Grayson v. Town of Huntington

• Court: New York Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: JAMES A. GOWAN
• Citation: Grayson v. Town of Huntington, 545 N.Y.S.2d 633, 144 Misc.2d 1064 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989)
• Decision Date: 29 June 1989
• Parties: Gerald H. GRAYSON, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF HUNTINGTON, Huntington Housing Authority, John J. O'Neil, Richard Hanse, Sandra P. Triolo, James F. Gaughran, and Daniel Martin, as the Town Board of the Town of Huntington, William J. Byrne, Andrew L. Cisternino, Stanley D. Levin, Alexander G. McKay, Roger J. Hennessey, Virginia M. Earing, W. Gerard Asher, and James J. Finkle, as the Planning Board of the Town of Huntington, Royal Thompson, as Chairman of the Huntington Housing Authority, and Edith Embler, as Executive Director of the Huntington Housing Authority, Defendants.

Page 633

545 N.Y.S.2d 633

144 Misc.2d 1064

Gerald H. GRAYSON, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF HUNTINGTON, Huntington Housing Authority, John J O'Neil, Richard Hanse, Sandra P. Triolo, James F. Gaughran and Daniel Martin, as the Town Board of the Town of Huntington, William J. Byrne, Andrew L. Cisternino, Stanley D. Levin, Alexander G. McKay, Roger J. Hennessey, Virginia M. Earing, W. Gerard Asher, and James J. Finkle, as the Planning Board of the Town of Huntington, Royal Thompson, as Chairman of the Huntington Housing Authority, and Edith Embler, as Executive Director of the Huntington Housing Authority, Defendants.

Supreme Court, Suffolk County Trial Term, Part VII.

June 29, 1989.

Certilman, Haft, Balin, Buckley, Kremer & Hyman, East Meadow, for plaintiff.

Cahn, Wishod, Wishod & Lamb, Melville, for the Town of Huntington and for defendants, O'Neil, Hanse, Triolo, Gaughran, and Martin, as the Town Bd. of Town of Huntington.

Francis M. Neary, P.C., Huntington, for Huntington Housing Authority.

JAMES A. GOWAN, Judge.

Plaintiff, GERALD H. GRAYSON has commenced this declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that defendants, TOWN OF HUNTINGTON (TOWN) and JOHN O'NEIL, RICHARD HANSE, SANDRA TRIOLO, JAMES GAUGHRAN and DANIEL MARTIN, constituting the TOWN BOARD OF THE TOWN OF HUNTINGTON (TOWN BOARD) may not alienate a piece of real property, owned by the TOWN, (described on the Suffolk County Land and Tax Map as Section 270, Block 2, Lot 5) to defendant, HUNTINGTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, for use and development as low-income housing. The plaintiff bases his claim for relief upon the premise that the property in issue is "parkland" which cannot be alienated by the TOWN without the approval of the New York State Legislature.

The plaintiff also seeks to enjoin the defendants from diverting the property to any use other than parkland without the express authority of the State Legislature.

Now before this Court is a motion by the defendant, HUNTINGTON HOUSING AUTHORITY (HOUSING AUTHORITY), ROYAL THOMPSON, as Chairman of the HOUSING AUTHORITY, and EDITH EMBLER, Executive Director of the HOUSING AUTHORITY, seeking summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212, dismissing the complaint. The grounds are that pursuant to Public Housing Law Section 124, the TOWN possessed the authority to convey the subject property to the HOUSING AUTHORITY, even if it was parkland. Alternatively, it is urged that the property was not "parkland", despite its being referred to as such.

The TOWN and the TOWN BOARD have also joined in this motion.

The plaintiff opposes the defendants' motion and, at the same time, cross-moves pursuant to CPLR 3025(b), for leave to amend his complaint in order to add the following causes of action:

(1) The proposed housing project is violative of Public Housing Law Section 150;

(2) The resolution passed by the TOWN BOARD violated Town Law Sections 64 and 90; and

(3) The TOWN BOARD'S passage of the resolution approving the HOUSING AUTHORITY's application for rezoning of the property from an R-40 zoning district to an R-3M zoning district was arbitrary and constituted impermissible "spot zoning."

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The TOWN OF HUNTINGTON has held title to the property since its acquisition in 1699. Over the years, the property remained in an undeveloped state and appears to have been designated as parkland by at least one Town Department, to wit: the Assessor. In 1985, the HOUSING AUTHORITY obtained approval from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for the funding of public housing. After considering various locations, the HOUSING AUTHORITY recommended to the TOWN BOARD that the property, which is the subject of this lawsuit would be the best site for the construction of a 50-unit low-income housing project. In May of 1985, the HOUSING AUTHORITY filed an application with the TOWN, seeking a change of zone from its classification as one-acre residential (R-40) to garden apartment use (R-3M). This matter was referred to the TOWN PLANNING BOARD, which recommended a public hearing on the proposed rezoning.

While approval of the rezoning application was pending, the TOWN ATTORNEY's office made inquiry of the New York State Comptroller's Office as to whether the approval of the New York State Legislature was necessary to commit the property to a use other than parkland. By letter dated June 3, 1986, Associate Counsel for the State Comptroller notified the TOWN that no opinion could be expressed by his office regarding whether the property had been dedicated to park purposes and, therefore, left unanswered the question of whether State Legislative approval was necessary in order to terminate its status as parkland.

In the meanwhile, processing of the rezoning application continued. By resolution dated December 22, 1987, the TOWN BOARD changed the zoning classification from R-40 to R-3M and declared that it was the intent of the TOWN BOARD to convey the property to a "turnkey" developer (as defined by HUD regulations), for development and ultimate conveyance to the HOUSING AUTHORITY.

Thereafter, an action was commenced pursuant to CPLR Article 78 to annul the resolution of the TOWN BOARD. In addition, the plaintiff commenced the instant action seeking a judgment declaring the property affected by the resolution to be parkland, which could not be reclassified for other purposes without the approval of the State Legislature.

In the CPLR Article 78 proceeding, this Court (GOWAN, J.), in a decision dated July 1, 1988, annulled the determination of the TOWN BOARD and remitted the proceeding for further analysis of the long-term demographic effects of the proposed zoning reclassification on the population pattern and community character, as required by the Environmental Conservation Law.

In light of the aforementioned determination, the Court declined to address the contentions raised in the declaratory judgment action.

The judgment subsequently entered in accordance with the above decision was appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department, who determined that the TOWN had adequately considered the impact of the project upon the population patterns and community character of the surrounding area. The Appellate Division remitted the declaratory judgment action to this Court for a decision on the motions presented by the parties. (see, Matter of Strathmore Hills Civic Assn. v. Town of Huntington, 146 A.D.2d 783, 537 N.Y.S.2d 264).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Initially, the defendants contend that the reclassification of the property from parkland to another use did not require the approval of the State Legislature. In support of this premise, the defendants rely upon Public Housing Law Section 124, which states:

"124. Grant or lease of property by a government to or for an authority.

In connection with projects located within its territorial boundaries, a government may, notwithstanding any other provisions of law, upon such terms, with or without consideration, as it may deem advisable, grant, convey or lease any of its property, whether held in a proprietary or governmental capacity, to an authority or government, including real property already devoted to a public use, provided that the government making the grant or lease determines that the premises are no longer required for the public use to which the property is devoted and that it is to the interest of the government to grant or lease the property to the authority for the purposes of this chapter. Notwithstanding any general, special or local law and any limitation or prohibition which may be contained therein against the power of alienation, any grant, sale, conveyance or lease may be made by a government to an authority or government in connection with a project, without appraisal, public notice, advertisement or public bidding. The finding of the government having jurisdiction that the property is no longer required for the public purpose for which it is devoted and that it is to the best interest of the government involved to grant or lease the property, shall be conclusive."

In opposition, the plaintiff argues that Public Housing Law Section 124 is inapplicable to the circumstances at issue herein because:

(1) Parklands are excluded from the ambit of the statute;

(2) Conveyance of the property was not made directly to the HOUSING AUTHORITY, but rather to a "turnkey" developer; and

(3) The character of the property is not that to which the statute is directed.

GRAYSON's urging that Public Housing Law Section 124 is inapposite to this action is without merit. Public Housing Law Section 124, by its own terms, applies to the transfer of "any" governmental property, so long as the requirements of the statute have been satisfied. Assuming, without determining, that the property is parkland, courts are not required to give a statute a narrow meaning which defeats the general purpose and manifest policy intended to be promoted (see, McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Book 1, Statutes Section 96; 56 N.Y.Jur., Statutes, Section 223). Generally, words are to be given their usual and commonly understood meaning (see, e.g., We're Associates Co. v. Cohen, Stracher & Bloom, P.C., 65 N.Y.2d 148, 151, 490 N.Y.S.2d 743, 480 N.E.2d 357). Guided by these tenets of statutory construction, and mindful that the alienation of dedicated park areas in New York, for other than park purposes, requires the approval of the State Legislature (see, Matter of Ackerman v. Steisel, 104 A.D.2d 940, 480 N.Y.S.2d 556, aff'd 66 N.Y.2d 833, 498 N.Y.S.2d 364, 489 N.E.2d 251; Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y. 248, 253, 128 N.E. 121; Matter of Douglaston & Little Neck Coalition v. Sexton, 145 A.D.2d 480, 535 N.Y.S.2d 634), this Court concludes that the alienation of the subject property for use as low-income housing was lawful pursuant to Public Housing Law Section 124, notwithstanding the lack of such approval.

The plaintiff further...