Gray v. Davis

• Decision Date: 11 May 1966
• Docket Number: A,No. 18505,No. D--T8197,D--T8197,18505
• Citation: 148 S.E.2d 682,247 S.C. 536
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Helen F. GRAY, Respondent, v. Jerry R. DAVIS and one 1956 Chevrolet, 1965 S.C. Licenseppellant.

Page 682

148 S.E.2d 682

247 S.C. 536

Helen F. GRAY, Respondent, v. Jerry R. DAVIS and one 1956 Chevrolet, 1965 S.C. License No.

D--T8197, Appellant.

No. 18505.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

May 11, 1966.

Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Greenville, for appellant.

Abrams, Bowen & Townes, Greenville, for respondent.

BUSSEY, Justice.

In this action to recover both personal injury and property damages arising out of an automobile collision, the jury awarded plaintiff a verdict of $7,000.00, actual damages, and $500.00, punitive damages. The defendant moved for a new trial generally on the ground that the amount of the verdict was the result of prejudice, caprice or passion and not founded upon any legitimate evidence in the case. In the alternative, defendant moved for a new trial nisi on the ground that the verdict was unduly liberal. While the alternative motions challenged the entire verdict, the defendant apparently did not contend before the trial judge, and does not contend here, that the verdict for punitive damages was excessive. Both motions were denied by the trial judge and the appeal is from his order of denial.

The appellant correctly concedes that both of his motions were addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and that his discretion thereabout is not reviewable and will not be disturbed by this court in the absence of an abuse of discretion. We quote the following appropriate language from Moorer v. Dowling, et al., 216 S.C. 456, 58 S.E.2d 734,

'This Court, confined by constitutional limitations to the correction of errors of law in cases of this character, has no power to review and reverse the ruling of the Circuit Judge refusing to grant a new trial upon the ground that the verdict was excessive, unless the appeal record discloses and warrants the conclusion, as a matter of law, that such refusal amounts to a manifest abuse of the discretionary power exclusively vested in him to grant a new trial on account of matters of fact. See Duncan v. Record Publishing Co., 145 S.C. 196, 143 S.E. 31; Union Bleaching & Finishing Co. v. Barker Fuel Co., 124 S.C. 458, 117 S.E. 735; Bennett v. Southern Ry.-Carolina Division, 98 S.C. 42, 79 S.E. 710; Southern Ry.-Carolina Division v. Bennett, 233 U.S. 80, 34 S.Ct. 566, 567, 58 L.Ed. 860; Payne v. Cohen, 168 S.C. 459, 167 S.E. 665, 667; Williams v. Tolbert, 76 S.C. 211, 56 S.E. 908; Steele v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 103 S.C. 102, 87 S.E. 639; Jennings v. McCowan, 215 S.C. 404, 55 S.E.2d 522.'

For this court to disturb the decision of the lower court, it must clearly appear that the trial judge abused his discretion. Campbell v. Hall, 210 S.Ct. 423, 43 S.E.2d 129; Ford v. A.A.A. Highway Express, 204 S.C. 433, 29 S.E.2d 760. Appellant contends, however, that the trial judge here clearly abused his discretion in that the amount of the verdict for actual damages substantially exceeds any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages proved by the respondent, and in that the trial judge's decision was based upon, and controlled by manifest errors of law.

We first consider whether, as contended by appellant, the verdict substantially exceeds any rational appraisal of the damages shown by the evidence.

The collision out of which the case arose occurred in November 1964, and the case was tried in September 1965. At the time of the trial respondent was fifty years old, and her occupation was that of a maid. Her special damages, including property damage to her automobile, medical expenses and lost time, up until the time of trial, amounted to slightly less than $1,000.00, of which slightly more than $500 was occasioned by damages to her automobile. Evidence in her behalf reflects that she sustained an injury to her neck and back. There is evidence that she has endured pain and suffering and that she will endure pain and suffering in the future. Her testimony that she had had no difficulty with her neck or back prior to the injury was corroborated by other witnesses. There is medical evidence that X-rays show certain changes in the bone structure in the cervical area of the spine, including a narrowing of one intervertebral disk space. She sustained some loss of sensation in her left hand, particularly in her thumb and index area. She also has a lessening of the reflex responses of the left arm, medical evidence being to the effect that such, as well as the loss of sensation in the hand, is indicative of nerve injury. At the time of the trial she was still working for the same employer in whose service she had been for a number of years. While she had suffered no reduction in her rate of pay, there is evidence that she is unable to perform her duties as a maid as fully and efficiently as prior to her injury. The X-rays taken shortly after her injury indicated that she had some arthritic changes prior to her injury and, as is not unusual in injuries of this type, there is argument as to how much of her present condition is attributable to these prior arthritic changes and how much thereof is attributable to the injury.

We will not state the evidence as to damages in greater detail, but have carefully reviewed all of the evidence and conclude that there is no merit in the contention of the appellant that the judgment of the lower court should be disturbed, on the ground that the verdict was capricious and not supported by the evidence, or any rational appraisal thereof.

Appellant asserts that the trial judge was controlled by a basic misconception of the law in denying both of its motions, in that he was under the impression that reckless conduct on the part of the defendant would justify an increase in the amount of actual damages awarded. It is argued that his order reflects such misconception on his part. We see nothing in the order which would support this contention. The contention is based on the fact that the trial judge did refer to the circumstances of the case and the reckless conduct of the defendant, and then went on to say that the award of only $500 punitive damages, under all of the circumstances related, was 'indicative of the fact that passion, prejudice,...