Gray v. Gray, 196

• Decision Date: 20 March 1968
• Docket Number: No. 196,196
• Citation: 273 N.C. 319,160 S.E.2d 1
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Doris S. GRAY, William Morris Gray, April Gray, Minor, by and through her Next Friend Doris S. Gray, Mary Torrence Gray, Minor, by and through her Next Friend, Doris S. Gray v. George A. GRAY, Jr.

Page 1

160 S.E.2d 1

273 N.C. 319

Doris S. GRAY, William Morris Gray, April Gray, Minor, by and through her Next Friend Doris S. Gray, Mary Torrence Gray, Minor, by and through her Next Friend, Doris S. Gray v. George A. GRAY, Jr.

No. 196.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 20, 1968.

Mullen, Holland & Harrell and Thomas H. Morgan, Gastonia, for plaintiff appellants.

Ernest R. Warren, Gastonia, for defendant appellee.

BOBBITT, Justice.

During the pendency of this action, the two older children attained their majority. The present status of Doris S. Gray in this action is twofold, that is, as mother and also as next friend of the two minor children, April Gray (18) and Mary Torrence Gray (15).

The record indicates the provisions of the separation agreement of February 25, 1955, including the provision that Doris S. Gray was to have sole and exclusive custody of the Four minor children and provide a home for them, were incorporated in the judgment entered herein by Pless, J., in October, 1958; and that, as contemplated, the children during minority have made their home with the mother. The record contains no order providing for a change in respect of the custody of April. Nor does it appear that April has left or has attempted to leave the home in which she has resided with her mother and sister.

Even if we assume April's college expenses will be provided for by her own earnings and by contributions made by her father directly to April or directly in payment of college expenses, as long as she is in the custody of her mother and makes her home with her mother and sister provision must be made for her support there, whether her actual residence there be occasional or continuous. Moreover, if there is to be a reduction in the amount defendant is required to pay for April's support when in the home with her mother and sister because of her part-time residence at college, it would seem the court should incorporate in its judgment provisions spelling out, at least in substance, what the father is obligated to do rather than accept informal assurances as to his intentions and plans.

It appears affirmatively that Judge McLean's order was entered under the apprehension that defendant was 'not longer responsible' for the 'upkeep' of April after she attained 'the age of eighteen years.' This explains comments and findings in his order apparently based on informal conversations with April and with defendant. However, we are of opinion, and so decide, that Judge McLean's order in this respect is based on a misapprehension of the applicable law.

In Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31, 1 A.L.R.2d 205, Winborne, J., (later C.J.), for this Court, stated: 'Ordinarily a child, in the eyes of the law, is in a condition to provide for his own maintenance when he has reached the age of twenty-one years, that is, has attained the status of majority. That age was arbitrarily fixed at common law for the termination of the child's minority, and the attainment of his majority, and the rule has remained in force throughout the United States.' Quoting further from the opinion in Wells: 'Hence, we hold that ordinarily the law presumes that when a child reaches...