Gray v. Bayer
Decision Date | 14 July 2014 |
Docket Number | Case No. 13-cv-385-JPG-PMF |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Parties | JEFF GRAY, individually and as Special Administrator of the Estate of Beaulah Inez Gray, and MICHAEL GRAY, Plaintiffs, v. KEVIN BAYER, doing business as CLAY COUNTY SPEEDWAY, Defendant. |
This matter comes before the Court on defendant Kevin Bayer's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 26) to which plaintiffs Jeff Gray ("Jeff") and Michael Gray ("Michael") (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed responses (Doc. 31 & 35). The Court heard oral argument from the parties on June 11, 2014. For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion.
As a hobby, Michael modified vehicles for the purposes of participating in various derby races. On September 23, 2012, Michael and his mother, Beaulah Gray ("Beaulah"), participated in the powder puff race at the Clay County Speedway located in Flora, Illinois. Michael had modified their vehicle in various ways, including removing the shoulder strap of the safety belt. Beaulah drove, and Michael sat in the driver's seat. Beaulah had never participated in a highspeed race before like the incident race and there is evidence that the vehicle was wholly unsuitable for this particular race. During the incident, Michael was not wearing a seat belt andat one point prior to the accident the car lifted approximately three feet off the ground. Ultimately, the vehicle rolled resulting in Beaulah's death and Michael's serious injury
The parties agree that Michael and Beaulah signed a release prior to the race that states in pertinent part as follows:
Plaintiffs brought negligence and willful and wanton claims against Bayer. In the instant motion, Bayer argues that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on (1) the negligence claim based on the releases signed by Michael and Beaulah; and (1) the willful and wanton claims because the pleaded actions do not constitute willful and wanton conduct. In his response, Jeff first argues that summary judgment should not be granted on the negligence or willful and wanton claims because (1) Bayer is not included within the class of persons protected by the release language, and (2) the instant incident was not contemplated in the release. Second, Jeff argues that even if Defendant is included within the class protected by the release, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendant's conduct was willful and wanton. Michael filed a response in which he adopted in full Jeff's arguments. At the hearing, however, Michael indicated he only wished to proceed on the willful and wanton claim. The Court will now consider whether Bayer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on either the negligence or willful and wanton claims.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int'l-Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000). The reviewing court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 2008); Spath, 211 F.3d at 396. Where the moving party fails to meet its strict burden of proof, a court cannot enter summary judgment for the moving party even if the opposing party fails to present relevant evidence in response to the motion. Cooper v. Lane, 969 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1992).
In responding to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party may not simply rest upon the allegations contained in the pleadings but must present specific facts to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-26; Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 1996). A genuine issue of material fact is not demonstrated by the mere existence of "some alleged factual dispute between the parties," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, or by "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists only if "a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. With these standards in mind, the Court will address the negligence and willful and wanton claims in turn.
Bayer first argues he is entitled to summary judgment on the negligence claims because the parties signed a release prior to the accident. Illinois law provides that parties may contract to avoid liability for a party's own negligence even in high-risk activities such as racing automobiles. Polansky v. Kelly, 856 F. Supp. 2d 962, 968 (S.D. Ill. 2012). Jeff, however, argues the release does not help Bayer because (1) Bayer was not included within the class specified in the release, and (2) the accident was not contemplated by the parties at the time Michael and Beaulah signed the release. The Court will consider each argument in turn.
First, the Court will address whether Bayer was included with the class specified in the release. The Court must give effect to the parties' intention when constructing a contract by looking to the language of the contract. Schek v. Chi. Transit Auth., 247 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1969). When the contract language is clear, its interpretation is a question of law. Platt v. Gateway Int'l Motorsports Corp., 813 N.E.2d 279, 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). A contract is ambiguous when there is more than one reasonable...
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