Gray v. Mayor, Etc., of Griffin

• Decision Date: 13 July 1900
• Parties: GRAY v. MAYOR, ETC., OF GRIFFIN.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

36 S.E. 792

111 Ga. 361

GRAY v. MAYOR, ETC., OF GRIFFIN.

Supreme Court of Georgia

July 13, 1900

Syllabus by the Court.

1. In erecting and maintaining a city prison a municipal corporation is exercising a purely governmental functions and is, therefore, not liable in damages to a person arrested and imprisoned therein by its police officers, for injuries sustained by him, while so confined, by reason of the improper construction or negligent maintenance of such prison.

2. A municipal corporation is not liable for the illegal arrest of a person by its police officers, nor for his consequent imprisonment.

3. Nor is a city liable in damages because its mayor required of a person charged with a violation of a city ordinance a larger bond for his appearance than the law authorized, even if the failure of such person to give bond and his consequent confinement were occasioned thereby.

Error from superior court, Spalding county; E. J. Reagan, Judge.

Action by William E. Gray against the mayor and council of Griffin. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the complaint plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Jas Flynt and Lloyd Cleveland, for plaintiff in error.

Wm. H. Beck, and O. H. P. Slaton, for defendant in error.

FISH J.

Taking the allegations of the plaintiff's petition to be true as we must do upon demurrer, he certainly has just and great cause to complain of the needless hardships and suffering which he endured while confined in the city guard house. But, however strongly the story of his sufferings may appeal to our sentiments of humanity, the law affords him no redress against the municipality. The general rule is well established that a municipal corporation is not liable in damages for injuries sustained by reason of the negligent or improper exercise of a purely governmental power. The preservation of the public peace, quiet, good order, etc., of a community, is a governmental function. Where the legislative authority of a city passes ordinances for such purposes, it is clearly exercising a governmental power. When, for the purpose of enforcing such ordinances, the city erects and maintains a prison wherein to confine offenders, for the purpose of punishment, or those charged with offenses, for safe-keeping until they can be tried, it is exercising the same power. The enactment of such ordinances, and the provisions made for their enforcement, belong to the police power, which is purely governmental in character. In Love v. City of Atlanta, 95 Ga. 129, 22 S.E. 29, this court held that as "the duty of keeping the streets clear of putrid and other substances offensive to the sense of smell, and which tend to imperil the public health, devolves, under the charter of the city of Atlanta, upon the board of health of that city, and the functions of this department of the city government being governmental, and not purely administrative, in their character, it follows that if, in the exercise of such functions, and in the discharge of the duties devolving upon this department thereunder, a private citizen is injured by the negligence of one of its servants in and about such work, no right of action arises against the city." In the opinion, Mr. Justice Atkinson said: "The principle of nonliability rests upon the broad ground that, in the discharge of its purely governmental functions, a corporate body to which has been delegated a portion of the sovereign power is not liable for torts committed in the discharge of such duties, and in the exercise of such powers." In Bartlett v. City of Columbus, 101 Ga. 300, 28 S.E. 599, it was held that "a municipal corporation is not liable, in an action for false imprisonment, for damages alleged to have been occasioned to the plaintiff by reason of his imprisonment under a judgment rendered against him by a municipal court for the violation of an ordinance; and this is true though such judgment may have been irregular, erroneous, or even void." In Nisbet v. City of Atlanta, 97 Ga. 650, 25 S.E. 173, it was held that "a municipal corporation is not liable in damages for the death of one convicted in a corporation court and sentenced to work upon the public streets, although his death was occasioned while the convict was engaged in such work, and resulted from negligence on the part of the foreman who had been placed by the municipal authorities in charge thereof, and from the failure of such foreman to provide the convict, after his injury, with proper medical attention and treatment." In the opinion Mr. Justice Lumpkin said: "Neither the law of master and servant, nor the doctrine of respondent superior, applies" in such a case, "because in such matters the municipal corporation is exercising governmental powers and discharging governmental duties, in the course of which it, of necessity, employs the services of the officer in question." In the case of Brown's Adm'r v. Town of Guyan dotte, 12 S.E. 707, the supreme court of West Virginia held that "a town is not liable for damages for the death of a person caused by the burning of its jail while such person was confined therein for a violation of its ordinances, though such fire was attributable to the wrongful act or negligence of the officers or agents of the town." Brannon, J., in the opinion, said, "I think the duty and function of keeping a jail, and confining therein offenders against the municipal ordinances of a town, are plainly purely governmental in character." In La Clef v. City of Concordia, 41 Kan. 323, 21 P. 272, it was held that, "where a person is confined in a city prison upon conviction for disturbing the peace and quiet of the city, the city is not liable for damages for injuries sustained by reason of the bad character of the prison, or the negligence of the officer in charge of the same." This decision was followed in City of New Kiowa v. Craven, 46 Kan. 114, 26 P. 426, where an administratrix sought to recover from a city damages for the death of her intestate husband, alleged to have been caused by his confinement and exposure in an unhealthy, uninhabitable, and filthy prison. In Gullikson v. McDonald, 62 Minn. 278, 64 N.W. 812, it was held that "a municipal corporation is not liable for negligently maintaining its lockup in a defective and unfit condition, by reason of which a prisoner confined therein is injured." In Blake v. City of Pontiac, 49 Ill.App. 543, a case in which damages were sought for injuries alleged to have been sustained by reason of the confinement of the plaintiff in an improperly constructed and negligently maintained city prison, it was held that the municipal corporation was not liable, and that "the building of the calaboose, and the establishing of regulations...