Gray v. Giannikios

• Decision Date: 20 December 2011
• Citation: 935 N.Y.S.2d 112,2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 09272,90 A.D.3d 836
• Parties: Scott GRAY, etc., et al., appellants, v. Michael GIANNIKIOS, et al., respondents, et al., defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 09272

90 A.D.3d 836

935 N.Y.S.2d 112

Scott GRAY, etc., et al., appellants,

v.Michael GIANNIKIOS, et al., respondents, et al., defendant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Dec. 20, 2011.

John J. Ciafone, Astoria, N.Y., for appellants.

Mendolia & Stenz (Montfort, Healy, McGuire & Salley, Garden City, N.Y. [Donald S. Neumann, Jr., and Matthew K. Arad], of counsel), for respondents.

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, A.P.J., RUTH C. BALKIN, CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries and injury to property, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Rosengarten, J.), entered October 12, 2010, as granted the motion of the defendants Michael Giannikios and Ekaterini Zoumberakis pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them for lack of personal jurisdiction.

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Ekaterini Zoumberakis for lack of personal jurisdiction; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for a hearing on, and a new determination of, that branch of the motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Ekaterini Zoumberakis for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The summons and complaint purportedly were served upon the defendants Michael Giannikios and Ekaterini Zoumberakis (hereinafter together the respondents) by the “nail and mail” method pursuant to CPLR 308(4). However, the record demonstrates that the service was deficient because the plaintiffs failed “to show the existence of even a factual question as to whether the process server exercised the due diligence necessary to be permitted to serve someone under CPLR 308(4)” ( Leviton v. Unger, 56 A.D.3d 731, 732, 868 N.Y.S.2d 126; see Schwarz v. Margie, 62 A.D.3d 780, 781, 878 N.Y.S.2d 459). Since the proof of due diligence was insufficient as a matter of law, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the respondents' motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against Giannikios ( see Leviton v. Unger, 56 A.D.3d at 732, 868 N.Y.S.2d 126; Estate of Edward S. Waterman v. Jones, 46 A.D.3d 63, 66–67, 843 N.Y.S.2d 462; County of Nassau v. Yohannan, 34 A.D.3d 620, 621, 824 N.Y.S.2d 431).

However, the Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against Zoumberakis. Zoumberakis purportedly was re-served pursuant to CPLR 308(1). Where a defendant submits a sworn denial of receipt of process containing specific facts to rebut the statements in the process server's affidavit, the presumption of proper service is rebutted and an evidentiary hearing is required ( see Matter of Davis v. Davis, 84 A.D.3d 1080, 1081, 923 N.Y.S.2d 633; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Christie, 83 A.D.3d 824, 825, 921 N.Y.S.2d 127...