Graziani, In re, 91-024

Decision Date05 April 1991
Docket NumberNo. 91-024,91-024
Citation591 A.2d 91,156 Vt. 278
CourtVermont Supreme Court
PartiesIn re Paul B. GRAZIANI.

E.M. Allen, Defender Gen., and William A. Nelson, Appellate Atty., Montpelier, for petitioner-appellant.

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Atty. Gen., and David Tartter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Montpelier, for respondent-appellee.

Before ALLEN, C.J., and GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.

DOOLEY, Justice.

Petitioner Paul Graziani appeals from the superior court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.

On the evening of May 29, 1990, a bomb exploded on the front porch of a residence in Torrington, Connecticut. Following an investigation by the Torrington Police Department, the State of Connecticut charged petitioner with arson, manufacture of a bomb, reckless endangerment, possession of a sawed-off shotgun, and violation of probation. On August 16, 1990, the Governor of Connecticut requested extradition of petitioner from Vermont.

The requisition warrant was accompanied by the following documents: (1) an "Information," dated June 22, 1990, charging petitioner with arson, manufacture of a bomb, and reckless endangerment; (2) an "Application for Arrest Warrant," signed by an assistant state's attorney and dated June 22, 1990, including a six-page affidavit signed and sworn to by a Torrington police officer before a police sergeant, who apparently is also a notary; (3) a "Finding," preprinted on the arrest warrant application and signed by a superior court judge, stating that "there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the accused committed it and, therefore, that probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the above-named accused"; (4) an arrest warrant, signed by a superior court judge and dated June 22, 1990; (5) an "Information," dated June 29, 1990, charging petitioner with possession of a sawed-off shotgun; (6) a form entitled "Application for Arrest Warrant," signed by a deputy assistant state's attorney and dated June 22, 1990, including a three-page affidavit, signed and sworn to by a Torrington Police Department sergeant before a police lieutenant, who apparently is a notary; (7) a "Finding," preprinted on the application described in (6) and signed by a superior court judge, stating that "probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the above named accused"; and (8) an arrest warrant, signed by a superior court judge and dated June 29, 1990. On September 13th, the Governor of Vermont issued a warrant for the arrest of petitioner, who was subsequently apprehended. Petitioner brought this habeas corpus petition to prevent his extradition.

Petitioner complained that the documents filed in support of Connecticut's extradition demand failed to comply with Vermont's codification of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 13 V.S.A. §§ 4941-4969. According to petitioner, the extradition demand was defective because the accompanying affidavits were sworn to before a police officer, rather than "before a magistrate," as required by § 4943. The trial court concluded that, taken as a whole, the materials accompanying the warrant--an "affidavit notarized by a police officer, a finding of probable cause by a judicial officer and a warrant"--satisfied the requirements of the Act. On appeal, petitioner claims that the trial court erred in ruling that the documents satisfied the requirement of an "affidavit made before a magistrate." The State advances an alternative ground for affirmance under § 4943, that the requisition warrant included "an information supported by affidavit."

We have emphasized that review in this Court is limited to "the validity of the demanding warrant and the procedural compliance with the requirements for rendition. If those are in order, we look no further in this proceeding." In re Everett, 139 Vt. 317, 319, 427 A.2d 349, 350 (1981). Under 13 V.S.A. § 4943(a), an extradition demand for a person who is charged with a crime in the demanding state must be accompanied by a copy of one of the following documents: (1) an indictment; (2) an information supported by affidavit; or (3) an affidavit made before a magistrate. Subsection (b) of § 4943 states that an extradition warrant shall not be issued unless the accompanying documents "show that ... [the person] is lawfully charged by indictment found or by information filed by a prosecuting officer and supported by affidavit to the facts, or by affidavit made before a magistrate." These two sections provide the bases for the issuance of an extradition warrant and must be read together. See Rayburn v. State, 366 So.2d 698, 702 (Ala.Crim.App.1978), aff'd, 366 So.2d 708 (Ala.1979) (applying identical provisions in Alabama Act).

In this case, the two affidavits submitted with the extradition warrant were sworn to by officers from the Torrington Police Department before police officers who apparently were notaries. Neither was "made before a magistrate." The trial court concluded that the accompanying arrest warrant, signed by a superior court judge, vindicated the warrant. We do not decide whether these materials, viewed in their entirety, satisfy the "affidavit made before a magistrate" ground of § 4943; rather, we conclude that the denial of the petition must be affirmed because the extradition demand included "an information filed by a prosecuting officer and supported by affidavit to the facts." See State v. Greenia, 147 Vt. 596, 597, 522 A.2d 242, 243 (1987) (decision of trial court may be affirmed on any legal ground, even though trial court based its ruling upon another ground).

The extradition demand was supported by two "Information" forms from a Connecticut state's attorney's office. The first was signed by an assistant state's attorney, the latter was signed by a deputy assistant state's attorney. Either of these documents satisfy the "information filed by a prosecuting officer" language of § 4943. They are sworn to by the prosecuting officer and are accompanied by detailed affidavits, sworn to by Torrington Police Department officers. These informations and affidavits satisfy the "supported by affidavit" requirement of the statute.

Petitioner makes two arguments against this conclusion. The first is that there is nothing to show that the informations were filed by the prosecutor or anyone else, a specific requirement of § 4943. At best, petitioner is raising a "mere technical error" in the extradition documents. See In re Ropp, 149 Vt. 269, 274, 541 A.2d 86, 90 (1988). The information, dated June 22, 1990, is accompanied by an affidavit of June 21, 1990 on a form entitled "Application for Arrest Warrant." On the bottom of the form is a finding of a superior judge, dated June 22, 1990, that probable cause exists for issuance of an arrest warrant. An arrest warrant was issued on that date. To accept petitioner's argument, we would have to conclude that the court ordered the arrest of petitioner based on an information that had never been filed. We believe that the action of the court was sufficient to establish filing by a prosecuting officer.

Petitioner's second argument is that the affidavit supporting the information must be made by the prosecuting officer; an affidavit of a police officer is insufficient. He correctly points out that this Court, in a previous case, appeared to construe § 4943 to require an information filed by a prosecuting officer to be supported by "an affidavit of fact by the prosecuting offi...

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7 cases
  • In re Handy
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 17 Noviembre 2000
    ...granted only under the amended bylaws. Rather than read an unnecessary limitation into the statutory language, see In re Graziani, 156 Vt. 278, 282, 591 A.2d 91, 94 (1991) ("we ordinarily do not assume that words are used in a more limited sense than their plain meaning"), we assume that th......
  • American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania v. Nordic Leasing, Inc.
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    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • 9 Diciembre 1994
    ...we must presume the legislature intended to use the term according to its commonly accepted meaning at the time. See In re Graziani, 156 Vt. 278, 282, 591 A.2d 91, 94 (1991) (Vermont Supreme Court does not ordinarily assume that words are used in a more limited sense than their plain meanin......
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    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 27 Enero 1995
    ...fair trial. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of his petition without addressing his first argument. See In re Graziani, 156 Vt. 278, 280, 591 A.2d 91, 93 (1991) (decision of trial court may be affirmed on any legal ground, even if the trial court's ruling is based upon another A. A New ......
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    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 13 Diciembre 1991
    ...a proper construction of the statute. In construing a statute, we look first to the plain meaning of the words used. In re Graziani, 156 Vt. 278, 282, 591 A.2d 91, 94 (1991). The prohibition of § 2632(a)(6) extends to any "person" without regard to gender. Thus, "any person," either male or......
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