Gray v. City of St. Paul
| Decision Date | 26 June 1908 |
| Docket Number | 15,679 - (210) |
| Citation | 116 N.W. 1111,105 Minn. 19 |
| Parties | GEORGE GRAY v. CITY OF ST. PAUL |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Ramsey county to recover $1,846.73 the amount paid for the purchase of certain local improvement certificates issued by defendant which had been declared void in proper court proceedings. From an order, Kelly, J. sustaining defendant's demurrer to the complaint plaintiff appealed. Reversed.
Act Unconstitutional.
Chapter 183, Laws 1907, which prohibits the maintaining of any action for the refundment of money paid for assessment sale certificates under the charter of the city of St. Paul after two years from the date when notice of expiration of the period of redemption could have lawfully been given, is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case; the same being in violation of the contract under which such certificates were sold by the city.
P. J. McLaughlin and Bryan & Coffman, for appellant.
J. C. Michael and Louis R. Frankel, for respondent.
Certain local improvement certificates of sale were issued by the city in 1892 and 1894, which by assignment were transferred to appellant in this action. In October, 1907, the validity of all such certificates was called into question in a certain action, and it was adjudged that they were illegal and void. The present action was brought against the city for the purpose of recovering the amount paid for the certificates, with interest. The city demurred to the complaint upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and the demurrer was sustained upon the ground that the time for commencing the action had expired under the provisions of chapter 183, p. 207, Laws 1907.
According to the charter provisions (sections 45-56, c. 7, pp. 352-355, Sp. Laws 1887), the certificates were subject to redemption by the owner, or any other person interested in the property sold, in five annual installments, or at any time within five years from the date of the sale. At least three months before the time for redeeming expired the city treasurer was required to give notice thereof, and upon expiration of such time the purchaser was entitled to a deed upon payment of the cost of redemption notice and the subsequent and prior assessments. By section 50, c. 32, p. 590, Sp. Laws 1889, it was provided that, if a certificate should be adjudged void in any action in which its validity was questioned, then the holder thereof was entitled to a refundment of the amount paid with interest. Unless affected by the 1907 act, appellant's action against the city for refundment is governed by the six-year statute of limitations. Chapter 183, p. 207, Laws 1907, reads:
That no action for the refundment or recovery of moneys paid on account of the purchase of any valid or invalid certificate of sale for a local improvement assessment, heretofore or hereafter issued by any city in this state now or hereafter having a population of over fifty thousand inhabitants, shall be maintained after the expiration of two years from the date when notice of expiration of the period of redemption of the property described in such certificate from the sale evidenced thereby could have lawfully been given. * * *
This act was approved April 13, 1907, and made to take effect and be in force from and after January 1, 1908. The question in the case is whether the act of 1907 is in violation of section 10, art. 1, and section 1, art. 14, of the constitution of the United States, and of sections 7, 8, and 11, art. 1, of the state constitution.
The learned trial court was of opinion that the act did not imperil any right possessed by the purchasers of the certificates under the laws in force at the time of the sale that the act related wholly to the remedy, and that the legislature had the authority to enact and change a statute of limitations applicable to judicial remedies and to contracts already in force. The court was also of opinion, on the authority of Hill v. Townley, 45 Minn. 169, 47 N.W. 653, that what constituted a reasonable time after the act went into effect, within which to commence suits, rested in the sound discretion of the legislature, and that the time...
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