Gray v. Holmes

• Decision Date: 11 July 1896
• Docket Number: 8762
• Citation: 45 P. 596,57 Kan. 217
• Parties: MATILDA GRAY et al. v. B. F. HOLMES et al
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

45 P. 596

57 Kan. 217

MATILDA GRAY et al. v. B. F. HOLMES et al

No. 8762

Supreme Court of Kansas

July 11, 1896

Decided July, 1896.

Error from Bourbon District Court Hon. S. H. Allen, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

THE original action was brought by B. F. Holmes and Una Holmes against Elizabeth E. Huffman and Matilda Gray for the partition of certain real estate of which Adam Huffman died seized, the same not being necessary for the payment of debts. Adam Huffman married Sophronia Gray, daughter of B. W and Sarah Gray, in 1860. William H. Huffman was born in July 1861, the only child of said marriage. Sarah Gray died intestate January 1, 1862. Her daughter, Sophronia J Huffman, died intestate January 7, 1862, and said child William H. Huffman died January 14, 1862. After the death of his wife and his son as aforesaid, Adam Huffman married Elizabeth E. Adamson, a widow, and on September 5, 1870, he adopted as his daughter Alice Ann Adamson, a girl about 10 years of age, by deed under the Missouri statute, in Vernon County where all then resided. Afterward, Alice Ann was married to B. F. Holmes and there was born unto them Una, a daughter. Alice Ann died intestate before the death of Adam Huffman, who also died intestate in April, 1890. B. W. Gray is still living, and on April 16, 1891, he conveyed his interest and title, if any, to Matilda Gray. The Court found and adjudged that the plaintiffs, B. F. Holmes and Una Holmes, were each entitled to an undivided one-fourth part of said real estate, and that Elizabeth E. Huffman was entitled to one-half thereof, and that Matilda Gray had no interest therein; and this proceeding in error is prosecuted for the purpose of reversing said judgment, it being claimed by the plaintiffs in error that the defendants in error had no interest in said real estate.

Judgment affirmed.

Walter L. Simons, for plaintiffs in error.

A. A. Harris, and Henry E. Harris, for defendants in error.

MARTIN C. J. All the Justices concurring.

OPINION

MARTIN, C. J.

I. It was assumed but not decided in Renz v. Drury, ante, page 84, that a child adopted in a sister state in substantial compliance with her statutes, would inherit lands of the deceased adopting parent in this State on equal terms with a child of such parent born in wedlock. This proposition, however, is now earnestly controverted by the plaintiffs in error. Counsel says that Alice Ann Adamson could not have inherited from Adam Huffman in the absence of sections 6 and 7 of chapter 67 of the General Statutes of 1889 (PP 3873, 3874), relating to the adoption of minor children; that only children adopted in the Probate Court in accordance with our statute are "entitled to the same rights of person and property as children or heirs at law of the person thus adopting them"; and that Alice Ann was not adopted in this way, but only by deed. This, however, was the method prescribed by chapter 29 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1889, then in force; and the Supreme Court of that State, in Fosburgh v. Rogers, 114 Mo. 122, 21 S.W. 82, held that a child adopted in accordance with the statute acquires a right to inherit from the adopting parents upon their intestacy, and that this right does not conflict with the Statute of Descents, but only points out who are to be deemed children under that statute. See also Moran v. Stewart, 122 Mo. 295, 26 S.W. 962. Now, although the method of adoption in Missouri essentially differs from our own, yet the rights conferred upon the child are substantially identical in the two states. A personal or relative status lawfully acquired in one state or country will generally be recognized by the courts of another state or country. This proposition was clearly stated by Chief Justice GRAY in Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 246, as follows:

"It is a general principle, that the status, or condition of a person, the relation in which he stands to another person, and by which he is qualified or made capable to take certain rights in that other's property, is fixed by the law of the domicil; and that this status and capacity are to be recognized and upheld in every other state, so far as they are not inconsistent with its own laws and policy. Subject to this limitation, upon the death of any man, the status of those who claim succession or inheritance in his estate is to be ascertained by the law under which that status was acquired; his personal property is indeed to be distributed according to the law of his domicil at the time of his death, and his real estate descends according to the law of the place in which it is situated; but, in either case, it is according to those provisions of that law which regulate the succession or the inheritance of persons having such a status."

The opinion is replete with learning upon the whole subject of the law of place as affecting the status of a person changing his domicil, or having property rights in other states or countries, and it was held that a child adopted under the laws of Pennsylvania would be...