Gray v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 20 October 1964
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 3580.
• Citation: 234 F. Supp. 743
• Parties: Victoria GRAY et al., Plaintiffs, v. Honorable Paul B. JOHNSON, Jr., Governor, State of Mississippi, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

234 F. Supp. 743

Victoria GRAY et al., Plaintiffs, v. Honorable Paul B. JOHNSON, Jr., Governor, State of Mississippi, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 3580.

United States District Court S. D. Mississippi, Jackson Division.

October 20, 1964.

L. H. Rosenthal, Jackson, Miss., Kunstler, Kunstler & Kinoy, New York City, Morton Stavis, Newark, N. J., Smith, Waltzer, Jones & Peebles, Bruce C. Waltzer, New Orleans, La., Mel Wulf, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Joe T. Patterson, Atty. Gen., William A. Allain, Peter M. Stockett, Jr., Assts. to Atty. Gen., Jackson, Miss., for defendants.

Before GRIFFIN B. BELL, Circuit Judge, and CLAYTON and COX, District Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiffs sue under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 for a declaratory judgment to test the constitutional validity of Senate Bill 1783, Mississippi Laws 1964, which became effective on April 23, 1964.¹

The plaintiff (Gray) was a candidate for the United States Senate in Mississippi and was defeated in the June 2, 1964, primary. The plaintiff (Wallace) was registered to vote in Forrest County, Mississippi, on May 6, 1964, but had not obtained a poll tax receipt to identify her and entitle her to vote in said primary under the requirements of said act. The defendants are the Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General of the State and representative members of the State Board of Election Commissioners, the County Election Commissioners and County Democratic Executive Committees charged with the duty and responsibility of conducting primary, special and general elections in Mississippi. The Complaint designates Ceda Wallace as a plaintiff but she appears registered as Ceola Wallace. Of course, Gray has no interest in the general election as a candidate since she was defeated in the primary, but Wallace has no poll tax receipt, and she will need such a receipt if she is to be allowed to vote in the general election on November 3, 1964. The act requires such a receipt in all primary, special and general elections. She is entitled as an interested party within the meaning of the declaratory judgment act to bring this suit to have her rights and legal relations declared by the Court, whether she truly represents anybody else or not.

The case is presented to the Court on stipulation of counsel for the parties on the pleadings, consisting of the amended complaint, answer of the defendants, motion to dismiss or abstain; and motion of the plaintiffs for a summary judgment.

The question thus posed is as to whether or not this act on its face impinges upon the twenty-fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.² The Court is thus confronted with the inescapable necessity of passing on the constitutional validity of this act.

The defendants contend that the act does not deny or abridge the right of any citizen to vote in any election "by reason of failure to pay any poll tax" but simply provides an only source of information available to election officials as to whom is qualified to vote in any election. The name, age, sex, place of residence and voting precinct would be disclosed by one of these poll tax receipts which thus serves for identification purposes.

The act provides that any voter exempted by state law from payment of the poll tax as a prerequisite to voting may vote in any election upon presenting to the election officials an exemption certificate from the circuit clerk of the county. Such a certificate once obtained suffices for all elections thereafter.³ That provision, among others, seems to belie the claimed purpose of this act. In effect it creates two procedures — one for the voter exempted by state law and another more burdensome one for those exempted by Amendment XXIV. This just will not do. This defect appears on the face of the act and thus this law is constitutionally invalid as an inescapable conclusion of law. The plaintiffs as registered voters possess the necessary requisites of being interested parties, although their appearance as representing any class be very seriously doubted. The act does not contain a savings clause. If it be infirm in any material respect, the entire enactment must fall. It may not be gainsaid from any fair reading and interpretation of the act that its onerous requirements are occasioned solely by reason of the failure of the registered voter to pay his poll tax. Such a voter after 1964, must have two such poll tax receipts, both dated on or before February 1 for the two years next preceding the election at which he offers to vote. He has thus been excused literally from paying the tax as such but by reason of the non-payment thereof he has been required to get the requisite poll tax receipts within a fixed time from the sheriff who is not an election official or the custodian of registration records or data. He is the official who collects and receipts for the poll taxes from persons who wish to vote in state elections.

The word "abridge", according to Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, means to diminish or curtail; to deprive, to cutoff. When the word is used in connection with and following the word "deny", it means to circumscribe or burden. It was the clear intention and purpose of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution that neither the United States, nor any state should impair the vested right of a duly registered voter to vote by reason of his failure to pay a poll tax. No state is thus permitted to circumscribe or burden or impair or impede the right of a voter to the free and effective exercise and enjoyment of his franchise in any election for a Federal official "by reason of failure to pay any poll tax", as the amendment expressly provides. The same view was expressed by a Three Judge United States District Court in the Eastern District of Virginia, in Lars and Forssenius v. Harman, Civil Action No. 3897, and Henderson v. Harman, D.C., 235 F.Supp. 66 decided May 29, 1964.

The Court is thus of the opinion that Senate Bill 1783, Mississippi Laws 1964, is unconstitutional, as being in violation of the Twenty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The plaintiffs' motion for a summary judgment will, therefore, be sustained because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment as a matter of law. The defendants' motions to dismiss or abstain will be overruled even though no state court has passed on the validity of said act. George W. Doud v. Orville Hodge, 350 U.S. 485, 76 S.Ct. 491, 100 L.Ed. 577. The defendants admit in their answer that the act will be applied and enforced until its enforcement is enjoined. That will be done. A judgment will be prepared and entered by the Court to declare ...