Gray v. Hamil

• Decision Date: 31 July 1889
• Citation: 10 S.E. 205,82 Ga. 375
• Parties: GRAY v. HAMIL.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

10 S.E. 205

82 Ga. 375

GRAY v. HAMIL.

Supreme Court of Georgia

July 31, 1889^[1]

One of two partners having, by the excessive use of stimulants voluntarily disabled himself from performing service in the firm affairs, and thus cast upon his copartner more than a due share of labor, his agreement after dissolution, but before full settlement and final division of the assets, to allow his copartner, out of the assets, a specific sum per month for a definite number of months for past service, so as to equalize to that extent the difference resulting from the failure of one to do his part, and the overlooking by the other of his part, is not without consideration, but is supported by a strong moral obligation, which, under the Code, is sufficient to render the agreement obligatory as a contract.

Error from superior court, Sumter county; FORT, Judge.

J. A Ansley and E. A. Hawkins, for plaintiff in error.

Guerry & Son, E. G. Simmons, and B. P. Hollis, for defendant in error.

BLECKLEY C.J.

As to matters of practice, taking the whole record together, with the explanations given therein by the presiding judge, we are unable to discover any error; and, as to the merits, we think there was evidence which justified the jury in arriving at a conclusion different from that which the auditor reached. This leaves as the controlling question of the whole case one matter of law only, viz., whether, under the facts proved, an agreement was obligatory, made by one of the partners, J. R Hamil, to allow the other, A. J. Hamil, a fixed compensation to-wit, $80 per month for 17 months, for services rendered by the latter while the former was incapacitated to do his part as a member of the firm; his incapacity (as might well be inferred from the evidence) being a voluntary one, brought on by him, during the existence of the partnership, through the excessive use of stimulants. The agreement was made after the dissolution, but before the business was entirely wound up and before the assets had all been divided. The general rule, no doubt, is that a partner is entitled to nothing extra for any inequality of service rendered by him as compared with that rendered by his copartner. The authorities to this effect are so numerous and so uniform that they need not be cited. It is equally clear that an express agreement made by the partners with each other, either in the partnership articles or upon a valid consideration...