Hale v. State
| Decision Date | 17 November 1896 |
| Citation | 55 Ohio St. 210,45 N.E. 199 |
| Parties | HALE v. STATE. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Error to circuit court, Jackson county.
William T. Hale, being convicted of contempt, brings error. Affirmed.
The plaintiff in error seeks a reversal of the judgment of the circuit court, affirming a judgment of the common pleas court of Jackson county finding him guilty upon an information for contempt of court and adjudging him to pay a fine of $500 and the costs of prosecution. The information charged, in substance, that on the 28th of November, 1893, a witness named was under subpoena to appear before said court, at its session on December 1, 1893, to testify upon the trial of an indictment charging Hale with a felony; that the accused knowing that said witness was under subpoena and that she would be a material witness against him on the trial of said indictment, by promising to pay her expenses, and other promises, induced her to leave said county, and did take her from the county, and beyond the reach of the process of said court, thereby preventing the appearance of said witness at said trial, and obstructing the administration of justice. On Hale's plea of not guilty, the evidence was heard by the court, and the accused found guilty. His motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled. The latter motion challenged the jurisdiction of the court and the sufficiency of the information.
1. The general assembly is without authority to abridge the power of a court created by the constitution to punish contempts summarily, such power being inherent, and necessary to the exercise of judicial functions; and sections 6906, 6907, Rev St., will not be so construed as to impute to the general assembly an intention to abridge such power.
2. Removing a witness from the county of his residence, where he was under subpoena to attend upon the trial of a cause pending, with the purpose and effect of preventing his appearance upon the day of trial, being a wrongful act, which obstructs the administration of justice, is a contempt of court. Baldwin v. State, 11 Ohio St. 681, overruled.
Elmer C. Powell, for plaintiff in error.
John W Higgins and John T. Moore, for the State.
SHAUCK, J. (after stating the facts).
The case submitted to us concedes that the evidence produced in the court of common pleas established the allegations of the information. The question of law presented by the record here is whether that court erred in overruling the motion in arrest of judgment, which challenged the sufficiency of the information and the jurisdiction of the court to try the accused summarily. We do not understand counsel for the plaintiff in error to deny, either that the act charged was a contempt at common law, or that the court may punish summarily any act which, under the statute, is a contempt of court. Their contention is that it is within the authority of the legislature to abridge the power of courts in this regard, and that such authority has been exercised in the enactment of sections 6906 and 6907 of the Revised Statutes, which make certain acts, formerly punishable as contempts, punishable by indictment as ‘ offenses against public justice.’ The former section provides for the punishment of persons who, in the manner pointed out, evade the service of subpoenas, or refuse to appear and testify after service. It contains the express provision that ‘ this section shall not prevent summary proceedings for contempt.’ The latter section provides for the punishment of persons who ‘ corruptly, or by threats or force, endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, * * * in the discharge of his duty,’ etc.; and it is not by any express provision made cumulative to summary proceedings for contempt. It is said that the actual removal of the witness from the jurisdiction of the court, which this information charges, is wholly comprehended within the attempt to influence to which the statute affixes a penalty; and that, from the omission of words making the section cumulative to summary proceedings for contempt, it results that it is exclusive of such proceedings.
However justifiable this inference might be, if a proper view comprehended the provisions of the statute alone, it will according to a familiar rule, be a sufficient reason for rejecting it, if it leads to such an interpretation of the statute as would impute to the general assembly an intention to exercise power which it does not possess. The difference between the jurisdiction of courts and their inherent powers is too important to be overlooked. In constitutional governments their jurisdiction is conferred by the provisions of the constitutions and of statutes enacted in the exercise of legislative authority. That, however, is not true with respect to such powers as are necessary to the orderly and efficient exercise of jurisdiction. Such powers, from both their nature and their ancient exercise, must be regarded as inherent. They do not depend upon express constitutional grant, nor in any sense upon the legislative will. The power to maintain order, to secure the attendance of witnesses to the end that the rights of parties may be ascertained, and to enforce process to the end that effect may be given to judgments, must inhere in every court, or the purpose of its creation fails. Without such power, no other could be exercised. When constitutional governments were established upon this continent, there was general familiarity with the course of judicial proceedings in the administration of the common law. This power had long been exercised by courts as inherent. It was within every conception of a judicial court. The view of the subject then generally taken was stated by Chief Justice McKean, in 1788: Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 329. The power, therefore, arose upon the creation of a court, because it was implied in every conception of a court. A people does not lose majesty by achieving liberty. ...
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