Graziano v. Lanuto

• Decision Date: 23 December 1924
• Parties: GRAZIANO v. LANUTO.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

127 A. 109

GRAZIANO

v. LANUTO.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Dec. 23, 1924.

Bill by Francesco Graziano against Natale Lanuto for cancellation of deeds. On final hearing. Decree setting aside conveyances advised.

Morris V. McDonald, of Vineland, for complainant.

Thomas G. Tuso, of Vineland, for defendant.

INGERSOLL, V. C. The complainant is an Italian, now of the age of 59. He left Italy in 1888, and after a stay in Canada came to Philadelphia. In each of these places he worked as a common laborer. In 1897 he came to New Jersey and bought brush land in the neighborhood of Vineland, about 30 acres of which he has cleared and has built a small house and some farm buildings, all of a very inferior character.

He was married in Italy, and some time after his arrival his wife joined him. By that marriage there were born eight children, of whom five are still living. None of the children are living with him. His wife died in 1914, and from that time until 1922 he lived alone on his property. On the 11th day of February, 1922, he was introduced to Rose Caranti by a "matchmaker" in Brooklyn, N. Y., and immediately married her. In a day or two they came to Vineland, but they remained at a neighbor's (John Ardito's) house for about a week. She then went to his home. She secured from him about $800 in money, evidently by threatening to refuse him conjugal relations.

The next night after she obtained the money (about the 1st of March, 1922) she left his home and returned to Ardito's house, and remained 8 months. At that time, ascertaining from Ardito that his wife was at his (Ardito's) house, Graziano called to see her. This interview and others following it resulted in the complainant, as he says, agreeing to make a will, giving to her son (Lanuto), the defendant, his property, upon the condition that he (Lanuto) support him during his life. Lanuto came from New York, and a visit was made by Graziano, his wife, and Lanuto to the office of one Frank De Luca, a member of the bar of this state, who acted "as counsel for all three." Graziano did not have his title deeds with him at that time, and left to get his papers, and returned several days later, when a deed was drawn and executed by complainant and wife to Lanuto, conveying all his property, but reserving the use to Graziano and his wife for the term of their natural lives. This deed was acknowledged before De Luca, and was held by him without record until January 9th, when it was recorded.

On January 18th Graziano and his wife called at De Luca's office, and a quitclaim deed was drawn and executed by Graziano and his wife to Lanuto, in which it was stipulated that—

"The specific intent of this quitclaim deed is that grantors release and surrender said life use or estate in the last mentioned deed reserved, and convey all their right, title, and interest in said premises to the grantee, to the end that title to the same shall be vested absolutely and in fee simple in the said Natale Lanuto, without any restrictions or reservations whatsoever."

The acknowledgment of this deed was also taken by De Luca. This deed was not recorded at once, but was held until the 14th day of February, 1923. Graziano insists that at all times he understood he was making a "testament"; that is, giving the property to Lanuto after his (Graziano's) death, upon condition that Lanuto support him during his lifetime.

On the 11th day of February, 1923, according to the file in a proceeding for divorce filed by Graziano against his wife, she left him, and on June 25, 1923, entered into a bigamous marriage with one Frank Berenato. A decree nisi was entered on June 26, 1924.

Lanuto stayed a short time at the farm, and then returned to New York; Graziano remaining on the premises, where he has since lived.

This case comes within the rule as laid down in Slack v. Rees, 66 N. J. Eq. 447, at page 448, 59 A. 466, 467 (69 L. R. A. 393):

"That the absence of such [competent and independent] advice will invalidate a deed of gift, which contains no power of revocation, where a relation of trust and confidence exists between the donor and donee, is not denied, and, indeed, it was so held by the vice chancellor. He seems to have considered, however, that such relationship was not shown, unless it was made to appear that the donee occupied such a dominant position toward the donor as to raise the presumption that the latter was without power to assert his will in opposition to that of the donee. But this is not the situation. The rule has a much broader sweep. Its purpose is not so much to afford protection to the donor against the consequences of undue influence exercised over him by the donee as it is to afford him protection against the consequences of voluntary action on his part, induced by the existence of the relationship between them, the effect of which, upon his own interests, he may only partially understand or appreciate. The following citations from our own decisions make this plain: 'In all transactions between parties occupying relations, whether legal, natural, or conventional in their origin, in which confidence is naturally inspired, or, in fact, reasonably exists, the burden of proof is thrown upon the person in whom the confidence is reposed, and who has acquired an advantage, to show affirmatively not only that no deception was practiced therein, no undue influence used, and that all was fair, open, and voluntary, but that it was well understood.' Hall v. Otterson, 7 Dick. Ch. Rep. 528; s. c., on appeal, 8 Dick. Ch. Rep. 695. 'Where parties hold positions in which one is more or less dependent upon the other, courts of equity hold that the weaker party must be protected, and they set aside his gifts if he had not proper advice, independently of the other.' Haydock v. Haydock. 7 Stew. Eq. 575. 'The rule to be gathered from the English and American cases is that the burden of proof is cast upon the donee to establish that the donor fully appreciated what he was doing, or, at all events, in the doing had the benefit of disinterested and competent advice.' Coffey v. Sullivan, 18 Dick. Ch. Rep. 302."

In Post v. Hagan, 71 N. J. Eq. 234, 65 A. 1026, 124 Am. St. Rep. 997, Mr. Justice Garrison, in delivering the opinion of the Court of Errors and Appeals, said:

"Proper independent advice in this connection means that the donor had the preliminary benefit of conferring fully and privately upon the subject of his intended gift with a person who was not only competent to inform him correctly as to its legal effect, but who was furthermore so disassociated from the interests of the donee as to be in a position to advise with the donor impartially and confidently as to the consequences to himself of his proposed benefaction."

Consideration of the testimony can leave-no doubt of the domination of this wife over the mind of the husband. Nor can there be any doubt but that that domination was sufficient and actually was the cause of the...