting insurance carrier, the power and authority, under section 45 or other provision of the Workman's Compensation Act (Ga. L. 1920, pp. 167, 191), to pass an order reopening a case and granting another hearing for the taking of evidence, and to reconsider the case upon its merits, and thereupon to award compensation to the claimant, after, the Commission has entered an order about seven months prior thereto, finding that the employee in question 'was a farm employee and therefore exempt from the operation of the Georgia Workman's Compensation Act, under section 15; that the employer is under the act with reference to his manufacturing interests, but did not come under the act with reference to his farming' operations, ' and ordering that 'the case is dismissed, as the Industrial Commission has no jurisdiction in the matter;' where it appears that prior to the first order of the Commission a hearing had been had, with opportunity to the parties at interest to offer their evidence, and that such evidence had been taken, and where the second order recites as the reason therefor that 'it now appears that the Commission made an error in reversing' the award of the commissioner conducting the first hearing, 'and, under section 45, has decided, upon its own motion and at the request made by' the employer, 'to reopen this case and grant another hearing'?

"(2) If the answer to the preceding question be in the negative, is such second order a 'final decision' within the meaning of section 59 of the Workman's Compensation Act (Ga. L. 1920, p. 19S), so as to require the insurance carrier desiring to question the order reopening the case to enter its appeal therefrom to the superior court within 30 days; or can such carrier wait until the second hearing on the merits of the claim, and at such time offer in evidence the record and order on the first hearing, adverse to the claimant, as res judicata of his right to compensation, and then raise the question of the right to reopen, by way of exception in its appeal to the superior court from the order of the Commission on the second hearing awarding compensation to the claimant; such appeal being taken within 30 days from such last order, but more than 30 days from the order reopening the ease and granting another hearing?

"(3) If the answer to the first question be in the affirmative, or if the answer to the second question be in effect that the insurance carrier was required to enter its appeal to the superior court within 30 days from the order reopening the case in order to question the same, is a person a farm laborer within the meaning of section 15 of the Workman's Compensation Act (Ga. L. 1920, p. 177), so as to be exempted from the application of the act unless the employer and employee had voluntarily elected to be bound thereby, where the employer was primarily engaged in the manufacturing business, operating a tannery and a harness, shoe, and horse collar factory and operated in connection therewith and as an. incident thereto a farm, on which rye was raised for the purpose of using the straw inthe collar factory, and other farm products, including corn, incident to the upkeep and maintenance of the farm; where the employee for two or three weeks preceding his injury had been engaged in shredding corn and mixing fertilizer on the farm, and the injury resulted from the crushing of his hand and arm by a corn shredder while engaged in shredding corn on the farm; and where the employee, while thus working on the farm, was not carried on the employer's farm account, but upon its general pay roll together with other employees, whom it was the custom of the employer to assign to any work needed, in the factory, on the farm, or in other duties, although the injured employee had never actually done work other than on the farm as stated, except some labor in the tannery several weeks before the injury?

"(4) If the answer to the third preceding question be in the affirmative—that is, that such employee is a farm laborer and excluded from the provisions of the act, except where there has been a voluntary election to be bound by the act—would the company carrying the insurance, by accepting a premium and issuing its policy partly upon the basis of the inclusion of the employee's name in the employer's general pay roll, covered by the policy, and the wages paid to such employee, but where the insurance company was without previous actual knowledge of the status of such employee, be estopped from setting up as a defense that the employee, by reason of his work and duties, was a farm laborer exempted from the act?"

1. The Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act (Acts 1920, p. 167), § 45, provides that—

"Upon its own motion before judicial determination or upon the application of any party in interest on the ground of a change in condition, the Industrial Commission may at any time review any award or any settlement made between the parties and filed with the Commission, and, on such review, may make an award ending, diminishing or increasing the compensation previously awarded or agreed upon, subject to the maximum or minimum provided in this act, and shall immediately send to the parties a copy of the award. No such review shall affect such award as regards any moneys paid."

This section of the act does not provide for a rehearing or reopening of a case like the present. The adjudication of the Industrial Commission is final. Section 45 of the act provides for cases where an award has been made, and conditions have changed for some reason that makes a readjustment of the award necessary. But the act does not contemplate the reopening of a case like the present, seven months after a final decision, either on their own motion or on...