Gray v. State ex rel. Brown

• Decision Date: 05 August 1966
• Docket Number: No. 16785,16785
• Citation: 406 S.W.2d 934
• Parties: Floyd GRAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas ex rel. William BROWN, Appellee. . Fort Worth
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 934

406 S.W.2d 934

Floyd GRAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas ex rel. William BROWN, Appellee.

No. 16785.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas Fort Worth.

Aug. 5, 1966.

Charles Dickens, Fort Worth, for appellant.

Doug Crouch, Crim. Dist. Atty. of Tarrant County, Gerald Weatherly, Fort Worth, for appellee.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This action was brought by the State of Texas, on relation of William Brown, a candidate for the nomination as Justice of the Peace by the Democratic Party of Justice Precinct 3 in Tarrant County, Texas. Object thereof was to have it judicially declared that Floyd Gray, victor in the election for such nomination, had forfeited his right to have his name placed on the official ballot at the general election to be held in November of 1966. Following a trial before the court, without intervention of a jury, a judgment was rendered declaring the forfeiture sought.

We reverse and render according to the application here presented by appellant Floyd Gray.

Through his own ignorance the appellant failed to comply with the provisions of law--in that he did not file a statement of campaign expenditures, etc., on a day not less than seven (7) nor more than ten (10) days prior to the day of the election at which he secured the nomination of his party. He filed such on the sixth day after the election, at the same time that he filed what would have been the supplemental report thereof.

The prime legislative aim in the enactment of the Election Code of the State of Texas was 'that the will of the people shall prevail and that true democracy shall not perish from the Lone Star State.' V.A.T.S., Election Code, Art. 1.01. Any question arising under the provisions of the Code should be decided with due consideration given that objective.

A question posed by the situation in the case before us relates to the meaning, if any, to be attributed to the word 'knowingly' in Art . 14.09 of the Election Code as applied to an occasion of 'nonfeasance', i.e., when the guilt or fault on the part of the candidate for public office (or nomination for public office) amounts only to a want of 'timely compliance' with the provisions of Art. 14.08(b). Therein it is provided that each candidate for office must file his sworn statement of gifts and loans received and of gifts, loans and payments made and all debts and obligations incurred or contracted in behalf of his candidacy at a time not less than seven (7) nor more than ten (10) days prior to the day of the election.

Art. 14.08(h) provides that 'Any candidate failing to file such sworn statement at the time provided * * * shall forfeit his right to have his name placed upon the ballot at any subsequent primary, special, or general election.' Art. 14.09 provides that 'Any candidate who shall knowingly permit or assent to the violation of any provision of this Chapter (Chapter 14 of the Election Code of which Art. 14.08 is also a part) by any campaign manager or assistant campaign manager, or other person, shall thereby forfeit his right to have his name placed upon the primary ballot, or if nominated in the primary election, to have his name placed on the official ballot at the general election.' It was upon the forfeiture provisions of Art. 14.09 that the State and its relator prayed for the relief decreed by the trial court.

Though Art. 14.08(b) of the Election Code has been since amended, such amendments would not affect the application of principles of construction theretofore made in the case of State ex rel. Butchofsky v. Crawford et al., 269 S.W.2d 536 (El Paso Civ.App., 1954, no writ history). In that case the candidate had failed to timely file his sworn statement within the time provided by the article (Art. 14.08(b)), there having been a delay of one day. Of this the candidate who had been defeated by Crawford in a primary election sought advantage. After reviewing various cases, to be noted in the opinion, the court held that said article should be treated as Directory as to the time when the statement was required to be filed, and that the matter of whether a candidate's failure in such respect should occasion the imposition of the prescribed penalty would be determined under the facts and circumstances of each case. In that connection the court opined that the legislative purpose of requiring expense statements was to serve the electorate in that such would be open for public inspection that the voters might determine what persons were influencing by contributing money or credit or other substantial aid to the candidate so that all might intelligently determine whether or not they should support him. The holding of the court was that there had been a substantial compliance with such legislative purpose.

Neither before the aforesaid section of Art. 14.08 was amended, nor afterward, was there any specific expression made a part thereof relative to any violation being 'knowingly' committed, nor as to any compliance therewith being 'knowingly' omitted. Section (h) of Art. 14.08 and Art. 14.09 have not undergone amendmen...