Gray v. Baker

• Decision Date: 26 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. 56547,56547
• Citation: 485 So.2d 306
• Parties: Morris L. GRAY v. Jerry E. BAKER, Hunter L. Roussel, Jr., Faith Presbyterian Church and Faith Presbyterian Church, Inc.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 306

485 So.2d 306

Morris L. GRAY v. Jerry E. BAKER, Hunter L. Roussel, Jr., Faith Presbyterian

Church and Faith Presbyterian Church, Inc.

No. 56547.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

March 26, 1986.

Michael P. Younger, Johnston & Younger, Brandon, for appellant.

Gee Ogletree, Young, Scanlon & Sessums, John C. McLaurin, McLaurin & McLaurin, Brandon, for appellees.

Before WALKER, P.J., and ROBERTSON and ANDERSON, JJ.

ROBERTSON, Justice, for the Court:

On January 17, 1985, Morris L. Gray brought this action in the Chancery Court of Rankin County, Mississippi, seeking rescission of a conveyance he made to Faith Presbyterian Church and charging fraud in the procurement. Gray alleges that prior to June 22, 1983, he owned some 10.20 acres in Rankin County, that he was approached by Jerry E. Baker who held himself out as representing the church regarding the possible purchase of this land, that in fact Baker was acting at least in part for Hunter L. Roussel, Jr., one to whom Gray says he would not have sold any part of his land for any reason, that Baker wholly failed to disclose Roussel's involvement, that in fact on June 22, 1983, he (Gray) conveyed the property to the church whereupon one month later the church conveyed half of it to Roussel.

The matter came before the Chancery Court on the motion of all Defendants--Baker, Roussel and the church--to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Rule 12(b)(6), Miss.R.Civ.P., or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, Rule 56, Miss.R.Civ.P. On May 3, 1985, the Chancery Court entered its order granting each of these alternative motions and dismissing Gray's complaint with prejudice. Gray appeals.

At the outset we are met with the complaint of Baker and the other Appellees that the summary judgment is not before the Court. To be sure, Gray's assignment of error is singular and is directed toward the trial court's granting of the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Appellees forget, however, that motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment are by rule declared interchangeable. See Rule 12(b), Miss.R.Civ.P.; Smith v. City of West Point, 475 So.2d 816, 818 (Miss.1985); 5 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 1366 (1969). The motion for summary judgment is the functional equivalent of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, only it occurs at a subsequent stage of the proceedings. Like the motion to dismiss, it tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim to undergird his insistence that further proceedings be had. Suffice it to say that an assignment of error brings before the Court all matters necessarily incident to the issue specifically assigned.

At its core, Gray's action charges that he was duped by Baker and Roussel, that the church--wittingly or unwittingly--lent itself to the deception. The record reflects that Gray lives in the area and had in years past sold some sixteen acres to Roussel upon which the latter has made his home. In later years a zoning dispute had led to less than amicable relations between the two. ¹ Gray maintains that he would not have sold any of his remaining property to Roussel under any circumstances and that he had no idea that Roussel had any connection with the sale he was negotiating with Baker. The fact appears that, one month after Gray sold the 10.20 acres, the church turned around and sold 5.10 acres to Roussel. Gray says this was according to a prearranged scheme. ²

Gray further charges that he reduced the sales price of the 10.20 acres out of consideration for the fact that the purchaser was a church. The record suggests that Gray originally placed a sales price of $150,000.00 on the property, that he subsequently offered the property for $125,000.00, but the sale was finally consummated at $110,000.00. Gray insists that he reduced the sales price to $110,000.00 solely because the purchaser was a church.

In his complaint Gray seeks various alternative forms of relief, his primary demand being that the conveyance to the church should be declared void. While it appears that we have no cases directly on the point, we recognize that transactions respecting interests in land may be voided when one party misrepresents a material fact and where the other relies to his detriment upon that material misrepresentation. McGee v. Clark, 343 So.2d 486, 489 (Miss.1977); State Highway Commission v. Powell, 184 Miss. 266, 274, 185 So. 589, 591 (1939); Fornea v. Goodyear Yellow Pine Co., 181 Miss. 50, 64-65, 178 So. 914, 918 (1938).

The identity of one's visible vendee is a material matter. Where a vendor would not have made a conveyance of land had he known of a prior agreement by the vendee to convey to another the vendor found objectionable, that vendor is entitled to a judicial recision of the instrument of conveyance. See Walker v. Galt, 171 F.2d 613 (5th Cir.1948); Orr v. Walker, 113 So.2d 485 (La.App.1959). It matters not that the advent of the obnoxious ultimate purchaser may cause the vendor no pecuniary loss. The vendor's rights in his property extend to the right to refuse to sell to such third party for good reason, for bad reason or for no reason at all--so long as he does not act for some legally impermissible reason (a caveat not applicable...