Gravning v. Gravning, 11015

• Citation: 389 N.W.2d 621
• Decision Date: 19 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 11015,11015
• Parties: Nancy GRAVNING, Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee, v. Greg GRAVNING, Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant. Civ.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota

Page 621

389 N.W.2d 621

67 A.L.R.4th 345

Nancy GRAVNING, Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee, v. Greg GRAVNING, Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant.

Civ. No. 11015.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

June 19, 1986.

Baer & Asbridge, Bismarck, for plaintiff, appellant, and cross-appellee; argued by Richard B. Baer.

Mackoff, Kellogg, Kirby & Kloster, Dickinson, for defendant, appellee, and cross-appellant; argued by Claudette M. Abel.

MESCHKE, Justice.

Nancy and Greg Gravning were married in mid 1982. Two children and two years later they separated. In mid 1985, they were divorced. The divorce judgment placed custody of Gabriel, born December 11, 1982, with Greg and custody of Amanda, born November 5, 1983, with Nancy. Two consecutive days of "joint visitation" were ordered for each month, alternating between Nancy's home in Bismarck and Greg's home at Hettinger, including visitation with Greg's parents.

The divorce judgment conditioned custody:

"That the custody of the minor child, Amanda Gravning, by the Plaintiff is expressly conditioned upon the Plaintiff actively pursuing her formal education and/or gainful employment.

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"That the custody of the minor child, Gabriel Gravning, by the Defendant is expressly conditioned upon the Defendant refraining from any use of any controlled substances including alcohol, the Defendant's remaining gainfully employed and the Defendant continuing to maintain his residence with his parents, Terry and Myrna Gravning."

Nancy contends that she should be awarded custody of both children and that the trial court "made a definite mistake in separating the children." Nancy also challenges the "financial conditions on continued custody of Amanda with her" and complains that the division of property was inequitable. Greg contends that he should be awarded custody of both children and also challenges the conditions on his custody of Gabriel.

The choice between parents is rarely easy for "neither the trial court nor this court has the wisdom of Solomon." Landsberger v. Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d 918, 920 (N.D.1985). The guiding standard is "the best interests and welfare of the child," Sec. 14-09-06.1, N.D.C.C., which must "be determined by the court's consideration and evaluation of all factors affecting the best interests and welfare of the child" as enumerated in Sec. 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C.

Recognizing that the "tender years" doctrine is no longer valid, see Odegard v. Odegard, 259 N.W.2d 484 (N.D.1977), Nancy asserts that the trial court overlooked her role as "primary caretaker" and abused its discretion in separating the children without articulating sufficient reasons. While the trial court's findings are not elaborate, its oral findings cover as many pages in the transcript as Nancy's entire appellate brief contains. And, we conclude that the appellate arguments advanced do not effectively counter the trial court's reasoning.

Some courts have made the "primary caretaker" factor into a presumptive rule, see Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn.1985), but in North Dakota the concept inheres in the statutory factors and has not yet been accorded elevated status. "[T]he observed fact that mothers of infants are most often better able to care for them than the fathers are ... is only one of the many considerations to be weighed by the trial court in making its finding as to the best interest of the child, and to be considered by us in determining whether the finding was clearly erroneous." Odegard v. Odegard, 259 N.W.2d at 486.

In North Dakota, parents "have equal rights" as to the "care, custody, education, and control" of their minor children; Sec. 14-09-06, N.D.C.C. (1985 Supp.). "Between the mother and father ... there is no presumption as to who will better promote the best interests and welfare of the child;" Sec. 14-09-06.1, N.D.C.C.

While courts are cautious about dividing custody of children, see Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 926, Comment Note.--Propriety of separating children by awarding custody to different parents (1964), this court has approved it for small children where the trial court has found it desirable; Henry v. Henry, 77 N.D. 845, 46 N.W.2d 701 (1950). This court has even required it where the record revealed seriously uneven treatment of one of two children by the initial custodial parent; Willi v. Willi, 335 N.W.2d 790 (N.D.1983).

Here, the trial court was concerned about a lack of cooperation in visitation, while both children were in Nancy's custody during the year of separation. And, the trial court was sensitive to the needs of the children:

"I would encourage the parties if indeed you can find a measure of common ground and a measure of mature relationship to benefit your children, to expend these visitations so that these children know each other. That[s] the purpose of the joint visitation--. I don't wish to see a further situation where there is animosity that has built up or the ill will that is present is again being shown and if indeed that is what the joint visitation turns out to be, I will terminate it. So, I hope I make myself clear. I don't wish to control your lives unnecessarily, but these young children are entitled to have a fair and honest relationship and it is the obligation of the Court to do what I can to give them the best opportunity."

This court has warned that "one's failure to permit reasonable visitation could be a very significant factor in the court's ultimate disposition" of custody; Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 131 (N.D.1980). Other courts have approved divided custody to address visitation problems where one parent had initial custody. 98 A.L.R.2d, supra, at 944. Here, the provisions for continuous "joint visitation" and for periodic review of the arrangements by the court with the parties point up the carefulness of the trial court's disposition. We conclude that divided custody was an appropriate "Solomonic" ¹ approach to the circumstances that the trial court encountered in this case.

Nancy and Greg directed much of their efforts on this appeal, as they did at trial, to try to show that each would be a better parent than the other. But, the trial court carefully considered the evidence and found that "each of Nancy Gravning and Greg Gravning are competent and capable parents and that each shall have equal standing in the eyes of the law." The findings are supported by evidence and are not clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P.; Landsberger v. Landsberger, supra. We see no error in the trial court's separate placement of these children.

The troublesome issues on this appeal are the conditions imposed on the award of custody to each parent. Both appellants complain about their individual conditions, but neither questions the appropriateness of imposing any conditions. Thus, our examination of the issues is limited by the lack of adversarial presentations on them.

The use of conditions for continuing custody may be an additional way to insure that divorced parents fulfill their obligations to their children. ² But, the critical concern must be whether the effect of conditioning custody risks making the child the innocent victim of a parent's misbehavior. Behavioral conditions directed to the conduct of the parents, like those used here, carry such a risk, particularly where the failure to live up to the condition does not clearly and directly affect the child's welfare. Whether that risk is acceptable, when weighed with the utility of promoting compliance with the custodial decree, can probably be determined better with experience. Therefore, we leave full resolution of that issue to another day, while making several observations about the subject.

First, every placement of custody carries implicit behavioral conditions. Any conduct of a parent which adversely affects the welfare of the child is regarded as a sufficient change of circumstances to warrant a change of custody. E.g., Vetter v. Vetter, 267 N.W.2d 790 (N.D.1978); Jordana v. Corley, 220 N.W.2d 515 (N.D.1974); Goff v. Goff, 211 N.W.2d 850 (N.D.1973). Therefore, we do not believe that every expressed condition can be condemned.

Second, these conditions are connected to the background and circumstances of these parents. Appellants' complaints about them do not show that they are wholly unrelated to the well-being of the child placed with that parent. A complete lack of relationship to the welfare of the child would no doubt make a condition of custody unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. We are unable to view these conditions as that disconnected to the interests of these children.

Finally, it may be better to consider the advantages and drawbacks of a particular condition when, and if, a trial court has determined that a breach of the expressed condition has taken place and has assessed the impact of the breach on the child involved.

The trial court gave sufficient reasons for the division made of the modest property of the parties.

Since error has not been demonstrated, we affirm.

ERICKSTAD, C.J., and GIERKE and VANDE WALLE, JJ., concur.

LEVINE, Justice, dissenting.

I agree that in custody disputes the "choice between parents is rarely easy for 'neither the trial court nor this court have the wisdom of Solomon.' " However, for this court to exercise whatever wisdom it may possess, it needs adequate factual findings by the trial court to determine whether the custody decision is clearly erroneous. Hust v. Hust, 295 N.W.2d 316 (N.D.1980); DeForest v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919 (N.D.1975). Adequate articulation of the trial court's findings provides the rationale for its decision and is essential for intelligent judicial review. Minot Daily News v. Holum, 380 N.W.2d 347 (N.D.1986).

In both its oral opinion and written findings, the trial court explained that it considered both Nancy and Greg equally fit to have custody of their children, but that the individual needs of each child would be best fulfilled by splitting...