Greason v. Cumberland R. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 October 1913
• Docket Number: 8-1913
• Citation: 54 Pa.Super. 595
• Parties: Greason v. Cumberland Railway Company
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

54 Pa.Super. 595

Greason v. Cumberland Railway Company

No. 8-1913

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

October 13, 1913

Argued March 10, 1913

Appeal by Thomas M. Derr, from order of C.P. Cumberland Co.-1909 No. 12, for contempt in case of David L. Greason v Cumberland Railway Company.

Rule to show cause why Thomas M. Derr should not be punished for contempt of court. Before Sadler, P. J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.

Error assigned was order adjudging the respondent guilty of contempt of court and fining him $ 25.00.

Affirmed.

E. M Biddle, Jr., with him F. B. Sellers, Jr., for appellant, cited: Com. v. Newton, 1 Grant (Pa.), 453; Crilly v. Hemm, 27 Pa.Super. 635; Aurentz v. Porter, 48 Pa. 335; Garis's App., 185 Pa. 497; Hummel's Case, 9 Watts, 416; Lerch's Contested Election, 21 Pa. Dist. 1113; In re Hirst & Ingersoll, 9 Phila. 216; Doan's Case, 5 Pa. Dist. 211; Dolan's Case, 6 Pa. Dist. 578; Com. v. Gibbons, 9 Pa.Super. 527.

G. Wilson Swartz, for appellee, cited: Com. v. Davis, 1 W.N.C. 18; State v. Cowan, 38 Tenn. 280; U.S. v. Reed, 2 Blatch. 435; Doan's Case, 5 Pa. Dist. 211.

Before Rice, P. J., Henderson, Morrison, Orlady, Head and Porter, JJ.

OPINION

ORLADY, J.

Thomas M. Derr was adjudged guilty of contempt of court and ordered to pay a fine of $ 25.00 for the use of Cumberland county. The facts of the case are substantially as follows: David L. Greason brought an action of trespass against the Cumberland Railway Company to recover damages suffered by him by reason of the construction and operation of a trolley road of the said company over his property in Cumberland county. A jury trial was had and resulted in a verdict in plaintiff's favor, which was set aside and a new trial ordered. On November 20, 1911, a jury in the second case was impaneled, and by agreement of counsel the court directed the sheriff to take the jury upon the ground to view the premises in question, in order that they would more fully understand the facts as developed on the trial. Thomas M. Derr, this appellant, resides near the farm of David L. Greason, whose land was being taken by the trolley company. He had been a witness for his neighbor, Greason, on the first trial and expected to be called as a witness on the second trial. He evidenced considerable interest in the case, conferred with Greason in reference to it, and accompanied him when he subpoenaed his witnesses, consulted with counsel and in a general way assisted in the preparation of Greason's case against the trolley company.

One of the jurors, Solomon Shelton, and Derr had been intimate acquaintances for many years, and after the jury of view had inspected the premises they were permitted to return to their homes for the night. During the ride on the car to their homes, Derr engaged Shelton in conversation and manifested considerable ill feeling against a Mr. Pascoe, who was the superintendent or manager of the trolley company, with whom he had a controversy in regard to the location of a trolley pole which had been erected by the company and cut down by Derr, speaking of him as " Such a big liar, you can't believe anything he says." And when Shelton replied by saying that he didn't know Pascoe was that kind of a man, the statement was repeated and emphasized.

It must be conceded from the facts in the case that Derr had a very pronounced ill feeling towards Pascoe; that he communicated this to Shelton; that his grievance against the trolley company was due to the alleged unfair treatment of Pascoe to him; that from his interest in the case of Greason against the trolley company his conversation with Shelton was intended to have the effect of prejudicing the juror against the defendant company, or at least against its general manager, who was in charge of the construction of the road and who had fixed the location of the line of which the plaintiff complains. Having served as sheriff of the county he was familiar with the care universally given to protect jurors from outside influence. With these admitted facts, was this such a case of contempt as to justify the court in finding him guilty and imposing the fine? The offense, if any, was not committed in the actual presence of the court, nor during the trial of the case in the court room. The jurors had been regularly impaneled and in the discharge of one of their duties they had been directed to view the premises, and between the adjournment and convening of the court this conversation occurred.

It has been universally recognized that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in the courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and writs of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice. It is a power inherent in all courts of record, and coexisting with them by the wise provisions of the common law: 7 Cyc., p. 30.

Any attempt, whether by a venal offer, or other influence to affect the mind of a juror who has been duly impaneled, is as much an interference with the administration of the law as any that could be suggested. It has been held that approaching a juror for the purpose of influencing his action is a contempt: In re Cuddy, 131 U.S. 280, 33 L.Ed. 154, 9 S.Ct. 703. Influencing a witness to absent himself has been held to be a contempt: Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210; Montgomery v. Palmer, 100 Mich. 436, 59 N.W. 148; 7 Cyc. 65; 17 Cyc. 1210. If a juror has been exposed to improper influence which may have affected the verdict, the presumption is ordinarily against the purity of the verdict: 17 Cyc. 1212.

The place where the conversation occurred is not controlling. The intention of the law being to preserve the juror's mind free from any contamination. Ex-sheriff Derr, this appellant, the friend and advisor of Greason as well as the friend of Shelton the juror, could have had but one purpose in view in maligning or attacking the credibility of the superintendent of the defendant trolley company. There would be no question of his wrongdoing if the conversation had been had while the appellant and the juror were seated in the presence of the court, or that it would have been a disregard of, and designed to foul, the administration of the law.

This proceeding was instituted at the instance of the defendant railway company, who were the special objects of the disfavor of the appellant, and when brought to the attention of the court a rule was granted to show cause why Derr should not be punished for...