Gray v. Sherwood

Decision Date05 August 1983
Citation436 So.2d 836
PartiesBetty Jane GRAY, as Administratrix of the Estate of Evart Bail, deceased v. Dr. James W. SHERWOOD, Dr. Henry G. Herrod, Jr., and Dr. James T. Gascoigne, et al. 81-425.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

John T. Roach, Jr., Birmingham, for appellant.

Robert B. Harwood, Jr. of Rosen, Harwood, Cook & Sledge, Tuscaloosa, for appellees.

EMBRY, Justice.

This is a wrongful death action.

On 6 January 1980, Mr. Evart Bail died as a result of a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm while a patient of the defendant doctors at Druid City Hospital, Tuscaloosa, Alabama. During the eight days that Bail was a patient in that hospital, he was treated for pancreatitis. Betty Jane Gray, as administratrix of the estate of her father, Evart Bail, alleges his death was due to the negligence of the defendants: Dr. James W. Sherwood, Dr. Henry G. Herrod, and Dr. James T. Gascoigne and others.

The case was tried to a jury in Tuscaloosa, which returned a verdict for the three doctors. The trial court overruled Gray's motion for a new trial. This appeal followed.

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred to reversal in refusing to grant plaintiff's challenges for cause of two of the prospective jurors. With regard to this issue, Alabama Power Co. v. Henderson, 342 So.2d 323, 327 (Ala.1977) provides:

"The test to be applied is probable prejudice. Probable prejudice for any reason disqualifies a prospective juror. Qualification of a juror is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and, on appeal, this court will look to the questions propounded and the answers given by the prospective juror to see if this discretion was properly exercised...."

In Grandquest v. Williams, 273 Ala. 140, 135 So.2d 391 (1961), this court outlined a more pointed test to be used in determining when jurors could be successfully challenged for cause pursuant to the above statute:

"The test to be applied has been stated to be that of probable prejudice. Probable prejudice for any reason disqualifies a prospective juror. Mutual Building & Loan Ass'n v. Watson, 226 Ala. 526, 147 So. 817. For a juror to be impartial between the parties he must be 'indifferent as he stands unsworn'. Wilson v. State, 243 Ala. 1, 8 So.2d 422, 430."

Id., 273 Ala. at 146, 135 So.2d 391.

Under these principles of law we review the trial court's action regarding whether there was an abuse of discretion.

A similar issue was presented in Ballard v. State, 225 Ala. 202, 142 So. 668 (1932), where this court considered whether there was error in refusing the defendant's challenge for cause of a juror who, after testifying he could give the defendant a fair trial, winked at the State's solicitor [now district attorney]. Regarding the winking incident, the following statement was made:

"We think that this circumstance was prima facie an indication of a favorable consideration from the standpoint of the state. We cannot disregard what all people understand...."

Id., 225 Ala. at 203, 142 So. 668.

Ballard was reversed for the combined effect of this and another separate error.

The conduct and actions of the challenged jurors in the instant case match and surpass the degree of manifested predisposition shown by the Ballard veniremen. During the voir dire examination of the jury panel, a prospective juror, Reba Whaley, stated that defendants "Dr. Herrod and Dr. Sherwood have been our family doctors for a number of years." When asked whether that fact would affect her ability to fairly and impartially hear the evidence in the case, she responded, "I would rather not sit on it." The plaintiff's attorney did not further question Whaley.

Another prospective juror, Michael Webber, during voir dire responded: "I know Dr. Gascoigne; he is our company doctor." When asked whether he had been treated by Dr. Gascoigne, Mr. Webber replied, "Yes, sir. I have seen him on several occasions." Mr. Webber then stated: "I want to ask to be struck from this jury." Webber was asked no further questions.

There is often a close personal relationship between...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Knop v. McCain
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • December 22, 1989
    ...the standard as set forth in Alabama Power Co. v. Henderson, supra; see also Ex parte Rutledge, 523 So.2d 1118 (Ala.1988); Gray v. Sherwood, 436 So.2d 836 (Ala.1983). Juror Bailey, in responding to questions by plaintiff's counsel, stated that in her personal opinion people "are too quick t......
  • Jones v. Shea
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • July 31, 1987
    ...perhaps in part, from the necessity for trust and confidence upon the part of the patient in his physician's judgment." Gray v. Sherwood, 436 So.2d 836, 837 (Ala.1983). In Marcin v. Kipfer, 117 Ill.App.3d 1065, 454 N.E.2d 370 (1983), the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed a refusal to gra......
  • Dixon v. Hardey
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • May 24, 1991
    ...391, 395 (1961). In applying this test, we are cognizant of the "time-honored sympathy between doctor and patient." Gray v. Sherwood, 436 So.2d 836, 837 (Ala.1983). In Gray, we reversed the judgment of the trial court on the ground that two prospective jurors who had requested exclusion fro......
  • Wright By and Through Wright v. Holy Name of Jesus Medical Center
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • October 1, 1993
    ...for cause, we must conclude that the trial court should have granted the challenge for cause as to veniremember P.C. In Gray v. Sherwood, 436 So.2d 836 (Ala.1983), two veniremembers who were patients of the defendant doctors specifically asked to be struck from the jury. Similarly, in Wood ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT