Gray v. Brazoria Cnty.
| Decision Date | 23 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-CV-109 |
| Parties | JOHN GRAY, Plaintiff, v. BRAZORIA COUNTY, et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Plaintiffs, John Gray and Crystal Gray Sandiford, have filed this lawsuit against Brazoria County and other Defendants because their daughter, Victoria Gray, died as a result of suicide on September 2, 2015 while in custody in the Brazoria County Jail. Plaintiffs filed their Original Complaint in this Court on April 26, 2016, and their live pleading is their First Amended Complaint on August 16, 2016. (Dkt. 18).
Plaintiffs assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of Victoria Gray's constitutional rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs have named nine Defendants: Brazoria County; Captain Gilbert Gardner; Deputy Jailer Viviana Gonzalez; Deputy Jailer Nancy Gragert; J. Allen and Associates of Texas, LLC, the contractor who provides medical services in the Brazoria County Detention Center; Nurse Laronda Billups, LVN; Nurse Sandra Sandoval, RN; and Nurse Sherry Garrido, LVN. Each of the individuals is sued in their individual capacities. Plaintiffs also assert claims against a group of "Unknown Employees" alleged to have been "the jail and infirmary staff on duty in the time period August 29, 2014 to September 02, 2014, who were charged with the care of Victoria Gray."
Plaintiffs filed their Original Complaint on April 26, 2016. Dkt. 1. The County immediately gave notice, under this Court's Procedures, of its intention to file a motion to dismiss, and the Court held a scheduling hearing, after which the Brazoria County parties proceeded with exchange of initial information and some preliminary discovery. This discovery included personnel files and the names of medical staff that may have provided care to Gray or been on duty during the relevant time frame. On August 16, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint, naming the medical providers defendants. Each of the Defendants has now filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's First Amended Petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
The Plaintiffs allege that Victoria Gray's history with the Brazoria County Detention Center began as early as March 2013, when she was incarcerated for one year on an assault conviction. Eight months later, in January 2014, Gray was again in the Brazoria County Detention Center on another assault charge. During this January 2014 incarceration, she attempted to commit suicide in her cell and was "subsequently committed to the Austin State Hospital for evaluation and treatment." According to Plaintiffs, Gray's release from Austin State Hospital in April 2014 was conditioned upon a court order requiring her "as a condition of her probation, to take anti-depressant medications [Klonopin and Trazodone] and . . . to present for blood tests to confirm that she was taking her required medications." Plaintiffs allege that these medications arehighly addictive and pose a risk of suicidal thoughts for persons in withdrawal, and Plaintiffs further generally allege that "[a]ll reasonable health care providers, including those in the field of corrections, are aware of the risks of withdrawal from these medications and its potentially fatal consequences."
Four months after her release from Austin State Hospital under these conditions, Gray was again arrested on August 29, 2014 for violating her probation. Plaintiffs allege that, at the time of her arrest, Gray was carrying her prescribed Trazadone but that it was taken from her during the intake process. Plaintiffs allege that Gray began exhibiting alarming symptoms almost immediately, "believing speakers were being pulled through her ears, was depressed and hearing things," and that Jail personnel determined Gray was a "[maximum] suicide risk." Plaintiffs further allege that Gray was "disruptive, exhibiting violent and irrational behavior," and she was then placed in "isolation for low risk inmates." Plaintiffs allege that this cell was subject to 30-minute "scrutiny" or checks, and that such a schedule was inappropriate for Gray.
Plaintiffs allege that, the day after her arrest, Gray asked Deputy Jailer Bailey for her medications. Plaintiffs also allege that Deputy Jailer Bailey1 reported that Gray attempted suicide that same day, August 30, 2014, and that such a report should have been given to the Captain on duty. Plaintiffs' allegations do not clarify whether they are alleging that such a report was made.
On August 31, 2014, Gray was evaluated by Nurse Billups, and Plaintiffs allege that Nurse Billups determined that Gray was a "suicide risk." Plaintiffs allege that, at thatevaluation, Gray "exhibited symptoms of withdrawal, auditory and visual hallucinations, emotional instability, depression, numbness in the abdomen, and wounds from attempted self harm" but that she was simply "returned to isolation, not provided her medications, and not put on suicide watch."
After Gray was placed in her cell, Plaintiffs allege that other inmates heard her "begging for medication, and crying out for assistance." During the next days, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to monitor Gray adequately, that as much as 48 minutes could elapse time between checks on Gray. Plaintiffs also allege that the cell in which Gray was placed did not contain adequate equipment for a suicidal inmate—for example, Gray was not provided with a paper mattress cover.
During the evening of September 2, 2014, Gray committed suicide in her cell by hanging herself with a mattress cover.
At the outset, the Court noted that, although Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated Gray's rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment, there are no facts that raise a Fourth Amendment claim regarding the original seizure or arrest of Gray. See Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 2000); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1443-44 (5th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims under the Fourth Amendment should be DISMISSED as to all Defendants.
Similarly, the facts pled show that Gray was a pretrial detainee, not a prisoner under the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims under the EighthAmendment should be DISMISSED as to all Defendants. However, as discussed below, the standards of the Eighth Amendment remain relevant to this case.
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the formal sufficiency of the pleadings and is "appropriate when a defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legally cognizable claim." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). The court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true, view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id.
To defeat a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Whenplaintiffs "have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (). In other words, a complaint must provide sufficient factual allegations that, if assumed true, "raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In conducting this analysis, however, the Court does not consider legal conclusions as true, and "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a private right of action for the deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. A complaint under § 1983 must allege that the acts complained of occurred under color of state law and that the complaining parties were deprived of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1995). A complaint under § 1983 must also allege that the constitutional or statutory deprivation was intentional or due to deliberate indifference and not the result of mere negligence. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Plaintiffs suing public...
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